Publication Date
4-25-2021
Document Type
Dissertation/Thesis
First Advisor
Warmke, Craig
Degree Name
B.A. (Bachelor of Arts)
Legacy Department
Department of Philosophy
Abstract
Leibniz's version of Idealism did not cooperate with the dominant beliefs of his time. For this reason, many set out to expose the flaws they believed to cause these Idealist arguments to fail. His critics labeled him an occasionalist due to not attributing genuine causal powers to creatures, leaving God alone to be causally efficacious in the world. Leibniz himself does not believe that his version of Idealism commits him to an occasionalist point of view, and I intend to demonstrate that Leibnizian Idealism withstands arguments that aim to label him an occasionalist for the role of God in his system of Monads.
Recommended Citation
Fuller, DeVonté, "A Response to Leibniz's Monadology" (2021). Honors Capstones. 60.
https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/studentengagement-honorscapstones/60
Extent
16 pages
Language
eng
Publisher
Northern Illinois University
Rights Statement
In Copyright
Rights Statement 2
NIU theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from Huskie Commons for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without the written permission of the authors.
Media Type
Text
