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Authors

Jon S. Faletto

Document Type

Article

Media Type

Text

Abstract

The author asserts that aggressive identification and correction of compliance problems are the best defenses in an environmental enforcement action. The purpose of the article is to provide an understanding of how civil penalties in environmental enforcement actions are calculated. The author suggests ways in which the civil penalties can be reduced and ways to secure some "return of value" to the company. The author also addresses the concept of recouping the economic benefit of non-compliance. Finally, the author suggests that there may be unanticipated consequences of settling an environmental enforcement action.

First Page

527

Last Page

552

Publication Date

7-1-1998

Department

Other

ISSN

0734-1490

Language

eng

Publisher

Northern Illinois University Law Review

Suggested Citation

Jon S. Faletto, Negotiating Resolution of Environmental Enforcement Actions, 18 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 527 (1998).

Included in

Law Commons

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