The purpose of this article is to review the development of the fiduciary duty owed in closely-held corporations. The judicially developed rule expands the ability of the courts to provide relief for shareholders who lack the voting power to force a change and has neither a statutory nor contractual right to relief. The authors identify the theoretical basis, general scope and content of the rule, as well as some other issues that still need to be decided in the course of the further development of the rule.
Northern Illinois University Law Review
Van Vliet, James M. Jr. and Snider, Mark D.
"The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap,"
Northern Illinois University Law Review: Vol. 18:
2, Article 7.
James M. Van Vliet Jr. and Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 239 (1998).