This article examines a line of precedent which has utilized the Frye standard to exclude forensic DNA evidence. An analysis of these cases provides support for the criticism that the Frye standard is subject to manipulation by those seeking to exclude evidence. Examining the scientific debate concerning the statistical interpretation of DNA evidence reveals that the Frye standard is a poor conceptual framework to evaluate an emerging forensic technique. The ambiguities of Frye allow the presentation of scientific controversy, which is inherent in any scientific advance, as constituting a lack of general acceptance. Furthermore, the adversarial nature of the Frye inquiry distorts the views of the scientific community.
Northern Illinois University Law Review
"DNA Fingerprinting: The Failings of Frye,"
Northern Illinois University Law Review: Vol. 16:
2, Article 2.
John McCabe, DNA Fingerprinting: The Failings of Frye, 16 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 455 (1996).