Strategic Behavior and Dynamic Externalities in Commercial Fisheries

Author ORCID Identifier

Anna Klis:https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5684-2870

Publication Title

Ecological Economics

ISSN

09218009

Document Type

Article

Abstract

This paper uses game theory to analyze commercial fishers’ willingness to practice conservation to recover a depleted fishery. We compare a game in which players choose their conservation effort simultaneously to a game in which there is a leader and a follower. We show that because the players ignore the effect of their conservation effort on the other player's expected benefits, their collective effort is suboptimal. When the players choose their effort sequentially, the leader puts less effort in conservation, reducing the likelihood of recovery and collective welfare.

Publication Date

3-1-2020

DOI

10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106503

Keywords

Bioeconomics, Cooperation, Game theory, Overfishing

Department

Department of Economics

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