Publication Date

2025

Document Type

Dissertation/Thesis

First Advisor

Schraufnagel, Scot

Degree Name

Ph.D. (Doctor of Philosophy)

Legacy Department

Department of Political Science

Abstract

This dissertation explains the puzzle of the survival of authoritarian regimes through a comparative study of Indonesia and Cambodia. Despite the two countries being blessed with rich natural resources and ruled by dictators for more than thirty years, Suharto in Indonesia and Hun Sen in Cambodia experienced different political fates. After ruling Indonesia for 32 years, mass protests and elite betrayals forced Suharto to step down in May 1998. He left Indonesia in a chaotic situation as riots and violence erupted in every corner of the country, and his successor had to face repeated coup attempts due to a lack of strong popular legitimacy and no firm support from the political elite. In contrast, after 38 years as the head of government, Hun Sen managed to reach an elite consensus for political succession. He agreed not to run again as Prime Minister in August 2023, but in return, he placed his son, Hun Manet, in power. This formula of dynastic succession was also applied to the regime's old guard, who occupied cabinet positions, in which Hun Manet appointed their sons as new members of the cabinet. Hun Sen bequeathed to his son a stable authoritarian regime that could manage popular support and tied the elites' interests to the regime's interests. In short, Indonesia and Cambodia represent a tale of two countries in which a durable authoritarian regime collapsed in Indonesia, while it survives in Cambodia. My research reveals that while natural resource endowments are important in building and maintaining authoritarian regimes, a viable political party in tandem with natural resources will play a crucial role in determining the fate of authoritarian regimes. Parties lay the groundwork for the “rules of the game,” and an impersonal mechanism for addressing crucial aspects of regime perpetuation. Political parties also provide an impersonal mechanism for the succession of regime leaders. More importantly, political parties perpetuate durable authoritarian regimes in weak states because it optimize the impact of the “patronage effect”: the distribution of state resources acquired through natural resource extraction by public officials or the ruling party to maintain the loyalty of the elites, co-opting oppositions, and winning public support. As a result, in Cambodia, a regime with a viable party was able to maintain elite cohesion and public support through the maintenance of patron-client networks. On the other hand, an authoritarian regime with a weak party, as was the case in Indonesia, was prone to collapse, as it lacked an impersonal mechanism for distributing patronage and rents to maintain elite cohesion and public support. The case of Indonesia under Suharto is an example of an authoritarian regime with a weak party, as power was personally centralized in the hands of Suharto. Golongan Karya (Golkar), the ruling party, did not function as an independent political organization, as its activities were heavily dependent on Suharto’s will or personality. It was Suharto who had the power to make decisions in distributing patronage and rents from personal foundations. It was only Suharto who could decide who would succeed him—a decision that he never made. In contrast, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) operates as an independent organization, where Hun Sen does not have full control over the party’s decision-making. It was the CPP that provided a channel for Hun Sen and the Cambodian elite to negotiate and perpetuate patronage distribution. Therefore, elite consensus was forged to allow for dynastic succession and the maintenance of the status quo. This would not have been possible without the existence of the CPP

Extent

246 pages

Language

en

Publisher

Northern Illinois University

Rights Statement

In Copyright

Rights Statement 2

NIU theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from Huskie Commons for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without the written permission of the authors.

Media Type

Text

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