Publication Date

2023

Document Type

Dissertation/Thesis

First Advisor

Un, Kheang

Second Advisor

Colin Kuehl

Degree Name

Ph.D. (Doctor of Philosophy)

Legacy Department

Department of Political Science

Abstract

Autocratic regimes’ primary interest is in maintaining their power. To achieve so, they rely on two main strategies: repression and co-optation. Repression can be a violation of life (hard repression) or a violation of liberty (soft repression), while co-optation can be an arrangement of power sharing (formal co-optation) or a distribution of material benefits (informal co-optation). Some autocratic regimes are more likely to deploy certain forms of co-optation and repression than others. What explains this difference in the ways that autocratic regimes maintain their power? Using a case study of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) which has shifted its political strategies from formal co-optation and hard repression (1990s - mid 2010s) to informal co-optation and soft repression (mid 2010s - present), I find that this shift is caused by the change in social-economic situations in Cambodia. To tease out other confounding factors and generalized this finding, I also conduct a statistical analysis on all autocratic regimes from 1989 to 2021 and a controlled comparison of autocratic regimes in Burundi and Rwanda. All in all, socio-economic development significantly affects political instruments that autocratic regimes deploy to maintain their power.

Extent

128 pages

Language

en

Publisher

Northern Illinois University

Rights Statement

In Copyright

Rights Statement 2

NIU theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from Huskie Commons for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without the written permission of the authors.

Media Type

Text

Download

Available for download on Friday, January 23, 2026

Share

COinS