Document Type
Article
Abstract
The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis implies that an agent acts freely only if there is one time at which she is able to perform an action and a distinct time at which she actually performs it. I then point out that determinism, too, is a thesis about trans-temporal relations. I conclude that it is precisely because my formulation of the consequence argument emphasizes transtemporality that it prevails against the modal fallacy and no past objections.
DOI
10.1007/s11098-011-9791-5
Publication Date
9-13-2011
Recommended Citation
Finch, Alicia (2011). On behalf of the consequence argument: time, modality, and the nature of free action. Philosophical Studies, 163:1, 151-170. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9791-5
Original Citation
Finch, Alicia (2011). On behalf of the consequence argument: time, modality, and the nature of free action. Philosophical Studies, 163:1, 151-170. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9791-5
Legacy Department
Department of Philosophy
Extent
20 pages
Language
eng
Publisher
Springer
