Document Type
Article
Abstract
Millikan (1993) and Wilson (1994) argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretationso f the role of referencet o the environmenti n such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretationsI, develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one explanatory paradigm among many in psychology.
Publication Date
1-1-1997
Recommended Citation
Buller, David J. 1997. "Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (or: In Defense of 'Narrow' Functions)." Philosophy of Science 64: 74-95.
Original Citation
Buller, David J. 1997. "Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (or: In Defense of 'Narrow' Functions)." Philosophy of Science 64: 74-95.
Legacy Department
Department of Philosophy
Language
eng
Publisher
Philosophy of Science
Rights Statement
In Copyright
