Why Does UN Peacekeeping Fail to Disarm and Demobilize Warring Parties in Intrastate Conflicts? A Cross-Case Comparative Analysis of Cambodia and Angola

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ABSTRACT

WHY DOES UN PEACEKEEPING FAIL TO DISARM AND DEMOBILIZE WARRING PARTIES IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS? A CROSS-CASE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CAMBODIA AND ANGOLA

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Second-generation peace operation is big in size and complex in operations and has positively impacted society and humankind and brought about peaceful endings in some conflicts. Nevertheless, studies in the area show that some peacekeeping has failed, and many limitations in each operation lead to UN peacekeeping failure.

The failure of UN peacekeeping to disarm and demobilize warring parties’ armed forces has been researched explicitly by scholars. However, those scholarships have limitations in explaining why the UN fails to disarm and demobilize warring parties in intrastate conflict. This thesis paper will look at the UN's failure to disarm and demobilize warring parties in intrastate conflict by using a comparative analysis between the case of UNTAC in Cambodia and UNAVEM II in Angola and will argue that the Security Council's trilemma and the unnatural ceasefire between warring parties led to the UN's failure in the disarmament and demobilization process in intrastate conflicts.
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BY

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE MASTER OF ARTS

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Thesis Director:
Kheang Un
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................1
   1. Research Question .....................................................................................1
   2. Significances of the Study ........................................................................5

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....................................................................7

III. RESEARCH DESIGN ..................................................................................23

IV. ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................26
   1. Pre-Implementation ..................................................................................26
      1.1 Cambodia: Paris Peace Agreement and UNTAC Phase I ...................26
      1.2 Angola: Before and After the Peace .................................................29
      1.3 Security Council’s Trilemma ...............................................................34
   2. Phase II: During Peace Operation ..........................................................37
      2.1 Maximize Success ...............................................................................38
      2.2 Minimize Risk .....................................................................................41
      2.3 Minimize Cost .....................................................................................44

V. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................48

REFERENCES ...............................................................................................50
I. INTRODUCTION

1. Research Question

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping’s roles and goals in intrastate conflicts have changed drastically from ending conflicts to restoring peace (Findlay, 1995). After the Cold War ended, the world turned to the UN to help solve ongoing conflicts that claimed thousands of lives for a peaceful ending. Between 1988 and 1994, the UN operated 16 new operations, including those in Cambodia and Angola, and by the mid-1990s, its annual cost jumped to $4 billion, increasing the size, cost, and operation goals as never before (Hill, 2005). The first-generation peace operation that focused only on ending conflicts between states was no longer the primary role of the UN. Instead, the second-generation peace operation was introduced, which required the UN to be increasingly involved in restoring and building peace in countries of conflict (United Nations, 1995). This second-generation peace operation is big in size and complex in operations and has positively impacted society and humankind and brought about peaceful endings in some conflicts (Lisa et al., 2014). Nevertheless, studies in the area show that some peacekeeping has failed, and many limitations in each operation lead to UN peacekeeping failure (Autesserre, 2014).

The Second United Nations Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) is a notable example. Even though it consisted of seven main objectives with a funding of $132 million and 840 total personnel, its main objective was to prevent ceasefire non-compliance and monitor the disarmament and demobilization of the two main combatants in the Angolan Civil War: the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and People's Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MLPA) armed forces; and to create a new unified national armed forces of the two (Hill, 2005). Despite well-drafted and targeted objectives for its mandate, UNAVEM II peacekeeping failed to fulfill its mission to maintain a ceasefire and demobilize UNITA and MLPA. Only 4 and 18 percent of UNITA and MLPA forces had been demobilized by June 1992, while UNAVEM II was expected to be completed before 1992 (Fung, 1996). As a result, it hugely affected the outcome of the rest of its mission, in which war broke down immediately after the election.

Another great example would be the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) peacekeeping operation. UNTAC was the product of the Paris Peace Agreement (PPA) signed by the four factions of Cambodia in October 1991 to end the civil war by agreeing to disarm and demobilize in advance of the election organized by UNTAC (Findlay, 1995). Although it is no longer the most extensive UN peace operation, it is still the most complex second-generation UN peacekeeping with an enormous budget (Findlay, 1995). Fifteen thousand nine hundred troops, 3600 police, and 2000 civilian staff were deployed to run the mission (United Nations, 1993). It cost the UN $1.5 billion to carry out this one-year operation (Asia Watch, 1993). After warring parties signed the PPA in 1991, UNTAC was deployed in Cambodia to end the civil war by disarming and demobilizing all factions (Findlay, 1995). Coming with an extensive budget, ambition, and troops, UNTAC was expected to succeed in disarming and demobilizing the factions that only had light weapons and small armed forces as soon as they arrived in the country. Despite the vast budget commitment and high ambition, UNTAC failed to complete this initial step, considering their large-scale military forces compared to the factions' armed forces (Jennar, 1994).
The UNAVEM II in Angola and the UNTAC in Cambodia are two interesting cases to see what factors account for the failure of the UN peacekeeping operations to disarm and demobilize warring parties that have small arms and light weapons in intrastate conflict. They happened approximately in a similar timeframe (between 1991 and 1993) in two different regions. They had many differences regarding the nature of peace agreements and the size of the peacekeeping mandate and budget. Their peace agreements were negotiated at the same time, but their natures were vastly different, especially the UN's roles in disarmament and demobilization (Hill, 2005). The UN role, which was peripheral to the Angolan Peace Accords and more limited than the UN role stated in the PPA, ranged from monitoring ceasefire and non-compliance, disarming and demobilizing the warring parties' armed forces, organizing elections, and restoring the country's institutions (Hill, 2005). In terms of funding and size, the Security Council authorized around 22,000 military and civilian personnel (16,000 troops) for UNTAC (United Nations, 1993) and cost the UN $1.5 billion to carry (Asia Watch, 1993), making it the largest peacekeeping operation, while UNAVEM II only comprised approximately 840 personnel and civilian election observers and a $132 million budget (Hill, 2005). Despite these differences, each peacekeeping operation failed regarding the disarmament and demobilization process (Hill, 2005). Therefore, the paper will use the method of agreement in both cases to provide insight into the limitations of UN peacekeeping operations in disarming and demobilizing warring parties in intrastate conflicts.

The failure of UN peacekeeping to disarm and demobilize warring parties’ armed forces has been researched explicitly by scholars. There was existing literature on the content of peace agreements (Fortna, 2003; Malone & Thakur, 2001; Wennmann, 2009; Vries et al., 2009), financial difficulty (Singh, 1997), exhausted mandate (Banerji, 1997), causality minimizing (Cruz, 2017), and unnatural ceasefire (Werner & Yuen, 2005), competing to explain the failure of UN
peacekeeping. The literature on the policies of peace agreements cannot explain why peacekeeping fails. Despite the inclusion of conflict confidence measures in peace agreements, former studies show that some peacekeeping still fails, suggesting that there are other factors responsible for the failure of UN peacekeeping. Existing literature, separately on financial difficulty, exhausted mandate, and causality minimizing, also cannot explain why some peacekeeping succeeded while others failed. That is why Paul Williams (2020) proposed to discuss these three conditions altogether, calling them the Security Council's trilemma, to answer the research question of why peacekeeping fails. The UN Security Council's trilemma required UN peacekeeping simultaneously to maximize success, minimize risk, and minimize cost, which was impossible to achieve and set peacekeeping for failure. However, his theory lacked the conditions before the warring parties signed the peace agreement. It is when the unnatural ceasefire comes to fill the gap. Nonetheless, the unnatural ceasefire alone cannot answer the research question as to why peacekeeping failed to disarm and demobilize warring parties in intrastate conflicts.

I will argue that the Security Council's trilemma and the unnatural ceasefire between warring parties led to the UN's failure in the disarmament and demobilization process in intrastate conflicts. I will argue that both theories are not competing for an explanation but must be considered together. Before the peace operation, the unnatural ceasefire creates an environment for peacekeeping, whether to set them for success or failure. This condition, I argue, is aggravated by the Security Council's trilemma. The UN Security Council's trilemma requires peacekeeping simultaneously to maximize success, minimize risk, and minimize cost, leading to delays in the peace operation, creating a power vacuum between factions, stimulating security dilemma, and, ultimately, setting the peacekeeping up for failure. During the operation, the Security Council's trilemma directly affects the success or failure of UN peacekeeping by limiting its ability to deal
with non-compliance and worsening the devastating security dilemma set by the unnatural ceasefire between warring parties when signing the peace agreement.

The paper is divided into five sections. The first section is the introduction and significance of the study, stating why the study is important for political science. The next section will discuss the concepts that help readers understand the topic being studied, the previous explanations, and why they cannot explain UN limitations in disarming and demobilizing warring parties' armed forces. The section will also end with the hypothesis. The third section will discuss the research design, the differences between the two case studies, and the secondary sources used in the paper. Last but not least, the fourth and fifth sections will discuss the comparison analysis between UNTAC and UNAVEM II, the conclusion, and the recommendations and scopes for future studies.

2. Significance of the Study

There are a few significant contributions that this study offers. First, it contributes to the analysis of the limitations of UN peacekeeping. On top of previous explanations regarding economic reform and the content of peace agreements that are unable to explain the limitation of UN peacekeeping and the Security Council’s trilemma and unnatural ceasefire that are insufficient to offer individual answers to the limitation, this study provides a unique combination between the Security Council's trilemma and the unnatural ceasefire that will enrich the comprehension of UN peacekeeping. On top of that, while previous studies only accounted for either the pre-implementation or implementation stages, this study considers both stages of peacekeeping in light of the study of disarmament and demobilization failure. Finally, this research use of the most different case study analyses between Cambodia and Angola contributes to the little comparative
analysis of Southeast Asia and Africa in the field of political science, in addition to the studies of the limitations of UN Peacekeeping in disarmament and demobilization roles. In this case, it seeks to bring region studies into the conversation that will help the discipline rethink the theory of area studies.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The UN has many peace operations, including peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. Often, they have been used interchangeably, though they have different meanings, especially peacekeeping and peace enforcement. United Nations peace enforcement is the action of ending the war through military force (Howard, 2015). This operation aims to pressure warring parties to sign the peace accord to end wars. Hence, it usually happens before the peace accord is produced. On the other hand, peacekeeping is defined as deploying UN forces, including police and military, in a country of conflict with all parties' consent (Howard, 2015). In this case, forces are limited and operating fairly to fulfill a peace accord already signed and consented to (United Nations, n.d.). Peacekeeping would involve many more goals and mechanisms to keep peace. To date, UN peacekeeping has evolved from the first-generation peace operation that focused only on ending conflicts between states to the second generation, which is increasingly involved in restoring and building peace in countries of conflict (United Nations, 1995).

Peacekeeping has been deployed in interstate and intrastate conflicts with different goals in their operations. Interstate peacekeeping is the peacekeeping operation aiming to demobilize and monitor troops along borders to end conflict between two or more states, and this peacekeeping
finds less need to support state buildings afterward. *Intrastate peacekeeping*, conversely, mirrors the complexity of civil war between two or more warring parties. The goals are to disarm, demobilize, merge, and monitor local combatants; protect civilians; offer social and economic reforms; promote human rights and humanitarian aid; and build a new government and the state's physical and social infrastructure (Howard, 2015). This paper aims to explore UN intrastate peacekeeping and will explicitly discuss the UN peacekeeping mission to restore and keep peace in intrastate conflicts.

When talking about small arms and light weapons, war materials such as assault rifles, machine guns, pistols, grenades, handguns, light anti-tank missiles, and landmines fall into this category (Laurance, 1996, as cited in Hill, 2005). These weapons are traditionally viewed as less threatening than heavy conventional war materials such as nuclear weapons, heavy tanks, heavy anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, and large mortars. Nevertheless, recent studies show that small arms and light weapons have been crucially employed in conflicts between states, and scholars should focus more on their impacts (Hill, 2005). As a matter of fact, small arms and light weapons were responsible for 90 percent of all deaths in intrastate conflicts in the 1990s (United Nations, 2002, as cited in Hill, 2005). A press release by the UN also indicates the spread of 1 billion of these weapons remains a significant threat to the world, killing at least 200,000 people a year between 2010 and 2015 (United Nations, 2020). Therefore, when studying intrastate conflicts, it is significant to stress the predominant use of this type of weapon (Hill, 2005).

Witnessing the impacts of small arms and light weapons in intrastate conflicts, in 1991, when the UN established the UN Register of Conventional Weapons to promote transparency in armaments (UN Register of Conventional Arms, n.d., also see Hill, 2005), they were included as
one of the arm categories (Hill, 2005). Thus, to end intrastate conflicts, the UN has promoted small arms and light weapons disarmament and armed force demobilization in its peacekeeping process. That is why, when discussing UN peacekeeping, disarmament and demobilization of combatants of each warring party are the essential initial procedures before other steps come in, such as elections and social and economic reforms. Before proceeding with peacekeeping, the UN is supposed to collect all types of weapons from combatants within the conflict zone, called ‘disarmament,’ disband combatants from their military structures, and transition them to civilian lives, called ‘demobilization’ (United Nations, 2000). After disarmament and demobilization, ex-combatants are expected to return to productive civilian lives, both socially and economically, for peace to prevail. This step requires strong support from the UN for peacekeeping to succeed because if it fails, the rest of the peacekeeping process will collapse (United Nations, 2002). For instance, the UNTAC failed to disarm and demobilize the warring parties in Cambodia completely. As a result, violence occurred frequently before the elections, interrupted the peace process, and at the end, warring parties refused to accept the election results and used force to jeopardize the effort to unify armed forces (Findlay, 1995).

Evaluating the success or failure of disarmament and demobilization is problematic, as scholars find it hard to agree on terms. For some, the UN is required to fully disarm and demobilize warring parties to be defined as a successful process. In contrast, some define it relative to other stages of disarmament in other countries. In the end, the definition of success or failure of disarmament and demobilization should be defined in a realistic way to be considered a successful process; at least the UN can disarm and disband the armed capacity to the point that there is no armed confrontation that poses concern to the whole peacekeeping process (Hill, 2005). Therefore, the "failure in disarmament and demobilization" of warring parties should be operationalized as a
failure to collect weapons from warring parties in the conflict zone and disband their military structure to the extent that there is no outbreak of confrontation that poses distress to the whole peacekeeping process. It is essential to look at the disarmament and demobilization stage of peacekeeping because it is the critical point of whether peacekeeping can resist or fall into another violent fight. Some of the UN peacekeeping that have at least one of these measures include the UNTAC, UNAVEM II and III, and the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (United Nations, 2000).

Similarly, scholars disagree on whether a disarmament effort is necessary to end war. Some scholars support the UN disarmament efforts, while others do not. Those who support the disarmament effort believe arms are a cause of intrastate conflicts, while those who do not support it believe arms are not the cause but the symptoms (Hill, 2005). The United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts confirmed with the latter that the cause of conflicts should not be identified as due to small arms and light weapons (United Nations, 1999); nonetheless, small arms and light weapons make it easier to trigger violence in intrastate conflicts that would otherwise not take place (Spear, 1996) and increase the insecurity feelings between groups, which more likely prevent peace from happening (Sislin & Pearson, 2001).

It is because warring parties suffer from a condition called the security dilemma, a situation in which groups in conflict only gain a sense of security from obtaining more and more power than their enemies (Hill, 2005). In this case, power is a zero-sum game, and the only way to survive is to escape the power of others. The insecure parties will be ready to attack anytime; none can feel settled, and the cycle continues (Herz, 1950). Hartzell (1999) highlights that some warring parties are willing to sign the peace agreement, cooperate with the disarmament and demobilization
process, and successfully implement the agreement, but others refuse. He emphasizes warring parties' security dilemma during the implementation stage of peacekeeping as the main reason why UN peacekeeping fails to disarm and demobilize combatants with small arms and light weapons. Therefore, they can cause catastrophe among groups, and even though they should not be seen as positively affecting violence, they fuel the security dilemma, which increases the probability of violence (Sislin & Pearson, 2001). Because individuals are more vulnerable than states, the security dilemma is more severe in intrastate than interstate conflicts (Hobbes, 1968).

This condition is crucial in intrastate conflict to explain why the disarmament and demobilization processes are frequently tricky and fail (Hill, 2005). Security dilemma creates mistrust between warring parties, and in active conflict, they view each other as immediate threats. The peace process does not fail because of the differences, high cost of compromise, or indivisible stake between warring parties because compromises are possible (Walter, 1997). Peacekeeping fails due to the warring parties' security dilemma during the disarmament and demobilization process to prepare for peace. It is almost impossible for warring parties to disarm and demobilize when the security dilemma is a big problem for them. While there is no legitimate government or institution to enforce laws, giving up weapons and disbanding combatants are risky events for warring parties amid fear of sudden attacks from each other. Therefore, the security dilemma between warring parties makes disarmament and demobilization impossible when civil war adversaries cannot provide credible promises to comply with such conditions (Walter & Snyder, 1999).

What conditions would trigger a security dilemma that leads to the failure of the UN to disarm and demobilize small arms and light weapons in intrastate conflicts? The failures and
limitations of UN peacekeeping have been explicitly researched by many political scientists in the International Relations and Comparative Politics sub-field. Many scholars believe the problems lie in the peace agreement's contents, objectives, and action plans. A strong peace agreement that includes clear objectives and action plans can prevent the endangerment of the peace process. Fortna (2003) claims that a peace agreement's content influences peace's durability. Peace is more durable when the peace agreement includes with mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, establishing dispute resolution procedures, close-up monitoring, and confidence measures. These close-up monitoring mechanisms included in the peace agreement would make the disarmament and demobilization process more feasible and peacekeeping more durable because they give the warring parties an incentive not to break the ceasefire through the reduction of uncertainties about enemies’ actions and intentions, giving warring parties a sense of security and building trust between them, which prevents violations of another fight and solves security dilemma between warring parties. Malone and Thakur (2001) also point out that peacekeeping fails because the peace agreement fails to include conflict prevention policies on abusive government and economic and human rights violations after peace. In this case, failure to account for these conditions in the peace agreement would result in obstacles to achieving peace by creating dilemmas for conflicting actors to calculate the cost and benefits of returning to war. Combatants fear there is no security protection in the disarmament and demobilization process if human rights protection is not there, making the disarmament and demobilization process and peacekeeping extra tricky. To succeed, the UN should design policies that address all these critical conditions to tackle potential crises at their core before another act of violence breaks out.

Despite strong arguments for the content of peacekeeping, recent studies challenge the correlation between the inclusion of good governance (Mezzera et al., 2009) and human rights
policies (Putnam, 2002) in the peace agreement and positive outcomes. Wennmann (2009) finds that a peace agreement alone does not determine the direction of peace. Most importantly, it should not be broadly drafted because too many objectives might jeopardize peacekeeping. On the contrary, they believe economic provisions in the form of economic restoration in the peace agreement positively impact the disarmament and demobilization process. Poverty and economic inequality make it easy for warlords to recruit young men for wars (make profits from wars) and for them to receive direct economic benefits in the sectors of their interests. Therefore, they are unlikely to relinquish their weapons to begin peace.

These existing studies on peace agreements lack understanding of the limitations of UN peacekeeping to disarm and demobilize warring parties in conflicts in two ways. First, Wennmann (2009) discusses peacekeeping failure in conflict solely over resource sharing, so they should not be able to generalize to the case of other UN peacekeeping in conflicts that mirror other needs and values rather than sharing resources, such as ideology, culture, power struggle, and ethnic and class conflicts. Furthermore, while resource-sharing struggle could cause civil war relapse (Collier, 2001), many scholars argue against the assumption that all warring parties seek total power-sharing (Stedman, 2000). Not all warring parties refuse to disarm and demobilize their combatants due to resource or power sharing. As discussed earlier, the security dilemma is the explanation that scholars have discussed for why warring parties refuse to cooperate (Hartzell, 1999).

Second, despite a vast scholarship discussing the effect of monitoring, confidence measures, and economic restoration in the peace agreement, former studies show that some peacekeeping still fails despite including these conditions. The second-generation UN peacekeeping has taken on multidimensional roles that include all the policies on economic
provision, conflict prevention, and practical measurements such as demilitarized zones and monitoring processes (Malone & Thakur, 2001). Yet, peacekeeping still finds it challenging to fulfill peace processes such as demobilization. For instance, the case studies on Sudan, Burundi, and Mozambique by Vries et al. (2009) show that the incorporation of economic provisions in the peace agreement has a limited impact on the success of peacekeeping if either of the warring parties lacks the political will to implement those provisions. Moreover, the Bicesse Accords of 1991 of the UNAVEM negotiated for a ceasefire in Angola could not demobilize warring parties and stop the war from breaking again, even though they included demobilization of troops, democratic elections, and other resolution disputes in the agreement. The Paris Peace Agreement also failed to disarm and demobilize warring parties in Cambodia during the peace implementation process. It failed to maintain a ceasefire while implementing the election, even though it had a multidimensional peace agreement that included all the possible conflict resolutions and policy actions (Hampson, 1996).

To solve the security dilemma problem for a successful disarmament and demobilization process, the presence of an outsider is essential. Only when outsiders act as parties to help enforce the rules is the disarmament and demobilization process possible (Walter, 1997). The third party plays a massive role in verifying demobilization and disarmament terms, providing warring parties with a sense of security through neutrality, keeping surprise attacks more complicated, and helping them commit to the terms. Even so, international relations scholars still find the third party’s presence itself to influence the failure of peacekeeping. Paul William (2020) identifies a crucial condition that leads to the failure of peacekeeping at any stage, and he calls it the UN Security Council's trilemma. The ‘UN Security Council's trilemma’ is a condition in which the Council requires UN peacekeeping to maximize success, minimize risk, and minimize cost simultaneously.
This situation is impossible to achieve all at once, but it coexists and limits the success of peacekeeping. The Council designed the mandate to be broad in a high-threat environment and cost less. It minimizes risk by employing many personnel and limiting the use of force in self-defense. 'Minimizing risk' is characterized by the personnel's 'limited use of force' during the operation. The Council maximizes success by establishing peacekeeping with multidimensional roles and embarking on as many goals as possible, but that comes with a high cost. ‘Maximizing success’ is operationalized as having ‘exhausted’ and ‘unclear mandates’ with ‘few guidelines.’ To minimize cost, the Council reduces the number of personnel in the mission to be much smaller than required and cuts the mandate's scope, but doing so will undermine its goal to minimize risk and maximize success. ‘Minimizing cost’ is seen when the mission ‘cuts the budget’ and ‘reduces the number of personnel’ to lower the cost of operation. The three conditions are happening simultaneously and cannot be achieved simultaneously, undermining the UN mission.

Contrary to the conventional thinking that more mandates mean more success, recent literature shows that the broader and more the mandate is, the more likely it is for peacekeeping to fail. Banerji (1997) and Malone & Thakur (2001) study the limitations of UN peacekeeping and find that UN peacekeeping fails due to the UN effort to maximize the mandate's success. For each peacekeeping mission, the Security Council always comes up with high ambition and optimism for the future of peace operations, often leading to exhausted and unclear peacekeeping mandates. As mentioned earlier, after the post-Cold War, the mission took on multidimensional roles such as holding elections, maintaining laws and orders, protecting human rights, and giving humanitarian intervention (Malone & Thakur, 2001). These mandates add up to hundreds of tasks, resulting in a loss of specific direction and unclear mandate objectives (Malone & Thakur, 2001). For instance, the Security Council expects the South Sudan United Nations Mission in South Sudan to fulfill all
40 tasks on the mandate it designed, despite a multidimensional role that includes ambitious mandates and many complex tasks (Security Council, 2018). The broad mandate is a problem because it gives space for non-compliance-warring parties to justify their violation of the ceasefire. Worse, little guidance is given to the mandate on how to handle the conflict intervention (to use or not to use force), which makes it practically difficult for the UN force to handle the non-compliance during the disarmament and demobilization process that, at the end, worsens security dilemma warring parties have (Findlay, 1995). For instance, the Khmer Rouge could justify their ceasefire violation during the disarmament and demobilization stage using the broad UNTAC mandate loophole, and UNTAC could not correctly handle the situation (Phnom Penh Post, 1993).

Furthermore, little attention is given to disarmament compared to the humanitarian agenda in UN peacekeeping. For instance, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1992 focused heavily on supporting humanitarian efforts for Somalia through humanitarian programs such as the World Food Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization, and less on the disarmament and demobilization of combatants. Unfortunately, these humanitarian programs were poorly affected by daily armed gang attacks and the continued fighting between warring parties in Somalia (Mehdi, 1994). Instead of broadening the mandate, the Council should put more effort into solving the security dilemma that affects the disarmament and demobilization stages.

The cost minimization goal of the Security Council also poses a considerable challenge to peacekeeping, such as in the disarmament and demobilization process. With increasing demands for operations that required an annual outlay of $3.3 billion in 1992 and increased annually, the UN faced obstacles with a lack of adequate funds and material support to ensure peacekeeping
success (Singh, 1997). Due to increasing operations yearly, the budget has dropped rapidly to size
down operations (Williams, 2020). The inadequate funding hinders the personnel from gaining
proper technical capacities to handle problems arising during disarmament and demobilization,
considering the dangerous and life-threatening processes (Autesserre, 2019). The personnel lack
technical training, logistic capacity, and strategic measures to deal with non-compliant combatants,
the biggest problem of disarmament and demobilization (Malone & Thakur, 2001), and they are
also ill-equipped to carry out effective measures for the mission (Williams, 2020). The
undercapacity worsens the security dilemma problem because the forces look less intimidating for
non-compliant forces to comply with the UN.

Besides inadequate training, underfunding also undernumbers the UN forces themselves.
Authorized forces are determined by what the Security Council finds financially acceptable rather
than what is efficiently needed on the ground (United Nations, 2000). For instance, the UNAIMD
in Sudan and the MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo needed approximately 92,000
to 148,000 forces and 207,000 to 414,000 forces respectively, but the Council only authorized
25,000 and 21,500 forces respectfully (World Bank, 2018). A proper civilian-to-personnel ratio is
needed for special forces, rapid response to threat units, and protection mobility units to solve the
security dilemma problem (Cruz et al., 2017). Security dilemmas between warring parties will be
resolved once the forces are well-positioned in a country of conflict. Sufficient force provides
combatants with a security guarantor, disarming and separating combatants to pull back from
conflicts and solve commitment problems (Hultman et al., 2014). The bigger the UN troops are,
the more violence mitigates their function. Thus, fewer troops being deployed leads to a severe
problem regarding disarming and demobilizing warring forces. Under-personnel raises risks when
confronting non-compliance forces (Williams, 2020). Ultimately, these conditions will set the UN peace operation for failure in the implementation stage (Autesserre, 2019).

Even so, more than limited funding is needed to explain why the security dilemma cannot be solved to push for successful disarmament and demobilization. Potentially, the Council can solve this problem by narrowing down the mandate to focus on strengthening forces, prioritizing rapid response to threat units, or optimizing how forces should efficiently respond to non-compliance (Williams, 2020). Even though the civilian-to-personnel ratio might be smaller than the required personnel, with the big arms and heavy weapons sponsored by the P5 and the rest of the world, the UN forces should be relatively more competent than the small arms and light weapons operated by warring parties in conflicts. Hence, Williams (2020) looks at the Council’s desire to minimize the risk of peacekeepers' fatalities and injuries in the operation. To minimize risk during the disarmament, demobilization, and mandate implementation process, UN personnel are encouraged by the Council to adopt a defensive posture and not use force to defend themselves (Cruz et al., 2017), and casualty reduction has been the ultimate goal for UN personnel (Willmot et al., 2015). The Council restricts peacekeepers on what response methods and when to use force against non-compliance (Novosseloff, 2016). According to Cruz (2017), such action puts force protection as the central factor in UN peace operations. Consequently, it encourages spoilers, creates an inconsistent footprint that prohibits the mission from removing threats, and enhances insecurity among peacekeepers and warring parties (Cruz et al., 2017).

There are two critics of Paul Williams' sophisticated study of the Security Council's trilemma on the limitation of UN peace operations. First, when discussing the influence of the Security Council's trilemma on the limitation of UN peacekeeping operations, Paul Williams
focuses mainly on the success and failure of overall mandate implementation, especially the big tasks such as elections. Little attention has been given to the disarmament and demobilization process, arguably the most critical stage in mandate implementation. As discussed earlier, disarmament and demobilization of each warring party's combatants are crucial initial steps before an election and social and economic reforms occur. For instance, the biggest mistake of UN peacekeeping in Afghanistan was the delay in including disarmament and demobilization in the imitative, leaving the security dilemma contended (Hartzell, 2011). Therefore, a study should thoroughly observe Williams' variables in the disarmament and demobilization of UN peacekeeping to efficiently analyze the Security Council's trilemma.

Second, Williams' study of the Security Council's trilemma also focuses solely on the implementation phase and does not account for the pre-implementation phase. In short, the condition before the peace operation, such as during the signing of a peace agreement, potentially determining the peace outcome, has yet to be included in the discussion. As debated earlier, the security dilemma between warring parties determines why some UN peacekeeping can be implemented as planned while others involve spoilers and violent outbreaks that jeopardize mandate execution. Hence, to study the limitations of UN peacekeeping success or failure in any stage, especially during the disarmament and demobilization phases, the pre-implementation phase should be considered altogether with the implementation phase.

Water (1997) analyzes the pre-implementation phase (negotiation and peace agreement signing) and claims the security dilemma during this stage deserves a close look. Even with a third party, the disarmament and demobilization process are still more likely to fail if the peace agreement results from 'unnatural' ceasefires. Genuine reconciliation occurs when parties
reconcile naturally with a view of little uncertainty around the consequences of continued fighting, and warring parties agree to the settlement based on the belief that renewed war would not return a different outcome. Genuine reconciliation would resolve the security dilemma between warring parties by creating mutual trust and a sense of commitment to the peace agreement and ceasefire (Werner & Yuen, 2005). An unnatural ceasefire occurs when third-party pressure is present and genuine reconciliation is absent. In contrast, if the peace agreement is the result of an 'unnatural' ceasefire from third parties, such as international diplomats, through heavy diplomatic pressures and threats of economic, military, and political repercussions, the security dilemma is not appropriately dissolved (Werner & Yuen, 2005), which, as described earlier, makes the disarmament and demobilization process impossible when civil war adversaries are unable to provide credible promises to comply with such dangerous conditions (Synder & Walter, 1999).

No matter how well-crafted and well-planned the UN peace operation is, it will only be adequate if the warring parties are committed to the peacekeeping that they naturally come to. Peacekeeping will fail if the factions have unresolved security dilemmas, especially during disarmament and demobilization (Werner & Yuen, 2005). Hence, the unnatural ceasefire is operationalized as a condition in which the ceasefire is achieved through regional or international third-party pressure instead of a genuine reconciliation between factions trying to work on disagreements. The unnatural ceasefire at the pre-implementation stage sets a condition for disarmament and demobilization and determines the rest of the UN peacekeeping operation.

After discussing the Security Council's trilemma and the unnatural ceasefire, I argue that they are not competing for the explanation but must consider it together. The hypothesis to explain the failure of UN peacekeeping to disarm and demobilize warring parties with small arms and light weapons in intrastate conflicts is:
(H): The Security Council’s trilemma and the unnatural ceasefire between warring parties led to the UN’s failure in the disarmament and demobilization process in intrastate conflicts.

Before the peace operation, the unnatural ceasefire influences the warring parties' security dilemma and creates an environment for UN peacekeeping, whether to set them for success or failure. This condition is aggravated by the Security Council's trilemma, which is the sufficient condition. It is a sufficient condition because, even though the unnatural ceasefire is the condition that sets the future of peacekeeping, it can be overcome through how the Security Council designs its mandate and overall operation. The UN Security Council's trilemma requires the UN simultaneously to maximize success, minimize risk, and minimize cost, which leads to delays in the peace operation, creates a power vacuum between factions, stimulates fears, and ultimately sets the operations up for failure. During the operation, the Security Council's trilemma directly affects the success or failure of the UN by limiting its ability to deal with non-compliance through the minimize cost and minimize risk objective. It worsened the devastating security dilemma regarding spoilers and piloting the mission to failure. Security dilemmas from the unnatural ceasefire could be overcome by improving third parties’ monitoring capability, trust-building initiatives, the rising cost of defection enforced by the peace agreement and mission (Werner & Yuen, 2005), and increasing the cost of the overall UN peace operation.

Hegr, Hultman, and Nygård (2019) quantitatively studied the relationship between the size of the budget and UN peacekeeping from 1960 to 2013 and found that "If the UN had invested $200 billion in peacekeeping with strong mandates, major armed conflict would have been reduced by up to two-thirds." In this situation, the Council would have to prioritize peacekeepers’ safety in the high-threat environment (minimize risks) and empower a broad mandate (maximize success)
by employing a considerable number of peacekeepers, authorizing extra training, investing in expensive weapons, and deploying better force infrastructure (Williams, 2020). This scenario would result in UN peacekeeping successfully disarming and disbanding warring parties, but the cost would prevent the Council from achieving its third objective (minimizing cost) (Hegre et al., 2018). Therefore, it is evident that the Security Council's trilemma is a sufficient condition that cannot explain the limitation of UN peacekeeping, while the unnatural ceasefire is necessary to understand how the security dilemma alters the UN from successfully disarming and demobilizing warring parties.

On the other hand, without the security dilemma formed by the unnatural ceasefire from third parties that drove factions to breach the agreement in the first place, the Security Council's trilemma alone would not lead to peacekeeping failure. Without the unnatural ceasefire, we would see a situation in which factions respect the ceasefire commitment in the peace agreement and agree to disarm and demobilize once UN personnel enter the country. We also see some peacekeeping designed by the same council with the same trilemma, but they still succeed. Without the Security Council’s trilemma, the unnatural ceasefire alone would not lead peacekeeping to a complete failure. It will have a large number of international troops (not limited by the use of force), a large-scale budget, and a manageable mandate with clear guidelines to deal with non-compliant combatants.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN

The case study of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the second United Nations Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), which happened approximately in a similar timeframe (between 1991 and 1993), are deployed to provide an explanation to help answer the research question of why the UN peacekeeping operations fail to disarm and demobilize warring parties in intrastate conflicts. Many differences between the two cases spark interest in looking deeply into both cases. First, UNTAC and UNAVEM II operated in two different regions. UNTAC operated in Cambodia, a tiny Southeast Asian country bordering Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, while UNAVEM II operated in Angola, a large country in Southwestern Africa. Cambodia has fertile plains and rivers, while Angola has a diverse landscape, including deserts, highlands, mountains, and rainforests (World Bank, 2023).

UNTAC and UNAVEM II also differ in peacekeeping size, funding, and nature of peace agreements. Their peace agreements were negotiated at the same time, but the nature of the peace agreements was vastly different, especially the UN's roles in disarmament and demobilization (Hill, 2005). In the Angolan Accords, the UN role is peripheral and more limited than the UN role stated in the PPA. The Angolan Accords consist of seven main elements, including establishing a ceasefire (Hill, 2005), monitoring compliance, making final decisions on ceasefire violations (Sislin & Pearson, 2001), ensuring disarmament and demobilization of armed forces, and providing election assistance and monitoring (Posen, 1993). However, the main task of the UN in UNAVEM II was to disarm and demobilize UNITA and FNLA to prepare for democratic elections.
In the PPA, the UN role is far more involved than stated in the Angolan Accords. The UN's role in UNTAC was enormous and ranged from monitoring ceasefires and non-compliance to disarming and demobilizing warring parties’ armed forces, organizing elections, and restoring the country's institutions (Hill, 2005). In terms of funding and size, the Security Council authorized around 22,000 military and civilian personnel (16,000 troops) for UNTAC (United Nations, 1993). It also cost the UN $1.5 billion to carry (Asia Watch, 1993), making it the largest peacekeeping operation in the past. Although it is no longer the largest peace operation, it is still the most complex second-generation in the history of UN peacekeeping operations (Findlay, 1995). The UNAVEM II, on the contrary, only comprised approximately 840 personnel and civilian election observers and a $132 million budget (Hill, 2005). The mandate was small and limited, which logically should have allowed UNAVEM II to focus entirely on monitoring the ceasefire and disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants compared to the UNTAC's. Despite these differences, each peacekeeping operation failed regarding the disarmament and demobilization process (Hill, 2005). Therefore, using the method of agreement in both cases will provide insight into the limitations of UN peacekeeping operations in disarming and demobilizing warring parties in intrastate conflicts.

This study will use a comparative analysis method developed by John Stuart Mill (1984) to provide detailed insight into the causal mechanism of the relationship between the Security Council's trilemma and unnatural ceasefire and the failure of UN peacekeeping to disarm and demobilize warring parties. The study will use the 'Most Different System Design' or 'Method of Agreement' to compare the two case studies. This method selects cases because they differ but provide the same outcome (Mill, 1984). Therefore, the dependent variable, *failure to disarm and demobilize*, is the same, but the two selected cases have differences in their nature of peace
agreement and peacekeeping size and budget. The paper will look to the period before and when both peace agreements were signed and the pre-implementation phases to understand the unnatural ceasefire set for the agreement’s implementation and how the Security Council's trilemma worsens the security dilemma between warring parties, leading to failure in the disarmament and demobilization process. After that, the paper will look at Phase II (operation period) to understand how the Security Council's trilemma aggravated the worsened domestic security dilemma and how they set UN peacekeeping up for failure.

Existing scholarships, such as international news reports from CNN and Economists and local news reports from Phnom Penh Posts, mission progress reports from diverse international organizations, including the UN itself, books from various authors talking about the same issues in both Cambodia and Angola, secondary interview data, journal articles from local and international journals, periodicals, the UN reports, UN press releases, the UN reference papers, manuscripts from the UN representative of Cambodia and Angola, and other documents, will be used to inform the case study. The information will be triangulated using these scholarships to ensure that the secondary data collected are reliable for analysis.
IV. ANALYSIS

1. Pre-Implementation

1.1 Cambodia: Paris Peace Agreement and UNTAC Phase I

To end the bloody civil war in Cambodia, the PPA required the four warring parties to disarm and demobilize their armed forces, stop the ceasefire, and wait for UNTAC to organize the election. The four factions include the radical group Khmer Rouge (KR), the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), managed by soon-to-be Prime Minister Hun Sen, the royalist FUNCEPEC, and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), commanded by former General Lon Nol (Findlay, 1995).

The Cambodian civil war could be identified as a proxy war between the big powers at that time. The three factions, including FUNCEPEC, KPNLF, and the KR, were supported by aid from China, Thailand, and Western Countries. These factions, coalited under their aid donor power, were granted a seat in the UN General Assembly despite lacking national attributes. The Vietnamese government and the Soviet Union supported the PRK. The civil war soon reached a power and political stalemate, in which the PRK was unable to defeat the KR and two other factions, and the KR and its coalition were unable to use military methods to bring down the PRK (Zartman, 1991).
There were several attempts at peace settlement moderated by the aid donors of each faction. However, several attempts failed as the PRK refused to share power with the KR (Evans & Grant, 1995). Even though some factions, such as the KR, purposely missed the meetings in peace settlements a few times to not want to sign the agreement (Tomoda, 1992), the international pressure from the UN forced them to accept the settlement (Findlay, 1995). We would not be able to know the KR's desire not to comply, but we see clearly that they never wished to cooperate thoroughly with the UN (Berry, 2012). The diplomats working on the PPA should be responsible for the unnatural ceasefire between warring parties after the signing of the agreement. The agreement was reached not because of natural reconciliation between the four parties but because of external pressure (Findlay, 1995). Consequently, before and after signing the peace agreement, each warring party still had security dilemmas about disarming their weapons and demobilizing their armed forces, and all four parties were still uncertain about the UN's role in peacekeeping operations (Hill, 2005). It is a sign that the future disarmament and demobilization process is in jeopardy despite any implementation effort that would be put in.

The UNTAC was presumed to start as soon as all signatures signed the peace agreement in October 1991, but it only occurred in May 1992 (Security Council, 1991). During these six prolonged months, an unfortunate hiatus in power arose between all four factions, leading to a severe crisis of political conflict (Thayer, 1992). Although it did not affect the scheduled tasks of UNTAC, it did cause a negative psychological impact on domestic affairs (Schear, 1995). This delay in deployment gave space for a power struggle in the country and allowed for ceasefire violations, lawlessness, and chaos. It aroused skepticism among warring parties over the UN’s role in the upcoming peacekeeping operation. Moreover, it spurred the worst climate security dilemma that resulted from the unnatural ceasefire of the peace agreement. Each party feared that other
signatures would break the ceasefire agreement and take over the capital; the other three combatants feared that the KR would take over the cities at any time and that the UN could not protect them from that (Thayer, 1992). UNTAC left the four factions without a middleman, worsening their intense military tensions (Thayer, 1992).

The UNTAC Military Commander at that time asserted that there were two times that a significant violation of the PPA broke out (Sanderson, 1994). For the first time, Prince Sihanouk launched a bold alliance with the FUNCEPEC and Hun Sen factions. They formed a coalition government to directly overshadow the KR's forces and violate the PPA (International Herald Tribune, November 21, 1991). The second time, the three factions almost killed the KR's leader on his arrival in Bangkok on November 27, forcing him to fly back (International Herald Tribune, November 29, 1991). The Security Council tried to convince the KR's leader to return to Cambodia with a guarantee of personal security from UN personnel (International Herald Tribune, December 5, 1991). Upon arrival in Cambodia, with the existing security dilemma about the ceasefire combined with recent surprise attacks from the three warring parties, it was clear to the KR that fighting the war was better than having faith in the UN and its operation. Not long after, the KKR's violation of the PPA was more noticeable daily (Asia Watch, 1992). In early January 1992, the KR mobilized and seized control of Kampong Thom, a tactical area between the capital city and the Northeast (United States Information Service, 1992). The mission was already in danger when UNTAC arrived in May 1992. During the deployment of UNTAC, the KR refused to disarm and demobilize and found various ways to mobilize and strike forces many times (see Hill, 2005).

Thus, as said, the security dilemma was not resolved before or after signing the PPA. Cambodia had never achieved a natural ceasefire among the KR, PRK, FUNCEPEC, and KPNLF
after the PPA due to diplomatic force and pressure from the international community like the UN. Moreover, it shows that the delay in UNTAC deployment worsens the country's fragile political and military circumstances.

1.2 Angola: Before and After the Angolan Peace Accords

The war in Angola began with large revolts in 1961 (Birmingham, 1992). Even before the country gained independence from the Portuguese, the local Angolan resistance groups that had fought the Portuguese had already been seen to clash with one another (Hill, 2005). The warring parties leading the revolt, the MPLA led by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and the UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi, are different in almost every aspect, including language, ideology, foreign support, and regional base, in which UNITA was a predominantly rural organization and the MPLA controlled most urban hubs like the capital Luanda (Birmingham, 1992).

Outsiders fueled the Angolan Civil War as a proxy war. The Soviet Union and Cuba supported the MPLA (Lodico, 1996). At the same time, UNITA was supported by the US. The superpowers' support went beyond aid and arms donations, in which they were directly involved on a massive scale. For instance, 50,000 Cuban armed forces were seen fighting to support the MPLA, while thousands of South African armed forces were seen heavily fighting for the UNITA (Lodico, 1996). In 1966, the war reached its stalemate as the 130,000 MPLA armed forces were not able to defeat the UNITA's 70,000 guerilla forces, and the UNITA did not have enough capacity to defeat the MPLA's conventional force (Somerville, 1993). That was when the third group of different subnational interests emerged in the ongoing conflict. In this case, the three
warring parties in the Angola interstate conflict were the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), MPLA, and UNITA, as described in Margaret Anstee’s manuscript (Jett, 2019).

In 1974, after the military coup in Portugal, the Portuguese government granted independence to Angola. In June 1975, they signed the Alvor Accord with the three warring parties, the FNLA, UNITA, and MPLA, and formed a temporary coalition for the three parties to prepare for the election in October 1975. The Soviet Union, which supported the MPLA throughout the 1980s with massive weapons and budget, began to seek peace settlement (Hamil, 1994), and the US also cut down almost wholly their support of UNITA due to economic and domestic political backlash (Somerville, 1993). The Portuguese government was responsible for helping put together a peace accord and a new government. On top of the short timeline to assemble the accord, the Portuguese did not support this temporary transitional government in disarmament or provide institutional policies to keep them together. Heavy fights started among the three warring parties shortly after this new government assumed office (Lodico, 1996).

The Angolan peace agreement did not arrive with smooth diplomatic negotiations. Multiple attempts at negotiations took place to put together a peace accord to implement peacekeeping in Angola, and they failed dramatically with episodes of mistrust and security dilemmas. For instance, in 1989, the warring parties were brought together for the first time at the negotiation table to work on a peace agreement (Jett, 2019). The two leaders, Dos Santos and Savimbi, agreed on peace agreement conditions and signed the agreement, promising a ceasefire. However, the MPLA continued accusing Savimbi of agreeing to merge the UNITA with them and for Savimbi to be in exile for two years. Savimbi furiously denied the accusation, adding more pressure to the security dilemma (Williams, 1993).
Between April and November 1990, the Portuguese government, as a third party, decided to assume the conflict mediator role for Angolan warring parties. Both parties accepted Portugal’s role as a mediator in this second peace negotiation attempt because they viewed the country as one of the superpowers at that time (Williams, 1993). These extended negotiations between the warring parties, facilitated by the Portuguese, made small progress. It was missing diplomatic and military influence in the mediation (Williams, 1993). Due to geographical and political overlap with a more intense problem in Namibia, the US, and the Soviet Union, as third-party superpowers, wanted quick progress on Angola and decided to bring Angolan warring parties to the negotiation table to bring about a peace agreement to end the civil war. The US and the Soviet Union were not concerned, to a large extent, about whether or how the parties would reconcile but decided to force them to the table anyway (Cleary, 1997).

To speed up this prolonged mediation, the US and the Soviet Union requested that their Secretary of State and Foreign Minister be personally involved in mediating the process. The peace agreement, the Bicesse Accords, was signed in May 1991, but not without multiple rounds of negotiations between warring parties. The Angolan warring parties finally came to a compromise; for example, the MPLA and UNITA agreed to the multi-party democratic election. The two initially had a different timeline. They wanted to host the election but then came to a compromise to host it 15 to 18 months after the peace accord was signed (Williams, 1993).

This compromise and the agreement to successfully sign the peace accord did not reflect the warring parties’ desire to reconcile. As mentioned earlier, the parties were still accusing each other; mistrust was clearly evidence, and the talk undoubtedly came from the diplomatic force of the third party’s pressures. The parties internally did not have a desire to reconcile naturally, and
the outside pressure brought about the unnatural reconciliation. Consequently, the security dilemma had never been resolved among the parties. Both parties had reasons to be suspicious of one another’s political motives (Fortna, 1993), and they could not agree on the terms and conditions of their differences (Hill, 2005). Most importantly, the term ceasefire to ensure security was never produced naturally by the parties, including the nature of the political system, modalities for ceasefire monitoring, and disarmament and demobilization (Jett, 2019). By the time of the third-round talk in August, the UNITA still refused to accept any ceasefire until the MPLA agreed to recognize it as a party. The MPLA, on the other hand, did not trust the UNITA at all and only agreed to a ceasefire and recognized it as a political party once it fully disarmed and demobilized itself (Wright, 1997, p. 156). The fourth talk in late September came around, and the sequence of political recognition and ceasefire remained stiff for both parties. The fifth round of talk in November finally could move both warring parties closer to a ceasefire agreement, but the difference on when to host the election persisted (Wright, 1997, p. 157).

If it were up to the MPLA and UNITA, the ceasefire agreement would not be possible. Both parties had so many disagreements on political recognition, ceasefire monitoring, and the length of the election, and, most importantly, they never resolved the security dilemma to reconcile naturally. Nevertheless, with constant diplomatic pressure from the superpowers on both sides and with the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister of the US and the Soviet Union personally involved in fixing the details of the peace agreement for both parties, the agreement for the Angolan peace accord was reached in December (Wright, 1997). After the peace accord was signed, the UN was requested to monitor the implementation of the peacekeeping process (Hill, 2005). A little different from the UNTAC, in which the UN was fully and heavily involved in implementing the PPA in every aspect, the UN only held a monitor role for UNAVEM II and was
mainly in Angola to verify compliance with the ceasefire and disarm and demobilize Angolan warring parties (United Nations, 1994). The reason why the UN was granted such a limited role in UNAVEM II peacekeeping, according to Jeff (2019, p. 127), was because of the ‘continuing deep mistrust’ of warring parties among themselves, thus wanting to hold power to themselves. Similar to the case of Cambodia, the parties were having security dilemmas with each other and uncertainty about the UN's role in peacekeeping operations. It is a sign that the future disarmament and demobilization process would be in danger even before the implementation began.

By the end of 1991, the disarmament and demobilization plan had not moved anywhere. The MPLA feared UNITA because it only disarmed 50,000 out of its 70,000 forces (Somerville, 1993, p. 59). Closer to 1992, the MPLA became suspicious that UNITA might have more armed forces hiding in the country. Its security dilemma grew even higher, and it became pessimistic about the UN's role in disarmament, demobilization, and the peacekeeping process. During the beginning of 1992, UNITA also refused to let the MPLA's administration into their territories, which, in a way, added more insecurity for the MPLA (Somerville, 1993, p. 62).

Despite its smaller size and narrower objective than UNTAC, which logically should have been much quicker and easier to get approved, the disarmament and demobilization process of UNAVEM II was delayed way longer than UNTAC was and did not begin until April 1992, making it nine months behind the original schedule (Hill, 2005). When UNAVEM II started to deploy its mission, the process was also moving very slowly, losing the necessary momentum to show warring parties the mission’s capability to resolve their security dilemma (Somerville, 1993). Both delays in UNTAC and UNAVEM II affected their whole missions heavily and are essential
factors to consider in the status of the implementation phase. What factors account for the delay in the deployment?

1.3 Security Council’s Trilemma

The reason for the delay in deploying both UNTAC and UNAVEM II to Cambodia and Angola was the UN Security Council's Trilemma, in which the Council desired to minimize cost, minimize risk, and maximize success simultaneously. In 1992 alone, the UN deployed about 50,000 personnel in 13 peacekeeping missions that would cost them $3 billion every year (Boutros-Ghali, 1993). However, by June 1992, the members had paid only 25% of the UN peacekeeping budget, and 65% and 35% of the 1992 and 1991 regular budgets were outstanding. This statistic reflected that by June 1992, the UN budget was short by almost a full year (Durch, 1993). The UN began to cut corners on its budget for its 13 peacekeeping missions. Angola was one of the peacekeeping forces awaiting budget approval for six months. It was still waiting another three months for the budget to be approved after the operation had begun. Although UNAVEM II was authorized with a small and specific focus, it was still competing with other UN peacekeeping efforts in terms of budget. The UN was trying to save on costs during the UNAVEM II period. The UNAVEM II was up against multiple big UN missions regarding budget and attention, such as competing against the UNTAC in Cambodia and establishing missions in Kuwait, El Salvador, and many more between 1991 and 1992 (Lodico, 1996). Equipment for disarming and demobilizing warring parties was not purchased until the budget was approved, nine months later than the original plan (Fortna, 1993). Considering the size of Angola, which is equivalent to Western Europe, and the fact that the country did not have existing infrastructure in place, the
mission would not have had a high chance of success even with a high budget and proper attention, not to mention a limited budget as it already was (Berdal, 1993).

In the case of UNTAC, the Council delayed phase II by six months. The Security Council needed to be more transparent about UNTAC’s budget due to its desire to minimize the cost of peacekeeping operations. The Council declined the UN Secretariat's estimation of the budget planning and calculation a few times before approval. It demanded an extraordinarily detailed and specific budget plan for UNTAC, which translated into taking approval six months longer than expected (Awanohara, 1993). On the one hand, due to budget constraints, the Council was debating whether to cut the budget for particular objectives, such as refugee rehabilitation, or whether to include them (Thayer, 1992). On the other hand, there was debate about limiting the UNTAC operation just to the demobilization and disarmament of the warring parties and not on country reconciliation or protection of human rights (United States Information Service, 1992, as cited in Findlay, 2005), but that would be contrary to the UN second-generation peacekeeping goals.

It is evident that despite being the most extensive UN peacekeeping operation and receiving the most political attention and UN involvement for its mission at that time, the UN had to go through many other peacekeeping operations at similar periods, which made it challenging to loosen the budget for all of them and, as a result, affected the UNTAC mission's budget. For instance, before the UNTAC operation, there were other missions underway or being expected, such as the operations in Angola, El Salvador, Croatia, and Western Sahara that were all being organized at the same time by the UN Secretariat (Awanohara, 1993). Consequently, this Security Council's minimized cost goal pushed and pulled the budget for UNTAC for six months before officially letting personnel hit the ground. The Council's desire to minimize costs led to many
difficulties. The Council struggled to secure military personnel, civil police, and civilian staff for the Civil Administration and Human Rights Components and Electoral Components for UNTAC (Findlay, 1995). There needed to be more troops for UNTAC operations, as the Council was cutting down troops for other operations. Some troops initially assigned to UNTAC had also been switched to the United Nations Protection Force in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina (Findlay, 1995), causing a longer delay in the process.

Prolonged budget calculations were not the only reason why the UN deployment was delayed for both missions. On top of minimizing overall mission costs, at the same time, the Security Council was trying to minimize risk and maximize its mission success. For UNAVEM II, the UN did not agree to the request from warring parties to target the most prominent tasks but agreed to all six main tasks. As mentioned earlier, the mission was supposed to start the disarmament process two months after the parties signed the peace agreement but ended up starting almost one year later (Jett, 2019). For UNTAC, the budget or objective cutting was not going through because the Council was ambitious with its objectives. The Council ended up with not one or two but six significant project goals (UN Security Council, 1991, as cited in Findlay, 1995).

The UN Secretariat at headquarters was also dealing with another issue: putting together an extremely detailed plan for the UNTAC operation, regarded as the priority call of the Security Council (UN Security Council, 1991). Because this event was their most significant project, a detailed plan of how and where to use police and military personnel and specific functions and roles to minimize the risk associated with the mission was required. There were also delays in deployment caused by concerns from the UN's Field Operations Division that all necessary support and force infrastructure must be assured almost to the last detail before deploying even single
personnel to Cambodia (Berry, 2012). Not just in the case of UNTAC, the UN was stringent in using force and always prioritized personnel safety in general. Before deploying single personnel, the UN had to be detail-oriented about their possible life-threatening events because its members who sent personnel to support the missions would not be happy if the UN had not minimized personnel's risks (Findlay, 1995).

Due to this Security Council’s trilemma, the Council refused many proposals from the UN Secretariat, creating repetitive submissions. During the six months that UNTAC was working on cutting the budget, increasing mission objectives, and detailing how and where to use military personnel, it ended up losing the project's momentum (Findlay, 1995), which was supposed to be a rapid operation taking advantage of the element of surprise while UNAVEM II was trying to do the same thing (Jett, 2019).

As discussed earlier, the delay caused by the Security Council’s trilemma heavily disrupted the disarmament and demobilization processes. It increased the security dilemma between warring parties and spurred the existing warring parties' security dilemma that resulted from the unnatural ceasefire before the signing of peace accords. The high political tension created an almost impossible environment for the disarmament and demobilization stage, resumed the ceasefire in Cambodia, and undermined the conditions for future deployment and phase II of the operation.

2. Phase II: During the Peace Operation

Besides tolerating a window of opportunity for the emergence of a power struggle in Cambodia and Angola, the Security Council’s trilemma also undermined both UNTAC and
UNAVEM II missions during the operation and aggravated the already fragile security dilemma in both intrastate conflicts.

2.1 Maximize Success

The spurring security dilemma undermined Phase I of the UNTAC peace operation and the pre-implementation phase of UNAVEM II. Still, more severe trouble started when UNTAC moved into Phase II operations (Findlay, 1995) and UNAVEM II moved into its operation phase. The most challenging part that affected the UNTAC was its approach to disarming and demobilizing the four parties (Findlay, 1995). It is expected that during the negotiation process for peace agreements, diplomats and politicians tend to maximize the success of the negotiation by including many conditions, compromises, and requests from warring parties (Ferris, 1994). Because UNTAC was the UN's first, largest, and most complex mission beyond traditional peacekeeping, it tended to have exhausting mandates. Doing so, those who implemented it realized that completing their agreed-upon tasks was almost impossible (Findlay, 1995). For the UNTAC operation, each warring party noticed that they could interpret the unclear PPA to suit their interests. The most prominent problem was with whom the agreement referred to ‘foreign forces.’ Parties had different interpretations of the term (Ferris, 1994). For instance, the KR justified its refusal to demobilize and disarm itself by accusing the UNTAC of the inability to exile foreign forces from Cambodia through the manipulation tactic of the term ‘foreign forces’ (Ferris, 1994). The KR could not provide evidence or pinpoint exactly the location and how many foreign forces, precisely the Vietnamese forces, they believed were in Cambodia at that time, besides the foreign personnel sent by other UN supporters as a part of the operation (Findlay, 1995).
On top of abusing the term, the KR could also justify PPA ceasefire violations due to an unclear and exhausted mandate. After many negotiations with the UN, the KR promised to comply with the ceasefire in Phase II only if the UNTAC met its demands. Those include requests for the UN to ensure the Vietnamese military that left would not return to Cambodia, for the UN to take complete control of the temporarily installed government (Phnom Penh Post, 1993), and to draw a clear border between Vietnam and Cambodia (Asia Watch, 1993). Later, they demanded that the UNTAC deport all Vietnamese from Cambodia and completely dissolve the temporarily installed government (Phnom Penh Post, 1993). The KR insisted on interpreting and manipulating the mandate, consistently violating the peace agreement, and rejecting the UNTAC troops to canton its forces (United Nations, 1993). While some demands were too absurd, which the UNTAC could not fulfill, the KR had a reason to justify its ceasefire violation.

Besides the vague terms and exhausted mandate that allowed warring parties to manipulate them, the mandate's guidance could also have been more precise on UNTAC's use of force. The mandate did not specify any charter of the UN; thereby, officials assumed it fell between charters VI and VII of the peace settlement and peace enforcement. The clauses on self-defense and the controlled use of force no doubt needed extra clarification (Secretary-General, 1992, as cited in Findlay, 1995). That being said, there needed to be a guideline on the use of force in the event of non-compliance (Hill, 2005). Even though there was a brief discussion on the assumption of possible non-compliance by the KR, the mandate needed to provide comprehensive guidelines and handy strategies to UNTAC regarding the matter (Berry, 2012). The mandate must also include effective reinforcement or punishment mechanisms to tackle the issues (Akashi, 1993). On the contrary, the mandate relied on good faith and, at least, with confidence that all factions would comply accordingly (Findlay, 1995).
In many aspects, the UNAVEM II mandate was way more troublesome than UNTAC. Many of the inadequacies witnessed in UNAVEM II could have been avoided with a more precise, focused, and clear mandate, especially on the future of disarmed and demobilized combatants. Margaret Anstee, UNAVEM II’s Secretary-General, complained so often that the nature of the Angolan Peace Accord had been the root cause of UNAVEM II's limitations in maintaining the ceasefire and for the mission to disarm and demobilize the MPLA and UNITA (see Jett, 2019, Hill, 2005). The UNAVEM II mandate might be smaller compared to other UN mandates that have ever been implemented if looking at only its size and budget. However, if looking at the budget compared with the tasks required for the mandate to be fulfilled, it relatively was not that small. With 840 personnel and civilian election observers and a $132 million budget approved (Hill, 2005), the mandate should be considered ambitious and broad for its size, which means the mission would be more likely to succeed in handling big tasks such as monitoring the ceasefire, disarming, and demobilizing armed forces. The UNAVEM II should be approved with more budget and personnel. UNAVEM II was ambitious in its way because a $132 million mission could not do so many tasks at the same time.

On top of that, while the UNTAC mandate was unclear and allowed the KR to occasionally manipulate the terms and justify its ceasefire violations, which later on increased security dilemmas through military clashes among warring parties, UNAVEM II increased warring parties' security dilemma differently. The mandate was unclear and did not include any direct clause about providing security for the future of disarmed and demobilized combatants. It also did not provide a clear outlook to support the disarmed and demobilized armed forces integrating into civilian lives, such as skills, jobs, and vocational training (Anstee, 1996). Armed forces had been fighting their entire lives and did not know what else they could do to support themselves; without proper
guidance, they would not feel safe and secure enough to leave their military lives behind. This concern was true to the UNITA armed forces the most. The UNITA armed forces were more concerned with guerilla welfare, while the government forces were more conventional. Therefore, without support from a third party like the UN, UNITA would have to stay where they were because they had no home to go to (Berdal, 1996).

2.2 Minimize Risk

Even though during the implementation phase, UNAVEM II and UNTAC operations were devastated by the Security Council’s desire to maximize success, what held them back and intensified the failure of both missions to disarm and demobilize former combatants was the Security Council's desire to minimize risk. UNTAC's whole operation was devastated by a ceasefire violation from the KR. However, to minimize the causality risk as much as possible, UNTAC found every way to avoid confrontation with the KR. These included drawing back on self-restraint and the restriction of 'using forces only in self-defense' (Findlay, 1995). It chose a diplomatic approach to deal with the KR's non-compliance by hosting peaceful dialogues rather than going for peace enforcement (Findlay, 1995).

The problem came when UNTAC failed to present its authority more assertively and forcefully and refused to challenge the KR as soon as possible, especially when the force was not out of control. With its technical capacity, heavy weapons, and how foreign warring parties were with UNTAC, UNTAC could take advantage of the element of surprise (Findlay, 1995). For instance, the failure of UNTAC to respond to the "bamboo pole" incident in early 1992, to a large extent, lowered its legitimacy in the KR's eyes. The bamboo pole incident happened around May 1992, during which the KR tried to defy the UN’s role in the operation. The Dutch battalion
attempted to deploy its force without the UN’s involvement close to the ‘Bamboo Pole Checkpoint’, an area between Pailin and Thailand that was occupied by the KR force (Chopra et al., 1993). However, the Dutch were rejected by the KR, and by the time UNTAC got there, the UNTAC force was also sent back by the KR, causing a one-sided incident in which UNTAC refused to use any forces against the KR’s halting of its police force (United Nations, 1992, June 12). Its failure to respond encouraged the KR and other factions to contemplate that they could abuse their power, and no matter how they acted, UNTAC would not strike back (Findlay, 1995). As a result, full-scale armed conflicts occurred in some areas of Cambodia soon after due to UNTAC’s weakness (Asia Watch, 1993). There were options for UNTAC in this situation that had already been done in other peacekeeping, such as in Somalia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. The first option was to use force against the KR and other factions, taking advantage of the tremendous international forces backed by the UN and dropping the self-defense mindset behind the back. The second option was to modify the mandate and the functions of its operation and emphasize the risk of physical danger to clarify the guidelines regarding peacekeeping force use (Berry, 2012). Surprisingly, UNTAC did not implement either of the options.

A clear illustration of UNTAC’s minimized risk was the disagreement between the UNAMIC’s Military Commander and UNTAC’s Deputy Military Commander. The former was removed from his post immediately after claiming that he would likely risk the death of 200 personnel if it were meant to end the KR’s threats to the mission (Chanda, 1992). He did not get his supervisor to consent to his proposal, and the Secretariat General told the press that he was devastated by the Military Commander’s comment on this issue. On the other hand, he would not risk 200 personnel’s lives because it is premature, and country members would also withdraw troops from Cambodia (Shenon, 1992).
The problem with how the UN was utilizing risk minimization was also evident in UNAVEM II. The head of mission of UNAVEM II, Margaret Anstee, was criticized for not being aggressive enough with non-compliance in terms of ceasefire violation, disarmament, and demobilization (Jeff, 2019). After the UNITA and MPLA forces clashed in the northern town of Malarjie, the security situation between the two became worse. Multiple incidents occurred and called for the UN to deploy peacekeepers to facilitate the situation, yet the UN did not send single personnel to deal with the issue (Jeff, 2019).

Moreover, instead of approaching the UNITA and MPLA more forcefully, Anstee always sought diplomatic fashion to deal with non-compliance. First, Anstee tried to influence the prominent donors and convince them to directly influence the UNITA and MPLA. Anstee met with international donors and supporters and asked them to put more pressure on warring parties (Anstee, 1996). This diplomatic approach to forcing changes in behavior did not present the mission with power and capability and granted her little success.

In addition, Anstee also complained that, despite the seven main tasks of the Angolan peace accord, the UN was only granted a marginal role in executing the mandate. By marginal role, Anstee did not necessarily refer to the small mandate or limited role that she had compared to a big mandate like the UNTAC but to the fact that she never felt in control of structures that relied entirely on the parties’ self-ability to demobilize and good faith (Strategic Survey, 1993, as cited in Jett, 2019). Even though UNAVEM II did not grant the UN as much direct involvement as UNTAC did, it still granted the UN a monitoring role and, most importantly, the ability to make decisions in cases of non-compliance with the peace accord. Nevertheless, the UN did not utilize this role. The Security Council also chose to ignore the non-compliance to demobilize and disarm
in the most non-confrontational way possible (Jett, 2019). In September 1992, when the MPLA and UNITA declared they had formally abolished their armed forces even though they had not, the international community did not confront them (Anstee, 1996).

2.3 Minimize Cost

Another holdback to the success of UNAVEM II and UNTAC in disarming and demobilizing warring parties was the Security Council’s desire to minimize cost. For UNTAC, funding was cut off from the actual assessed amount from time to time, and UNTAC personnel to run the operation were also short by numbers. Even though the Council did not remove some objectives to cut down costs when it first approved the budget, we saw the Council trying to cut down the budget along the way (Findlay, 1995). The actual budget estimation was $1.6 billion, yet the final cost authorized was only $1.5 billion, approximately $100 million under budget (United Nations, 1993). The financial assistance donated by the UN member states was also later than scheduled, which prevented the project from reaching its full potential (Jennar, 1994). Four months into the mission, the UN was still working on approving the budget. The preparatory mission, UNAMIC, was working on accumulating $45 million four months after it was deployed but failed to do so until February 1992, when the General Assembly gathered enough partial funding to approve emergency requests for $200 million to smooth the deployment of UNTAC (The Economist, 1992, as cited in Hill, 2005). The lack of an overall budget and timely budget approval continued to interrupt the smooth deployment of UNTAC personnel.

As discussed in the Peace Agreement and Phase I sections, there was a gap between the appropriate civilian-to-personnel ratio and the actual authorized troops for other peacekeeping operations, which were also under operation in a similar time frame. Hence, troops were switched
from UNTAC to UNPROFOR and other missions (Findlay, 1995). For instance, UNTAC failed to gather enough personnel to secure polling on election day, the most important day of the operation. It then requested backing from all warring parties to guide voters, even though the KR declined to offer help (Ferris, 1994); luckily, the KR did not fully attack election day; otherwise, the UNTAC mission would fail due to the Security Council's desire to minimize cost. Larger military troops, a more purposeful military outlook, and diplomatic pressure might have intimidated the KR and three other factions instead of a purely diplomatic outlook (de Beer, 1992).

The bigger problem did not lie with the $100 million under budget overall at the end of the mission but with how the UN always approved funding late during the mission (Hill, 2005). As a result of the delayed funding, by April 1992, UNTAC had deployed only about 3,700 personnel out of 15,900. By June 1992, when UNTAC moved to Phase II, the same problem persisted, as there were only four battalions deployed instead of eight battalions authorized. These four battalions were not enough to accommodate demobilizing and disarming armed forces while simultaneously demining and constructing shelters (United Nations, 1992). The four other battalions reached Cambodia by July 1992, but it was already late. The following September, UNTAC was still at 800 forces of its capacity (United Nations, 1992). Even Akashi himself was not appointed until two full months into the mission. He agreed that the big problem was in New York over funding and equipment (Lewis, 1992). At this point, the mission was deployed six months later than planned, which aggravated the warring parties' security dilemma resulting from an unnatural ceasefire. Two months after that six-month delay, the UN representative was not even in Cambodia to lead the project (Hill, 2005), adding more security dilemma to the warring parties about the future of disarmament and demobilization.
Even though funding was a huge problem for UNTAC and almost all UN peacekeeping missions, it was way worse for UNAVEM II. The Security Council’s desire to minimize costs interrupted the whole disarmament and demobilization of the armed forces during the operation. The mandate lacked appropriate resources to pay resettlement allowances to support the transition journey for disarming soldiers. Soldiers were paid only about $15 daily, not enough to survive. The disarmament and demobilization of the armed forces were slowed by their difficulty in arriving at their designated areas because they were remote. These remote areas made it almost impossible for the parties to supply their armed forces with basic needs, such as proper housing, medicine, food, clothes, and water (United Nations Security Council, 1992). The forces were unpaid, underfed, and deserted in such remote areas, drastically increasing the crime rate around the areas and the insecurity level of the whole disarmament and demobilization (Somerville, 1993). This lack of funding for the armed forces severely affected the disarmament and demobilization of the armed forces and the UN monitoring operation (Ginifer, 1995). No matter how remote the areas were, if more funding was approved, there should be enough transportation equipment to speed up the process for soldiers to arrive at their designated areas.

Witnessing this challenge and seeing how important it was to increase the UNAVEM II budget then, Anstee appealed to the Security Council for budget revision. Nevertheless, the UN rejected her request for a larger budget because the Security Council did not determine the budget based on the budget needed but on how much the donors could give (Jett, 2019). When she discussed this matter with the Portuguese official, she got a warning from the Secretary-General for interacting with third parties beyond the UN (Anstee, 1996). When Anstee tried to be creative by asking for more funding and personnel to fulfill the need for the mission voluntarily directly from the UN member states, the Secretary-General also blocked her from executing this innovative
way she came up with (Anstee, 1996). She requested only $44.7 million, but the UN headquarters strictly refused the query (Berdal, 1996, as cited in Jett, 2019). Therefore, the vocational training programs Anstee hoped to use to relieve the security dilemma of disarming and demobilizing armed forces did not come to reality, preventing her from escalating the situation to a more positive side (Anstee, 1996).
V. CONCLUSION

From the analysis of both the pre-implementation and implementation phases of UNTAC and UNAVEM II, characterized as two different types of peacekeeping regarding the nature of the peace agreement, mandate, and budget size, it is evident that an unnatural ceasefire did affect the security dilemma between parties heavily because the warring parties did not reconcile naturally but instead were diplomatically forced to accept ceasefire terms by third parties. The evidence was clear with the Angolan Peace Accord and the Paris Peace Agreement. The analysis of both peace missions also showed that the Security Council's trilemma worsened the already fragile security dilemma warring parties had that resulted from an unnatural ceasefire. This case was evident in both the pre-implementation and implementation phases of UNAVEM II and UNTAC, in which the Security Council's trilemma delayed the mandated deployment of both missions by six and nine months, respectively, which increased the warring parties' security dilemma even more. The Security Council's trilemma in the implementation process was why the mandate could not handle the tasks correctly, which was also evident in both cases. Therefore, despite UNAVEM II and UNTAC differences, both mandates faced the exact consequences of disarming and demobilizing warring parties' armed forces.

For the future scope of study, I aim to expand the paper beyond the Cambodia and Angola case studies. I plan on using the Nested Comparative Analysis to improve the external validity of the study, in which I will use the quantitative method to look for a relationship between the Security Council’s Trilemma and Warring Parties’ Security Dilemma and the UN’s failure to disarm and
demobilize warring parties by using large-N data. After getting a positive relationship between the independent and dependent variables, I will use qualitative analysis in terms of in-depth comparative analysis to show the causal mechanism between the variables, using the most different and most similar cases simultaneously to visualize the causal relationships. More than two case studies, with and without the same outcomes, will be used for the analysis.
REFERENCES


