
Tyson Odoo Juma
tysonodoo@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/allgraduate-thesesdissertations

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/allgraduate-thesesdissertations/7829

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Research & Artistry at Huskie Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Research Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Huskie Commons. For more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.
ABSTRACT

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, POVERTY AND SOCIAL CASH TRANSFERS: THE POLITICS OF FINANCING DISABILITY-INCLUSIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN KENYA

Tyson Odoo Juma, MA
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2023
Alesha Porisky, Director

What explains why the Persons With Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer (PWSD-CT) program receives limited financial support for expansion relative to the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT) and Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) programs? I interrogate this question by exploring three potential explanations: the political incentive to build a voter base, inadequacy in financial resources and weaker institutional advocacy. Using Kenya as a case study, I rely on key informant interviews, document analysis and a mini-survey to collect data. My theoretical and empirical strategy is two-fold. First, I analyze relevant program documents and interview transcripts to gain insight into the politics behind the financing of cash transfer programs. I then corroborate the findings of my analysis with a mini-survey aimed at establishing the most important factor that explains the limited financing of the PWSD-CT program. Principally, I find that the political motivation to build a voter base and inadequacy in financial resources influence the underfunding of the disability-targeted cash transfer program. The analysis further advances that this political motivation has the most significant effect of
the three factors examined. Essentially, parliamentarians in Kenya are driven by concerns around building their voter blocks during competitive elections. As a result, they intentionally target social welfare spending during parliamentary budgetary discussions and allocations towards populations that will likely support them - this being the elderly who are beneficiaries of the OPCT program, while excluding people with disabilities because they are deemed to be politically less salient. However, the findings also shed light on the fact that whilst state financial resources are scarce and play a secondary role, there is greater lack of political goodwill among parliamentarians to effectively prioritize lobbying for policies that ensure increase in resources and effective provision of a disability-inclusive social protection system. This thesis suggests that because of the categorical nature with which cash transfer programs are separated in Kenya, it makes it easy for politicians to specifically target welfare financing towards the elderly.
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, POVERTY AND SOCIAL CASH TRANSFERS: THE
POLITICS OF FINANCING DISABILITY-INCLUSIVE SOCIAL
PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN KENYA

BY

TYSON ODOO JUMA
©2023 Tyson O. Juma

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE
MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Thesis Director:
Alesha Porisky
The single story creates stereotypes, and the problem with stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. They turn one story into the only story.

Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The chance to write this MA thesis has been a profound privilege, yet the quest has occasionally felt lonely, long and sometimes arduous. As challenging as the journey was sometimes, I bear unreserved and sincere gratitude to a community of amazing souls that supported my navigation of this path, and helped make this possible. It certainly takes a village to get this kind of work put off the door!

First, I thank my mentor, advisor and thesis committee chair Dr. Alesha Porisky. She always gave me so much rare flexibility and often found time to touch base with me, giving inexhaustible guidance, detailed feedback and exhortation in the entire process of writing this piece of scholarly work. For her warm support, reading multiple versions of this work and invaluable kindness, I am forever grateful and remain inspired. Her expertise in social protection programs in low- and middle-income countries has bolstered my research in profound ways. Thank you for giving life to my path!

I also proffer immeasurable gratitude to Dr. Aarie Glas, Dr. Michael Clark and Dr. Kheang Un whose brilliant input shaped my thinking around the theoretical approach I employed in this study. Thank you for keeping me in the right direction through the comments and constructive criticisms of this work, which proved to be a timely asset for the progress and improvement of this thesis. Your indefatigable comments inspired better versions of this thesis, leading to this final piece.

I thank Julie Ann O'Connell, Betsy Hull, and Stephanie Kummerer for their support and encouragement. They opened their doors to me, hosting me at times during breaks and making it feel like I had a “second home” with them and their families. Their invaluable assistance and openness was beyond friendship, and I am forever indebted to them. To Dr. Alicia Schatteman and the entire family at the NIU Center for Nonprofit and NGO Studies (NNGO), I extend my heartfelt gratitude for giving me the keys and access to Zulauf Room 101 where I was able to let myself loose during this intellectual endeavor. I also owe the Center a lot because they gave me a 2-year Graduate Assistantship that made it possible for me to study. Additionally, I appreciate the travel grant from the Department of Political Science, together with the Dr. Russell Smith Memorial Endowment Fund – without which, this academic journey would not have been possible!
A special and warm thank you to Sharon Bush. I profoundly derived undying cheerfulness, a stream of balance and inspiration from our conversations. On multiple occasions with you, I found laughter, sanity and immense love - instances that reminded me to serve myself with utmost grace in this academic path. Also, inviting me to spend the holidays with your family was an act of endless kindness and love that I will always remember. To the Grand Victoria Foundation (GVF) family, I want to say thank you for giving me a rewarding internship while I was getting my MA degree. Extending the opportunity to me reoriented my thoughts to think more profoundly about how my studies can better impact social policies for the betterment of society. I am also deeply thankful to Prof. Teresa Wesonga and Prof. Andrew Otieno, whose advice guided and encouraged me as I made headway with this research study. Opening your doors to me and allowing me to break bread with you as we shared some Kenyan meals felt like a “homegoing” experience; I couldn’t thank you enough.

Tyson Odoo Juma
Illinois, United States of America (USA)
June 19th, 2023
DEDICATION

To my *gogo* (grandma) Alice Akinyi, Sandra Dieffenthaler & Michael Dieffenthaler
For cheerfully investing in me and laying a fantastic foundation; for an education that would have been impossible to obtain otherwise!

&

To me, Tyson Odoo Juma
For my tenacity, unwavering spirit, resilience, and determination; for cheerfully striving to overcome isolation and find community - locking arms with like-minded individuals who have consistently supported me throughout this life and piece of work.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF APPENDICES</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2: THE PUZZLE</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3: EXISTING AND ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4: METHODS AND DATA</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Number of Enrolled Program Beneficiaries as of November 2019</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Budgetary Allocations of CT Programs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>A Portfolio of CT Programs Deployed in Kenya during COVID-19 Pandemic</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Number of Countries in Africa Extending Cash Transfer Programs</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Overview of the Main Cash Transfer Programs in Kenya</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>An Overview of Data Collection Tools</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>An Outline of the Interview Respondents Engaged Based on their Roles</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8</td>
<td>The Most Important Variable Explaining Limitations in the Financing of the PWSD-CT Program</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1: Prevalence of Poverty among PWSD and People without Disabilities
Figure 2: The Discrepancy Between % of Poor People and People Covered by SP in Africa
Figure 3: Government Disbursements to the PWSD-CT
Figure 4: Disparities in Cash Transfers Mentions in Parliamentary Proceedings
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A</td>
<td>THESIS WORK PLAN</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B</td>
<td>INTERVIEW GUIDE/QUESTIONNAIRE</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C</td>
<td>INFORMED CONSENT FORM</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D</td>
<td>IRB APPROVAL NOTICE</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix E</td>
<td>CT PROGRAMS DEPLOYED IN KENYA, DURING COVID-19</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Cash Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT-OVC</td>
<td>Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Financial Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHs</td>
<td>Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSNP</td>
<td>Hunger Safety Net Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNCHR</td>
<td>Kenya National Commission on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIHBS</td>
<td>Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>Kenya Institute of Public Policy, Research and Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNBS</td>
<td>Kenya National Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPHC</td>
<td>Kenya Population and Housing Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kshs.</td>
<td>Kenya Shillings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMICs</td>
<td>Low and Middle-Income Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLSP</td>
<td>Ministry of Labor and Social Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs</td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCPWD</td>
<td>National Council for Persons with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGEC</td>
<td>National Gender and Equality Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSNP</td>
<td>National Safety Net Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPS</td>
<td>National Social Protection Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCT</td>
<td>Older Persons Cash Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSNP</td>
<td>Productive Safety Net Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWSD-CT</td>
<td>Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDSP</td>
<td>State Department for Social Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDPK</td>
<td>United Disabled People of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UDCRPD  United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
UNDESA  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
In Kenya, inequality and poverty incidence still persist despite the country’s economic progress aimed at improving citizens’ livelihoods. According to the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS, 2015/2016; KNBS, 2018), an estimated 36% of the country’s 47.6 million people$^1$ live on less than the international poverty line of US$1.90 per day. Correspondingly, persons with disabilities are increasingly more likely to live in poverty (Hanass-Hanock and McKenzie, 2017; UNDESA, 2018).

Since 2004, the Kenyan government has been strategically extending social protection interventions, including non-contributory social assistance policy programs like cash transfers. This is in an effort to support vulnerable populations, tackle socioeconomic inequalities and alleviate poverty in the country. Cash transfers have actually been widely implemented across many global south countries, but the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2021) reports low coverage of cash benefits for persons with severe disabilities. These social policy programs have however been adopted in countries like Kenya, but at the backdrop of local politics convergence with global policy transfer (Ouma, 2020; Opalo, 2021). Inextricably, the country also bears a history of contentious ethnic politics, even as the provision of such public goods remains deeply associated with ethnic favoritism by policymakers (Kramon and Posner, 2016; Opalo, 2021).

---

$^1$ The 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census (KPHC)
The Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer (PWSD-CT), the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT) and the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) are among the mainstream cash transfer programs implemented by the Kenyan government. As part of the National Social Protection Policy framework which aims to provide basic social security assurance for all, these programs are conceptualized and coordinated under the 2011 National Safety Net Program, NSNP (Republic of Kenya, 2011; Porisky, 2020; Porisky et al., 2022). Additionally, the cash transfers are predominantly government funded, with technical and financial support coming from aid donors and international development partners that guide the design and delivery of social assistance.

People living with disabilities account for over 3.5% of Kenya’s population2 with the 2019 Census Data reporting the number to be over 1.3 million individuals in need of support (KIPPRA, 2022). However, the PWSD-CT program coverage currently stands at 47,692 individual households that are deemed eligible to access the program - a number that is lower compared to the number of individuals covered by the OPCT and CT-OVC programs. There have not been any huge program expansions undertaken in recent years, even as the definition of what constitutes “disability” within the disability cash benefit program-eligibility criteria remains narrow - a poor individual requiring 24-hour care support. Table 1 below shows the differences in the number of enrolled beneficiaries across the programs.

---

2 Osomu et al. (2022). Special Paper on Enhancing Inclusivity by Empowering Persons With Disabilities (PWDs). See also KIPPRA (2022)
The annual budgetary funding of the disability-specific program has further been reportedly low in the country, perpetually maintained at Kshs. 1.2 billion (roughly US $9.7 million). This is out of over Kshs. 120.2 billion (approximately US $970.1 million) allotted annually to the State Department for Social Protection (SDSP) from the period FY2017/2018 to FY2021/2022 (Owino et al., 2021). Expenditure patterns on the other hand show that the OPCT program remains the most resourced cash transfer program by the Government of Kenya, accounting for over 43.6% of the SDSP budgetary allocation (Owino et al., 2021). Notwithstanding these trends and variations, it is still unclear what explains why the PWSD-CT program receives limited support for expanded financing relative to the OPCT and CT-OVC programs, which are more politically supported.
Table 2: Budgetary Allocations for Cash Transfer Programs as a Proportion of the Social Protection Budget, FY2017/2018 to FY2021/2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>Total Budgetary Allocation (FY2017/2018 - FY2021/2022)</th>
<th>% of Budgetary Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPCT</td>
<td>Kshs. 52.4 Billion (Approximately US $422.9 million)</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT - OVC</td>
<td>Kshs. 8 Billion (Approximately US $64.6 million)</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWSD - CT</td>
<td>Kshs. 1.2 Billion (Approximately US $9.7 million)</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aforementioned inconsistencies principally illuminate how social protection policies are inherently political in Kenya. Scholars such as Bossuroy and Coudouel (2018) have documented that the government’s commitment to scaling redistributive initiatives towards supporting vulnerable populations (including the elderly, orphans and the disabled) is subject to political debates; which are often hinged on contested ideologies, interests and incentives.

I build on a single-case study research design that focuses on policymaking at the national level to investigate the motives that inform how political actors and institutional agencies negotiate the financing and advocacy for the scaling of disability-inclusive social protection programs. I define political actors as including appointed government officials, elected politicians and aid donor groups, while institutions include civil society organizations (CSOs) and agencies responsible for coordinating disability issues in Kenya, such as the National Council for Persons with Disabilities (NCPWD), United Disabled People of Kenya (UDPK), Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
(KNCHR) and National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC). This thesis analyzes three lines of inquiry in order to understand the observed variations in the financing of cash transfer programs that have incentivized the under provision for people with disabilities. First, the political incentive to build a voter base - the PWSD-CT program is perceived as less politically salient than the OPCT and CT-OVC programs. Political elites seeking re-election to office have a tendency to view households with the elderly and orphans as a source of votes. This leads to the extensive advocacy for the financing of the OPCT and CT-OVC programs, while neglecting the PWSD-CT program which targets a category of vulnerable groups that are not electorally attractive as a voter base or constituency. Second, the inadequacy in financial resources - the resources available to effectively and efficiently scale cash transfer programs are insufficient, prompting policymakers to limit budgetary allocation for expanding disability-specific categories of social safety nets programs and potentially exclude poor and disabled individuals. Third, weaker institutional advocacy - people with disabilities seem to lack a consolidated and meaningful political voice of activism to responsively structure their needs and advocate for the increased financing of their program. Institutions dealing with disability issues seem to be working in silos, limiting their capacity to deliver for disabled populations who merit increased support and coverage.

The overarching question I probe in this thesis is; why does the PWSD-CT program in Kenya receive limited financing and less support for expansion than the OPCT and CT-OVC programs, which have broader support for increased financing and scaling? I find that the political incentive among Kenyan legislators to build a voter base and the inadequacy in financial resources greatly influence the

---

3 Efficiency herein implies the maximization of allocated budgetary/fiscal resources to the cash transfer programs, to realize intended outcomes at the lowest workable cost.
underfunding of the disability cash transfer program. I further show that this political motivation factor has the most significant effect of the three lines of inquiry examined. Essentially, Kenyan parliamentarians who are the state’s primary policymakers and legislators are driven by concerns around building their voter base during elections. As a result, they intentionally target social welfare spending and allocations towards populations that will likely support them during elections (which tend to be hotly contested in Kenya) - this being older persons, while excluding people with disabilities because they are deemed to be politically less salient. My findings underscore the fact that whilst state financial resources are scarce in Kenya, there is wider lack of political goodwill among parliamentarians to effectively prioritize lobbying for policies that ensure increase in resources and effective provision of a disability-inclusive social protection system. I unravel the “behind the scenes” political debates and policymaking conversations that influence the financing of social assistance programs targeting poor and vulnerable populations in the country. As African governments seek to minimize their dependency and overreliance on aid donor support while rapidly bolstering cash transfer programs (Opalo, 2021) and promoting the local ownership of social policy programs, this study has practical implications for future social policy development and sustainable delivery in Kenya. It is worth noting that by examining this puzzle in Kenya, the findings herein are Kenyan specific and speak broadly to this context.

**Structure of the Thesis**

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: subsequent to the introduction above, a primer on the puzzle is provided in chapter 2 below. Chapter 3 presents a discussion of some of the existing and potential explanations anchored in the literature on distributive politics and social protection policymaking processes in Africa. Chapter 3 outlines the methodological approach, including key
informant interviews, document analysis and survey feedback pursued as data collection sources. The research findings and analysis are presented and discussed in Chapter 4. The thesis concludes in Chapter 5 with a summary that revisits my research question, synthesizes the study findings, summarizes my arguments, situates the contributions of the research within the broader literature of social protection programs in LMICs and highlights possible areas of future research.
CHAPTER 2
THE PUZZLE

The inadequacy in funding allocations for the PWSD-CT program starkly exposes weaknesses in government’s infrastructural systems and capacity to effectively deliver for this category of the vulnerable in the society, persons with disabilities. The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic distinctly brought to light the implications of this. While global trends unveiled case examples of shock-responsive social protection programs adapted and expanded by governments and non-state actors like aid donors and international development agencies - as effective measures to mitigate the negative economic challenges of the Covid-19 crisis including inequality and poverty (Gentilini et al., 2021; Banerjee et al., 2020; Lustig et al., 2020) - Beazley et al. (2021; p. 17) contends that Kenya seemed to lack the adequate capacity to enhance the necessary adaptations that would rapidly extend social assistance to people with disabilities. Fundamentally, the state had not developed a robust disability management information system to prioritize the management of its disability affairs, something that is being undertaken at present. Additionally, its social protection systems had not been robustly made “shock-responsive,” as expansions had not been supported for a number of years.

Table 3 (see Appendix E) features a portfolio of cash transfer programs deployed in Kenya by different stakeholders (both government and non-state) as part of a response strategy aimed at shielding vulnerable households from the effects of the Covid-19 crisis. Specific to people with disabilities, Doyle and Ikutwa (2021) propounded that President Uhuru Kenyatta’s regime allocated
in 2020 over Kshs. 500 million (approximately US $4.5 million) to the state agency for people with disabilities NCPWD, aimed at extending cash transfer support to cushion PWDs in the short-term against the negative implications of Covid-19. However, a Human Rights Watch Report (HRW, 2021) reveals that the implementation of the cash transfer intervention together with other pandemic-related programs were riddled with corruption, irregularities and manipulated beneficiary lists that included over 1,290 non-deserving cronies and individuals (Kivuva, 2022). This led to limited coverage and support, pointing to possible difficulties and challenges for future shock-responsive cash transfer programs by the state targeting people with disabilities.

The prevalence of poverty is furthermore higher among persons with disabilities compared to people without disabilities, and this is more likely to exacerbate over time. A systematic review conducted across sub-Saharan Africa found that persons with disabilities were economically more poorer in over 81% of the country-cases examined (Banks et al., 2017). The review restricted poverty assessments along the indicators of socio-economic status, income and assets. Additionally, data derived from the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 2015/2016 (see Figure 1 below) shows that overall poverty prevalence among PWDs was at an alarming rate of 41.6% compared to 35.9% among people without disabilities. Even as the burden of poverty and vulnerability continues to be higher among people with disabilities, limitations in funding allocations is likely to remain aggravated as evidenced by present cash transfer budgetary disbursement allocations.
This demonstrated gap in the funding and support for expansion of the cash transfer program targeting people with disabilities demands a deeper and wider assessment, which is the primary ambition of this research study. More precisely, I attentively trace the involved patterns and processes to find evidence among policymakers, legislators and broader institutional actors accounting for why people with disabilities have been underprovided for! I employ different sources of evidence - to conduct this study, including key informant interviews with political and institutional actors, document analysis and a mini-survey. By critically examining and understanding the politics of supporting the financing of social assistance programs, this thesis contributes to the evolving body of literature on the political economy of social protection in Africa and other regions. Social protection policies remain products of give-and-take and contestations in democracies like Kenya; and as such I explore whether the categorical separation of cash transfer programs in Kenya has greater implications of underproviding for people with disabilities unlike some other Global South contexts where social
assistance programs are subsumed under a joint single program. Primarily, this is what makes Kenya a good choice of case study - it has all these multiple programs rather than one integrated program.

Across Africa, much of the existing accounts on social protection policymaking (Ouma, 2020) and literature on the distributive politics of cash transfers have stressed on the capacity and roles played by varied actors including aid donors and elected/appointed politicians in establishing the transfer and domestication of social assistance policies. Essentially, they have focused on the general adoption and design of programs. However, they have not paid careful attention to the examination of whether or not the categorical targeting of cash transfers for people with disabilities is motivated by issues of electoral politics, inadequacy in financial resources or weaker institutional advocacy. Also, many academic studies that have been undertaken so far have not talked about the issue of categorical funding for social assistance programs for people with disabilities in Africa, which is something this thesis seeks to address.

At the heart of my research study herein is therefore the examination of three possible lines of inquiry as aforementioned; the political incentive to build a voter base, inadequacy in financial resources and weaker institutional advocacy. If political actors are driven by the concerns around building their voter base during elections, they will intentionally target social welfare spending towards populations that will likely support them while excluding people with disabilities for they are deemed to be politically less salient. If financial resources are scarce, then funding allocations will be distributed in a way that facilitates the reduction of program costs, thereby leading to the marginalization and exclusion of some categories of poor and vulnerable groups i.e. people with disabilities. Finally, if existing institutions and disability rights advocacy groups (acting on behalf of people with disabilities) front a
unified alliance in structuring the needs of people with disabilities in Kenya, they could push policymakers to allocate more money to the PWSD-CT program.

These lines of inquiry are not mutually exclusive. Within the web of social assistance policymaking processes, different political actors may be driven by different motives at varied times, or a single actor may be stimulated by multiple motives at once. To corroborate my lines of inquiry, I mostly looked for strong confirmations in the form of written evidence or direct statements from political actors. In any event that I encounter the absence of direct statements and written evidence confirming these lines of inquiry, this does not prove the potential explanations are wrong. However, there may be competing explanations which I have not considered ex ante. In addition, policymakers may not wish to admit that they excluded people with disabilities from inclusive financing for the motives tested, even if they actually did so! As such, the validity of evidence I gathered from my critical assessment was enhanced by triangulating across the different sources of data.
CHAPTER 3
EXISTING AND ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS

Extant studies of social safety nets have accentuated cash transfer programs as subject to intense electoral manipulation by political actors in democracies, even as policymakers tend to allocate funds towards social protection programs in a way that builds them electoral support (Cox, 2009). In a similar vein, van de Walle (2014) contends that whilst the process of democratization can drive considerable engagement of poor citizens in politics, the voices of vulnerable groups like people with disabilities can be misrepresented. This is as a result of their narrow participation in electoral politics particularly in Africa and the global south where their autonomy to participate in politics has been largely curtailed (Diaz-Cayeros, 2016). While the commitment of policymakers and political actors to the financing of inclusive redistributive social policies (that better address the concerns of all poor people) is not a simple task, this study engages two bodies of dominant and mainstream scholarly research studies on the politics of social policies. These include scholarly accounts of the national-level adoption of social protection policies in Africa, and the distributive politics literature. In this chapter, I engage these dominant research paradigms within the social policy space to bring about a critical and deeper understanding of the existing blind spots within the politics of financing disability-inclusive social assistance policy programs in democratic contexts like Kenya.

The Expansion of Social Protection Programs in Africa

In the past two decades, cash transfer programs have been enthusiastically adopted and extended by national governments, donor agencies and international development partners in the global south
(Schmitt, 2020; Bender et al., 2014). This has raised their prominence as critical social protection strategies aimed at supporting poor and vulnerable populations, reducing poverty, inequalities and promoting socio-economic growth (World Bank, 2012; Abay et al., 2021). In Africa, Ferguson (2015) contends that only 4% of the continent’s 54 countries had domesticated cash transfer policies by the 2000s with the assistance of donor agencies; but a new wave of the diffusion of cash transfers was witnessed bringing the number of countries that have adopted the social assistance programs to about 76% which translates to about 41 countries (UNDP, 2019). The Global experience of the COVID-19 pandemic further triggered an unprecedented rise in the number of cash transfer interventions administered by both governments and non-state actors, as part of containment measures aimed at mitigating the adverse economic disruptions caused by the crisis and to shield vulnerable populations from the pandemic’s shocks of poverty. According to Gentilini et al. (2022), the figure stood at 96% (approximately 52 nations) as of 2022 in terms of countries in Africa providing some form of short-term or permanent cash assistance program. Table 4 below highlights this progression in the expansion of cash transfer programmes in Africa.

### Table 4:
**Number of Countries in Africa Extending National (State-Sponsored) Cash Transfer Programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000s</th>
<th>Up to 2019</th>
<th>During Covid-19 (2020 - 2022)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of Countries</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>As a (%)</strong></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This wave of increased expansion of cash transfer programs across Africa foregrounds a significant and favored investment in poverty reduction, opportunities for the vulnerable and enhanced food security among the poor. It essentially reflects a broader commitment emphasized in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly goal 1 which targets ending poverty through various means including the provision of appropriate social protection systems and coverage of the poor and vulnerable (UNGA, 2015). Correspondingly, institutions like the International Labor Organization have built on this dedication to centralize social assistance programs as core inputs in the reduction of inequalities and the promotion of decent work for people.

A number of studies have been undertaken to systematically pool robust evidence regarding the effectiveness of cash transfer programs. Beegle et al. (2018), for example, illustrates that Ethiopia’s food aid and Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) which extended cash transfers to households in remote settings had an effect on the national poverty rate by reducing it to an equivalent of 1.6 percentage points. In Malawi, a longitudinal study aimed at assessing the impact of the Social Cash Transfer Program (SCTP) operated by the Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare, and supported by UNICEF Malawi revealed a strong positive effect of the program on the health-seeking behaviors of household members when they are sick. Additionally, Ghana’s unconditional cash transfer program, Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 1000, which was piloted in 2008 to fight poverty, had a similar outcome on beneficiary households (Novignon et al., 2022).

In an assessment on the overall impacts of government-sponsored cash transfer programmes across sub-Saharan Africa, Handa, Otchere and Sirma (2021) reveal significant programmatic effects on a number of domains including children’s welfare and school-enrolment, food consumption, food security and livestock holdings. Peterman et al. (2019) review 38 studies on how social safety nets
impact the well-being of women in 17 states within Africa and affect strides towards gender equality. They find substantial outcomes, disclosing increase in the psychological health of women, decrease in intimate partner violence and improvement in the direct empowerment of women.

Overall, there is clear evidence regarding the effects of social welfare programs on citizens. Scholarship within the space continues to highlight the impacts of social protection initiatives in the fight against poverty, hunger, and inequality (Abay et al., 2021; Lustig et al., 2020). This establishes a relationship that is strengthened to enhance state legitimacy in the eyes of citizens (Brass, 2016), particularly in areas where citizens have been historically excluded from state access (Porisky, 2020). Whilst this citizen-state linkage is important, the broader political economy literature does not delve into illuminating the issue of state funding for these programs. An evaluation by Beazley et al. (2021) further argues that cash transfers have not been sufficiently resourced or expanded to reach all poor households. As such, household poverty rates have starkly remained higher with over 40% of Africans still living below the international poverty line of US$1.90 per day (UNDP, 2019). In Kenya, the World Bank (2020; p. 50), through its economic outlook on the effect of Covid-19 crisis on the country’s economy, indicated that the poverty rate was likely to increase by 4 percentage points due to the pandemic. This translates to an estimated 2 million “new Kenyans” falling below the poverty line.

Whilst the cost of putting an end to poverty still remains higher, spending on cash transfer programs has relatively been low across Africa. On average, the continent allocates 1.2% of its GDP to social protection funding as opposed to the global average spending of 1.6% (Gentilini, n.d.). This reflects an inadequacy in investing in the fight against poverty and inequalities, and ensuring the delivery of inclusive social protection systems. With limited domestic resources across many nations, development partners and donor agencies have always played an outsized role (Opalo, 2021) in
contributing to the financing of cash transfer programs and filling budgetary gaps (Nino-Zarazua et al., 2012). In fact, Devereux (2020) attests that social protection policy schemes have always been developed and scaled in low- and middle-income countries, humanitarian emergency contexts and conflict-affected fragile zones by the support of donor funding.

**The Social Protection Landscape in Kenya**

Kenya provides a portfolio of five categorically-separated cash assistance programs to its poor and vulnerable citizens. Three of the mainstream interventions implemented include Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT), Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) and People with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer Program (PWSD-CT). The Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP) and the World Food Programme's Asset Creation Program are the other two programs. They are all consolidated and implemented under the *Inua Jamii* social assistance pillar or the National Safety Net Program (GoK, 2021). Table 5 below provides an overview of these cash transfer programs. The social assistance schemes are predominantly tax-financed (with varying degrees of support from non-state aid donors and development partners) and implemented nation-wide, except for the HSNP which covers only 4 counties in Kenya. Brought together, the social protection programs maintain a beneficiary registry of approximately 1.3 million households as of the 2018/2019 financial period (MLSP, 2020).

**Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT) Program**

The OPCT program has since 2018 been succeeded by the Inua Jamii Senior Citizens’ Scheme. Fundamentally, individual recipients of the Older Persons Cash Transfer are provided with cash assistance between the ages 65-69 years; once they reach 70 years, they are moved to the Inua Jamii
Figure 2: The Discrepancy Between the Percentage of Population Living below the Poverty Line (USD $1.90 per day) and People Covered by Social Protection Programs in Africa

Source: Beegle et al. (2018)

Senior Citizens’ Scheme. According to Owino et al. (2021), the introduction of this intervention was also driven by the state’s commitment to extending social protection access to each and every citizen considered elderly and poor, besides its timing around the electoral period in Kenya. Targeted beneficiaries of the program receive Kshs. 2,000 (approximately USD $16) on a monthly basis.

Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) Program

In 2004, the Government of Kenya in collaboration with UNICEF launched the CT-OVC program to support households with children who were vulnerable, poor and affected by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS (Ouma and Adesina, 2019; Porisky, 2020). The program provides a monthly regular transfer of Kshs. 2,000 to registered households, so as to support the welfare of the children. An orphaned and vulnerable child is defined as one who is under the age of 17 years, and has at the minimum a deceased parent or lives with a caregiver or parent who is perennially unwell. (World Bank, 2019). Poor households that have individuals with disabilities are further predisposed to added difficulties including inaccessibility to educational opportunities and barriers to healthcare and employment access (Gelders, 2018; Kabare, 2018). The prevalence of these limitations could result in permanent and jeopardizing implications on their overall well-being if not adequately addressed.
Table 5: Overview of the Main Cash Transfer Programs in Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>START DATE</th>
<th>NO. OF BENEFICIARY HOUSEHOLDS COVERED (As of 2020)</th>
<th>MONTHLY TRANSFER VALUE</th>
<th>ELIGIBILITY</th>
<th>FUNDING SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>800,000 Households</td>
<td>Kshs. 2,000 (USD $16)</td>
<td>Poor households with a 65+ years old individual not already receiving any pension funds</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>353,000 Households</td>
<td>Kshs. 2,000 (USD $16)</td>
<td>Poor households caring for orphans and vulnerable children</td>
<td>Government of Kenya, FCDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People With Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer (PWSD-CT)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>47,000 Households</td>
<td>Kshs. 2,000 (USD $16)</td>
<td>Poor households with a member having a “severely” disabled person who requires 24-hour care</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Food Programme (WFP) Cash for Assets</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>60,068 Households</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>World Food Programme, Government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Representation based on Kenya Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MLSP, 2020); Mohamed et al. (2021); Opalo (2021)

**NOTE:** 1 USD equals Kshs. 125 (*As per February 2023 Exchange Rates*)
Persons With Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer (PWSD-CT) Program

The PWSD-CT is the national cash assistance program that targets and supports poor households having people with severe disabilities in Kenya. It is implemented across the country’s 47 counties, and one has to be a severely disabled poor person in need of full-time (24-hour) support from a caregiver for eligibility into the program (Owino et al., 2021). Formally launched in 2011 by the government of Kenya, the program covers an estimated 47,000 households who receive a regular cash transfer of Kshs. 4,000 every two months. Even though Kenya doesn't have enough data to make a better assessment of disability status, only a small number of households with disabled people are covered. This means that many are still stuck in and at risk of extreme poverty.

The inclusive and effective provision of social assistance programs for people with disabilities necessitates strong advocacy from both state and non-state civil society groups. According to Lewis and Madon (2004), both formal and informal advocacy are critical in elevating marginalized voices through government policy influence, particularly in contexts where client-patron relationships are common. In Kenya, state agencies and CSOs like the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), the National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC) and the United Disabled People of Kenya (UDPK) are important institutions mandated with coordinating and advocating for
the needs of the disabled. However, their meaningful engagement in the policymaking arena is often ignored thereby excluding and diminishing their decisive political power. In certain frames, they often assume a ceremonial role within spaces of dialogue that have impactful implications for the disabled population. Kabare (2018) contends that these agencies are in the habit of working in silos limiting their collective ability to consequentially deliver for persons with disabilities. They are driven by distinct priorities and agendas, which may generate fragmentations and hinder coherence in policy advocacy.

**The Role of Donors and Government Ownership of Cash Transfer Programs**

Fiscal investment and technical support in the first wave of extending social protection interventions across Africa in the early 2000s was largely driven by development partners and donor agencies notably the World Bank, the European Union, UNICEF, UNDP, World Food Programme among others (Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Adesina, 2020). Ellis et al. (2009) advances that this was against the backdrop of major success observed through the implementation of numerous social assistance programs in Latin America in the 1990s. Similarly, Garcia and Moore (2012) reiterated that flagship cash transfer programs in Latin America influenced the adoption of the social policy initiatives in Africa, despite variations in the anticipated levels of program success across the two regions. While external donor financing was crucial for the adoption, design and delivery of cash transfer programs in Africa, the reliance and heavy dependency of national governments on donor support raised concerns regarding agency and sustainability. As a result, African governments have been committed to the domestic ownership of programs so as to have full agency and control over the enactment and implementation of programs. This has been through a
process of transition towards increased support for much more predictable and stable financing via domestic tax resources. Furthermore, efficiency in the modalities of the delivery of cash transfers has in recent years been greatly enhanced through an ongoing shift from manual payments to digital mobile money transfers (UNDP, 2019; Gronbach 2020).

Although tax-financed programs have been encouraged and emphasized across literature under the guise of full government ownership of these social policy initiatives, Gentilini (2011; p. 334) extends a warning that this transitional process must be approached with greater care and caution so as to ensure that the established institutional arrangements and capacities are not lost. The advent of the Covid-19 crisis and its negative implications also unveiled serious financial constraints, undermining the capacity of national governments to effectively reach every poor and vulnerable household. Hence there was a need to consider alternative and complementary financing sources from non-state actors including development partners and aid donors. This inadequacy in financial resources could potentially mirror the under provision for some categories of vulnerable groups (people with disabilities), as it exacerbates low rates of coverage. There is a dearth of literature that has engaged this examination particularly in the Global South in general, and Africa in particular, something I seek to interrogate in this study.

**The Distributive Politics of Social Cash Transfer Programs**

This thesis considers some of the theoretical and empirical studies that scrutinize the political economy of social cash assistance programs. For instance, Hickey et al. (2020; p. 2) in examining how politics shapes social protection across the regions of Eastern and Southern Africa, propounded that the expansion of social assistance programs was largely contested around political agency.
Significantly, they also advance how the ideas of deservingness played a significant role in invariably shaping national political imperatives. In Tanzania, Ulriksen (2016) adduces that the fruitful orientation of policymakers with reference to the Productive Social Safety Net (PSSN) program happened to be a critical consideration in sealing political support for the program, as it presented an opportunity to address the agitations about foreign dependency.

Within Kenya, a study by Ouma and Adesina (2018) explored how the dynamics of power among actors and political processes was crucial in the adoption of two cash transfer programs: the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) and the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP). They found that politics represented a critical influence in the control of the uptake of the two social policies through the insertion of international partners and donors; as Kenyan politicians included UNICEF and DFID in mediating the debates and decisions that paved way for the diffusion and transfer of ideas about the cash assistance programs from the Latin America context to Kenya. Through technical training workshops facilitated by experts from the Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI), Kenyan politicians and policymakers were convinced of the value of cash transfer programs hence the uptake of the interventions. By contrast, other actors like civil society organizations were largely excluded and sidelined through depoliticization from the initial design of these programs.

In a study by Porisky (2020), she examined whether variations in state infrastructural power across four counties in Kenya affected the distribution of three cash transfer programs: the Inua Jamii Senior Citizens’ Scheme, the OPCT and the CT-OVC. Her analysis revealed that non-state political
actors and local bureaucrats such as administrative chiefs, clan leaders, village elders and civil society groups had significant influence over the household-level targeting of social transfers in counties where state resources and oversight capacity were limited. Despite this observation, she concluded that the cash transfer initiatives were generally implemented according to formal guidelines and rules set as per the operations manual; thereby limiting political influence on the programs at the county level. This body of distributive politics literature inherently incorporates a reinforcement of why it is important to understand the salient roles played by both political and non-state actors - politicians, development partners, local administrators, donors and civil society organizations (CSOs) - in the design of social protection policies, the decisions involving financing and investments, and the effective implementation of the programs. Nevertheless, it altogether does not address the issue of how the funding of different cash transfer programs is negotiated and allocated across the targeted categories of vulnerable and poor households. This forms a significant thrust of this thesis.

**Electoral Politics and Disability-Inclusive Cash Transfer Programs**

The realities of electoral politics have shaped the provision of cash transfers and targeting of poor individuals, with the aim of amassing political support. Wanyama and McCord (2017) underscored that Kenya’s members of parliament fundamentally urged the scaling of social assistance programs across districts with the aim of reaping electoral advantages from citizens. Prupe and Hickey (2017) similarly cited evidence of political benefits emanating from Zambia’s scaled-up Social Cash Transfer (SCT). In Uganda, the rollout of cash transfer interventions in the country’s northern region during the run-up to the 2016 national elections, was largely necessitated and catalyzed by the ruling party’s (National Resistance Movement, NRM) motivation to gain electoral support (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016).
Given the aforementioned examples of the political incentives derived from social safety nets, investments by policymakers have widely prioritized specific vulnerable groups over others in the expansion of cash transfer programs, because they are considered more powerful during elections. For instance, cash transfer initiatives targeting the elderly are prone to disproportionate support by politicians relative to social assistance programs targeting households with orphans and people with disabilities. Older persons in this case are deemed to be somewhat influential electorally, and powerful in holding politicians to account in the ballot - while the voices of the other categories of vulnerabilities are disregarded. People with severe disabilities in this case remain susceptible to being disadvantaged and excluded from greater support in social policies, a possibility this study aims to investigate in the Kenyan context.

Other relevant and early studies have also illuminated how electoral contestations shape the provision of public goods by examining whether politicians target public goods towards core voters (rewarding them for loyalty) vs. swing voters (encouraging turnout). Unequivocally, they have also examined the role of public goods as vital instruments for the building of political alliances in unstable party systems; and deconstructed how political business cycles explain the timing of investments in public goods and social policies so as to secure re-election to office. Mohamed et al. (2021) argued that the timing behind the inauguration of a universal social pension program in Kenya targeting the elderly coincided with the political campaign period in the run-up to the 2017 general elections; subsequently resulting in questions about the possibility of the timing around the launch of the scheme mirroring the incumbent regime’s plans to increase their electoral support.

Across African countries, numerous scholars have also noted the salience of ethnicity in structuring political alliances (Ekeh, 1975). They have also examined how political actors tend to provide public
employment and distribute public goods and services by directing them to voters who share their ethnicity (Briggs, 2014; Franck and Rainer, 2012; Kramon and Posner, 2016). However, other elected policymakers may also decide to target individuals and households that do not share their ethnicity in order to establish broader cross-ethnic alliances that may be pivotal during elections. Given that existing literature on distributive politics has also spoken to how co-ethnics structure access to public goods by targeting specific groups of individuals, it would be important for me to also examine whether this logic similarly applies to the limited reach of people with disabilities in cash transfer funding allocations.

Beagle et al. (2018) also adduces that political goodwill influences domestic advocacy for social safety nets spending. As such, the design, financing and implementation of social policy programs structure the evolving preferences of policymakers in a complex, reciprocal linkage that necessitates a deeper understanding (Hurrell and MacAuslan, 2012). Therefore, it is salient to accord consideration to the interaction between politics and the financing of social protection programs even as political processes frequently serve to be the achilles heel for the endorsement and provision of programs. Driscoll (2018) referenced in Porisky (2020) further contends that cash transfer programs have a likelihood of being politicized, as politicians frequently allocate social assistance in a way that builds them a voter base, widely unveiling patronage politics. On a broader scale, even while democratic ideals have made considerable progress in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) thereby enabling ample opportunities for the representation of poor people’s concerns; social cash transfers are nevertheless prone to be politicized. This makes it more likely for politicians to increase budgetary allocations and invest extensively in cash transfer schemes in order to maximize citizen buy-in (Opalo, 2021; Abuya et al., 2015).
A strand of literature advanced by Lavers and Hickey (2021) further correlates electoral competition - which is one of the necessary conditions for democratization (Linz and Stepan, 1996) - to the delivery of goods and services to citizens. The authors argue that the adoption and institutionalization of social assistance programs serves as a strategy of political survival in electorally competitive geographies. As Porisky (2022) has opined, electoral competitiveness is associated with programmatic social protection policies aimed at the broader expansion of government cash transfers. In Kenya, social protection has for long been embroidered in elections, featuring prominently in national political party manifestos during electoral cycles. During the 2022 General Elections in Kenya, for instance, the Azimio La Umoja Political Party Manifesto characterized cash transfer programs “...not as handouts, but as an investment…” (Strohm, 2022). In the 2017 contested elections, the Jubilee Political Party which was the incumbent regime political outfit, launched the registration of all elderly citizens (who are aged 70+ years old) into a universal social pension program. This was part of their nationwide election campaign package to solicit votes for re-election to office (Mohamed et al., 2021; Porisky et al., 2023).

In spite of these debates linking electoral politics to government welfare programs, state investment in cash transfer programs targeting disadvantaged and vulnerable groups has not been uniform or equitable across program interventions. Mitra (2010) found that disability-targeted cash transfers under South Africa’s Disability Grant Program were the least known and lacked publicity. In addition, as previously mentioned, there are greater variations not only in the budgetary financing of different social assistance programs, but also stronger support for the OPCT and CT-OVC programs than the

---

4 The universal social pension program initially targeting every 70+ yrs Kenyan citizen (notwithstanding their earnings) later excluded individuals benefiting from pension schemes, a striking policy change by the government post-election into office.
PWSD-CT program. This thesis therefore seeks to investigate why policymakers devote less financing and support to the PWSD-CT program.

In sum, this chapter has offered an overview of numerous strands of literature that speak to the adoption and distribution of social cash transfer programs. I have traced the expansion of social protection programs in Africa and chronicled the social cash transfers landscape in Kenya, discussing in brief three of the mainstream cash transfer programs implemented in the country including the OPCT, CT-OVC and PWSD-CT programs. I have also assessed issues of institutional advocacy and the role aid donors and international development partners have played in extending social assistance programs in Kenya. Throughout the chapter, I have considered some of the theoretical and empirical studies that scrutinize the political economy of social cash assistance programs; and underscored how electoral politics have shaped the provision of cash transfers and targeting of poor individuals. In the following chapter, this thesis will focus on sources of data and empirical methodology pursued in assessing the three lines of inquiry - the political incentive to build a voter base, inadequacy in financial resources and weaker institutional advocacy. The integral methods engaged include key informant interviews, document analysis and a mini-survey.
CHAPTER 4
METHODS AND DATA

Motivated by the aim to particularly achieve sufficient knowledge in understanding what drives the limited support for the funding and expansion of the PWSD-CT compared to the OPCT and CT-OVC programs, this chapter reveals the appropriate research methods I draw upon to test the three potential explanations. These include document analysis, a mini-survey and key informant interviews (KIIIs) with different actors engaged in the design and delivery of social protection programs (politicians, government officials, international development partners, foreign consultants and international donor representatives). The methods have been pivotal to numerous scholars in the understanding of the politicization of social protection schemes (Ouma and Adesina, 2018; Bukenya and Hickey, 2020). Herein, I situate the rationale behind using Kenya as a case study, give an overview of the data collection methods and the sampling strategy. The chapter further presents the ethical considerations I took into account, and a reflection on my positionality.

Kenya as A Case Study

Kenya offers a fascinating case study context to explore the politics of poverty and support for adequate financing of social policy programs targeting different categories of deserving vulnerable groups. According to George and Bennett (2005), a case study is suitable for interrogating social events with the aim of extracting explanations that enjoy external validity in analogous contexts. As such, this examination and analysis is oriented towards Kenya because it is implementing over four separately targeted programs unlike some other social assistance programs in the sub-Saharan region.
This provides the opportunity to visibly see the substantial variations and contestations in the financing, expansion and implementation of programs in Kenya. Essentially, this does not imply that Kenya is unique in under-targeting PWSDs given that cash transfer interventions across the region similarly target people with disabilities. Instead, Kenya’s programs make it easier to interrogate the under-targeting and exclusion due to this practice of programs being separated out rather than being subsumed under a joint single cash transfer program i.e. Zambia’s Social Cash Transfer (SCT) program that covers multiple categories of vulnerabilities.

The definition of a person with severe disability (as part of the eligibility criteria to justify one’s deservingness of cash assistance support in Kenya) is also quite restrictive, and hasn’t changed since the program was first introduced in June 2011. According to the National Social Protection Secretariat (NSPS, n.d.), a person with severe disability is someone who requires permanent and “full-time support of a caregiver.” Consequently, this excludes potential households where individuals might for instance be poor and deserving of support; but just facing barriers to employment due to visual impairment. This lack of an inclusive and expanded definition of what a person with disability means might have further implications for the potential of greater support for the program.

The selection of Kenya is also fit given the linkage between electoral politics and social protection policies (Hickey et al., 2019; Wanyama and McCord, 2017; Hickey, 2009). The political environment in Kenya is further quite complex, as Opalo (2021) argues that political partisanship tends to determine the financing of programs aimed at tackling poverty. Niedzwiecki (2018) also revealed that social welfare policy programs are connected to political alignments in Latin America, thus incentivizing political actors to claim credit for instituting social programs. Exploring this dynamic relationship in
Kenya where social protection programs are heavily being tax-financed, has greater distributive effects for the expansion of programs targeting people with disabilities.

While my single case study selection of Kenya allows me to focus on a detailed examination of the financing and support for social policy programs, I only situate my study as a single case study that focuses on policymaking at the national level. The lack of sub-national analysis therefore raises a salient limitation because there is a likelihood of variations in how social protection policies are made sense of at the local or sub-national level of governance. Kenya’s political system has since 2013 been devolved into 47 counties (subnational levels of governance), giving way to the decentralization of power (Cornell and D’Arcy, 2014). Given the unavailability of county-level data analysis, I am unable to conduct a comparative evaluation that can critically unravel valid dynamics that I may be missing in this thesis. For instance, political actors at the county-level bear a dynamic agency in structuring social assistance policies, and there is value in understanding how they navigate the social protection funding system that might place some of their counties at a disadvantage in terms of outreach to people with disabilities.

**An Overview of the Data Collection Methods**

Table 6 below details each of the methodological techniques that I used in this research study. The tools are crucial in bringing about a deeper and nuanced insight into Kenya’s financing strategy for social safety nets. To address the overarching question guiding this thesis, I rely on a cross-sectional research design.
Table 6: An Overview of the Data Collection Tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>Politicians; Government officials; International Development Partners; Donor representatives; Foreign consultants; Disability rights organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Analysis</td>
<td>Internal memos; Hansards; Relevant reports and meeting minutes sourced online and from interviewees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A mini-survey</td>
<td>Respondents include politicians, government officials, aid donor representatives and officials from disability-rights organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Representation

**Document Analysis**

I employ document analysis in this thesis as one of the key sources of data. This technique confers a researcher the benefits of drawing data from a “stable” source, implying that documents tend to be extant for long periods of time without being altered thereby supplying precise data with regards to historical events (Bowen, 2009); and in this case indicative explanations for funding decisions by policymakers and political actors. Considering that these material records have been conceived to be “official descriptions” of occurrences at a time, they are arguably sometimes not preferred over interviews which are seen to represent unexpurgated information by numerous scholars. In retrospect, documents collected can actually be way more valid without subjective interpretations feasible in interview data. In this research study, one of the most important documents that served as a source of data is the hansard. Hansards are transcripts of Kenya’s Parliamentary and Senate proceedings. I did gather these official documentary records which are available in the public domain (online) and from the Kenya National Archive. I particularly centered my attention on hansards that are related to
the social protection programs. The hansard materials were complemented with my fieldwork notes, relevant ministerial and parliamentary internal memos, meeting minutes, government and donor reports, newspapers and policy documents from agencies and institutions whose work is germane to the contestations being explored in this research study; and present a clearer picture on the status of cash transfers for persons with disabilities. In terms of access to these documents, I did ask some of my interview participants if they are willing to share them with me.

**A mini-survey**

In this thesis, I used a mini-survey as one of the research techniques for data gathering. Kumar (2006) opines that mini-surveys in popular belief, often tend to focus on a narrowly defined question and are designed to be administered among a smaller sample size - with the aim of saving on resources and time. The tool utilizes closed questions which largely gravitate towards listing different response categories - as respondents pick single or rank multiple categories as they find appropriate. Mini surveys can also be valuable in ruling out an entire universe of potential explanations to a particular question being assessed (Finsterbusch, 1976). Notwithstanding the usefulness of mini-surveys, this technique also encompasses a number of limitations. First, they have a wider margin of error with limited accuracy when making comparisons. Secondly, mini-surveys can be challenging in terms of generalizability (when contrasted with larger surveys) because the sample size might not be truly representative (Kumar, 2006; Finsterbusch, 1976). Bearing in mind these disadvantages and implications that can affect the reliability of surveys, I sent out a mini-survey to all my interview respondents with a targeted question as part of a follow-up inquiry, so as to establish the most important factor explaining the limited funding support for the PWSD-CT program.
**Key Informant Interviews (KII)**

I also proceeded to draw upon key informant interviews (KII) in this research, as my primary sources of data. Key informants are individuals widely believed to be well-informed concerning a particular theme being interrogated (Nkwi et al., 2001). Bearing in mind the fact that policy deliberations are often bound to occur in private, gleaning into the ideologies of knowledgeable individuals was pivotal in unraveling some of the processes that underlie social assistance funding negotiations and decisions; and detail narratives that may be widely missing (Beamer, 2002). Key informant interviews also have several limitations that can contribute to the unreliability of this data collection technique, including subjective and biased opinions, and possibilities of forgetting vital information or loss of institutional memory. By cross-validating and triangulating across the different sources of data I employed, I was able to counter some of these shortcomings of KII. I intended to conduct 15 interviews with respondents in Kenya ranging from political leaders (both appointed and elected), leaders from relevant civil society organizations, donor groups, government officials, disability rights organizations, bureaucrats and consultants. Whilst my initial goal was to conduct interviews in-person, I was able to incorporate phone and zoom interviews in contexts where physical meetings were impossible. Ultimately, I was only able to conduct 10 interviews given the timing duration of this research study. Table 7 below outlines the interview respondents engaged, based on their roles.
Table 7: An Outline of the Interview Respondents Engaged Based on their Roles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERVIEWEE</th>
<th>AFFILIATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>National Council for Persons with Disabilities (NCPWDs)</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection Policy Expert</td>
<td>International Organization (HelpAge)</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection Specialist</td>
<td>Ministry of Labor and Social Protection</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection Specialist</td>
<td>Ministry of Labor and Social Protection</td>
<td>June 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>National Social Protection Secretariat</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>National Social Protection Secretariat</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>United Disabled People of Kenya (Disability Rights Groups)</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Specialist</td>
<td>Ulemavu Research Institute (Disability Rights Groups)</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Representation

**Sampling Strategy**

In terms of sampling strategy, my sample of 10 interview participants were selected purposively - based on their knowledge of social protection issues and positions. As a technique, Babbie (2016) describes purposive sampling as a type of nonprobability sampling in which the units to be interrogated are selected based on a researcher’s knowledge or judgment of them, regarding who will be most useful to the study. Being that the area of social policy can be quite closed off, I adopted
snowball sampling as a method for identifying my interviewees. Vogt (1999) asserts that snowballing as a technique leverages pre-existing social networks of informants to provide prospective contacts to a researcher. As such, I was able to ask my informants to recommend names of other people I can talk to, and in certain cases possibly introduce me to them. I continually did this until it became a trail of referrals. Furthermore, as I reviewed some of the relevant scholarly works, I was able to take note of suitable individuals that I could possibly reach out to for interviews. Accessing elites like politicians for interviews can be quite an onerous task if a researcher doesn’t have connections to them, especially in low- and middle-income countries (something that was the case in my situation). I however made every possible effort to schedule and meet some politicians for interviews. Eventually, I was only able to speak with 1 member of parliament.

**The Research Process**

In terms of the research procedure, I began by preparing my research protocols accordingly. I developed and refined the interview questionnaire in consultation with my thesis supervisor. Once the interview questionnaire was ready, I sought for ethics approval from the NIU IRB approval committee - which was obtained. The interview guide featured varied questions which were grouped into five main themes including questions about the PWSD-CT program, financial resources, the political incentive to build a voter base, institutional advocacy and the role of international donors, civil society and disability rights groups. Such a thematic analysis is important in ensuring that the interview activities are attentive to all the viewpoints (Braun and Clarke, 2012) from the different lines of inquiry. During the interviews, I asked my respondents multiple open-ended questions. One of the open-ended questions I asked was “How are the different cash transfer programs viewed by Kenyan members of parliament?” I utilized prompts where I established the need for follow-up questions so as to gain clarity
on different perspectives the respondents raised and also elicit more information. Further details on the questionnaire guide are detailed in Appendix B.

Afterwards, I began cold-emailing, calling and tapping into existing networks of researchers within the social policymaking space in Kenya in the hope that they might help make some initial introductions with the elite circle of policymakers. By snowballing, I was able to recruit participants from across different bureaucratic spaces including a politician, officials from the State Department for Social Protection, representatives from disability-rights groups, aid-donor representatives and social protection policy specialists and researchers in Kenya. I conducted all the interviews virtually through video calls which permitted inordinate connection with the interview participants. I was not able to reimburse the interviewees due to lack of adequate resources for the same.

The interviews lasted for approximately one hour and fifteen minutes. I took detailed notes and also recorded some of audios after I had sought informed consent at the beginning of the interviews. After the interviews, I invited the participants (through a follow-up email) to undertake a mini-survey. This was particularly significant in establishing the most important factor accounting for the funding gaps, out of my three lines of inquiry. The survey question I asked the respondents was:

“On a scale of 1 to 3, rank each of the factor variables involving political salience, inadequacy in financial resources and institutional advocacy - the most important factor in accounting for the gaps in increased funding support for the PW/SD-CT program.”

3 represented the most important factor, while 1 represented the least important factor.
Ethical Considerations During Research

In conducting this thesis research, I took into account a number of ethical considerations. Participants during interviews were informed about the goals of the study and how the research findings will principally be used (within and potentially beyond the academic space). Additionally, any other germane research details that may be of interest to the informants were shared with them, and explanations given where clarity was duly needed. Informed consent from the interviewees was also sought to authorize the audio-recording of conversations; and these taped discussions were later on transcribed for analysis. I further made the informants aware that the details they share during the interviews will not be utilized to risk their welfare in any way. Accordingly, they will be guaranteed anonymity (through the use of pseudonyms) when this thesis is published.

Positionality

Whereas bearing a “native identity” status as a Kenyan can be assumed to help tackle obstacles in attempting to access bureaucrats and state officials, it is still a great challenge that necessitates continual and deeper reflection on my positionality as a fieldwork researcher. Soedirgo and Glas (2020) called for investigators to remain actively reflexive while conducting research, by adopting a dynamic practice of constantly appraising our individual assumptions regarding our positions and how we are read and situated by others during fieldwork. Similarly, Fujii (2017) contends that our research designs, strategies and insights could be better shaped by a humble approach to the research process, thus acknowledging the complexity of navigating relations with informants and the humanness critical in research. As I began scheduling and conducting interviews with politicians, state officials and bureaucratic policymakers engaged in the social protection space in Kenya, I anticipated some of my interview requests being met with rejection and delayed responses due to bureaucratic processes -
something that hindered me from accessing some politicians and officials. As such, gaining access to certain policymakers became quite an onerous obligation I had to grapple with! Members of parliament are hardly open to access by the general public, especially in contexts like Kenya. I am also just a mere student researcher, and politicians were not willing in certain instances to entertain the likelihood of making themselves available to me for interviews.

Despite this reluctance, I professionally presented myself at the offices of some politicians and officials from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, seeking meeting appointments. I relied on my “educated” status as emergent situations demanded at times, thereby widely switching between fluently speaking in English, Swahili and Luo languages so as to build rapport and solidify the comfortability in having the local authorities help me access opportunities for interviews. With this research study framed around a tight timeline of only two weeks of fieldwork in May 2023, I tried my best to adapt my strategies around approaching interviewees for meetings by engaging in cold-emailing, cold-calling and tapping into existing networks of researchers in the hope that they might help make some initial introductions with the elite circle of policymakers. Given that caution and care is explicitly recommended when applying positionality in practice as a static and essentialist (Soedirgo and Glas, 2020) nature of it can bring about detrimental biases in our research outcomes, I endeavored to remain actively reflexive so that my lens of understanding the politics of financing cash transfer programs for people with disabilities is not blurred in any way.
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

This section concentrates on presenting the results of this study regarding the motivations behind the limited financing of the PWSD-CT program, compared to the OPCT and CT-OVC programs. Fundamentally, the analysis provided herein discusses the three lines of inquiry assessed which include the political incentive to build a voter base, inadequacy in financial resources and weaker institutional advocacy! I find that the political incentive among Kenyan politicians to build a voter base and inadequacy in financial resources influence the underfunding of the disability cash transfer program. The analysis further advances that this political incentive has the most significant effect of the three factors examined. Essentially, parliamentarians are driven by concerns around building a massive voter base during competitive elections. As a result, they intentionally target social welfare spending during parliamentary budgetary discussions and allocations towards populations that will likely support them - this being older persons, while excluding people with disabilities because they are deemed to be politically less salient. However, the findings also shed light on the fact that whilst state financial resources are scarce, there is still lack of political goodwill among parliamentarians to effectively prioritize lobbying for policies that ensure increase in resources and effective provision of a disability-inclusive social protection system.

I commence by presenting the legal framework underpinning the provision of social protection programs in Kenya, as captured and reiterated across numerous documents analyzed. I further illustrate the state of affairs regarding the representation of persons with disabilities within the
political structures of Kenya. Within the context of the question probed, I discuss the results of the three lines of inquiry examined and the outcome of the mini-survey administered to establish the most salient explanation for the underfunding of the disability-targeted cash transfer program.

The Legal Framework of Social Protection for Persons with Disabilities in Kenya

The Kenyan Constitution, which was promulgated in 2010, maintains a solid and progressive commitment to the principles of non-discrimination and equality (GoK, 2010). Enshrined in Article 10 specifically is the provision that guarantees dignity, social justice, inclusiveness, and the protection of marginalized populations, national values that are integral to the design and enforcement of policies impacting their welfare and livelihoods. This is further reiterated in Article 21 of the 2010 Constitution, which mandates government officials with the responsibility to confront the needs of vulnerable citizens. In fact - through a deeper analysis of the constitutional document, Article 43 unequivocally stipulates that every citizen has a right to “...social security....” The state has additionally ratified a number of international treaties and conventions, and developed domestic frameworks including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948), the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD, 2006), the 2003 Persons with Disabilities Act and the Social Assistance Act of 2013 - all aimed at supporting and reaffirming that people with disabilities have the opportunity to enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms covering social protection schemes (Kabare, 2018).

Whilst the Kenyan government bears such a robust legal framework to ensure policymakers guarantee a universal and inclusive delivery of social protection for persons with disabilities, the promise remains an elusive mirage as the state has fallen short of this legal mandate to invest in this vulnerable group. This is reflected in its spending and financing of social safety nets. Across the African continent,
Kenya’s investment allocation on social assistance programs has since 2012 remained at an average 0.4% of total GDP (MLSP, 2020)\(^5\) nearly 8 times less compared to countries like South Africa which has devoted an equivalent 3.2% of its GDP expenditure on social protection (Beegle et al., 2018). Such a variation means lower coverage and greater inadequacy in sustainably financing interventions that not only target the poor and vulnerable in the society, but particularly also reach people with disabilities who are confronted with poverty.

Further interrogation of data from government documents and in particular the Kenya Social Protection Single Database Registry reveals that state budgetary allocation provided to ensure investment in, support for and the inclusion of people with disabilities in social assistance programs has been substantially declining over the past few years.

![Figure 3: Government Disbursements to PWSD-CT Program FY2017/2018 - FY2021/2022](source: Adapted from KIPPRA, 2022)

\(^5\) The Social Protection portfolio in Kenya is anchored under the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MLSP).
Figure 3 above shows the regressive decrement in budgetary disbursement to the PWSD-CT program, as a percentage share of the funds annually apportioned by the Government of Kenya to the State Department for Social Protection’s allotment. Between FY2017/2018 and FY2019/2020, the financial contribution designated for the Persons with Severe Disability Cash Transfer reduced from 3.9% to 2.7%. Subsequent to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, budgetary allocation during the FY2019/2020 was increased by 1% to increasingly support the livelihoods of vulnerable and poor households, including impacted persons with disabilities. Nevertheless, Owino et al. (2021) reports that these additional funding resources disbursed during the Covid-19 pandemic were instead diverted and spent on the OPCT and CT-OVC programs in lieu of the PWSD-CT. The impact of this is that it made it harder to expand program coverage, leading to increased exclusion and further exposure to acute poverty among people with disabilities. Whilst it is not clear the rationale that drove the diversion of the resources, some interview respondents cited that the Covid-19 shock-responsive expansions were aimed at trying to reach vulnerable groups that have been newly impacted by the crisis (e.g. the missing middle). As such, the attempt may not necessarily be aimed at reaching individuals who are typically on existing social protection rolls. Given that people with disabilities are likely to always need support and their needs continually compound over their life cycles without the possibility of “graduating,” it prompts a rethink of the existing mechanisms of disability support.

**The Representation of PWDs within Politics in Kenya**

Ochieng and Jattani (2023) highlight a worrisome situation within legislative politics that speaks to the failures inherent in disability-targeted programs. Through the optics of political representation in Kenya, they assess how people with disabilities have faced continual marginalization in elective politics. Article 54(2) of the Kenyan Constitution says that people with disabilities must fill 5% of
elected and appointed positions. During the August 2022 elections, only 2% of the positions were held by people with disabilities. Additionally, greater gaps exist in the political party nominations of people with disabilities to legislative assemblies through Special Interest Groups (SIGs) quotas, which exist to offset the disparity in elective seats. According to Ochieng and Jattani (2023), more than 21 of the 47 county assemblies did not support the nomination of PWDs, which put this category of vulnerable groups on the back burner. Practices like these weaken disability-inclusive social protection legislation, as PWDs are shortchanged in political participation which can give way to the influential voice needed in social policy decisions regarding program-specific finance allocations and spending.

*The Political Incentive Among Parliamentarians to Build A Voter Base*

This study explored whether members of parliament played a significant role in influencing the observed gap in financing the PWSD-CT program. These parliamentarians often sit at the intersection of citizen-state relations with the constitutional mandate to represent the interests of their constituents (De Sardan and Piccoli, 2018). In Kenya, they make up the legislative arm of the government and are constitutionally mandated with making laws, budgetary deliberations and the approval of the annual state budget. They majorly influence policy dynamics that condition how national resources are distributed, including social protection policies (Adesina, 2020).

A strikingly apt illustration of the varying levels of political support parliamentarians accord the different categories of cash transfer programs can be evidently seen when we look at the instances of cash transfer attention and mentions by the legislators in parliament during social protection debates. Wadron (2015; p. 43) analyzed parliamentary discussions on cash transfers by members of parliament (MPs) in Kenya and observed that the OPCT program was remarkably referenced 36% of the time
during legislative sessions, whereas the CT-OVC and PWSN-CT programs\(^6\) were only mentioned 12% and 5% of the time, respectively between 2006-2015. Figure 4 below captures this disparity in program mentions, which has major implications for the inclusive support and increased financing of specific categories of anti-poverty social assistance transfers.

![Figure 4: Disparity in Cash Transfer Program Mentions in the Parliament of Kenya](#)

**Figure 4: Disparity in Cash Transfer Program Mentions in the Parliament of Kenya**

*Source: Waldron, 2015; Mzalendo, 2015*

80% of the respondents I interviewed emphasized that parliamentarians strategically prioritized and advanced the interests of older persons during social protection policy making processes. This is because they are considered electorally viable, over persons with disabilities; and as such there is a wider appeal to build a voter base among the elderly through the OPCT program. As one government official observed,

\(^6\) There are 4 main cash transfer programs coordinated and extended by the Kenyan Government under its National Safety Net Program (NSNP) or *Inua Jamii* as part of its social protection policy portfolio. These include the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC), Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT), Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer (PWSN-CT) and the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP), which is only operated in specific counties in Northern Kenya categorized as ASAL areas.
“You know, Older Persons can go and vote in elections; but it is hard to find children (CT-OVC) going to vote. You might hardly also find a person with a severe disability voting! This is because PWSDs need intensive care - and so, you will not see them going to vote. So people with disabilities are just not seen as a viable constituency in political and civic life. They are just not seen as able to go out there and actually cast the vote (during elections). Therefore politics plays a key role in the neglect of the concerns of persons with disabilities, and it is something you see reflected in how such programs are financed. That’s why I think the OPCT program comes across as more favored and with wider appeal among politicians”

When I further probed some of the respondents on issues of channels of political advocacy and lobbying by members of parliament for increased financing of programs pertaining to persons with severe disabilities, a majority of the respondents I interviewed surprisingly highlighted in consensus that political goodwill for persons with disabilities was lacking. This is astonishing because Erdmann and Simutanyi (2003) posit that parliamentarians are democratically voted into office by electorates with the expectation that they will indiscriminately express goodwill in representing the interests of their constituents across policy arenas, including social policies. According to the views of one of the representatives of disability rights groups in Kenya,

“Tyson - this thing is about votes, votes, votes and votes. This is where they are looking for the votes Tyson. And as such, the political goodwill is lacking for people with disabilities. Parliamentarians are more drawn to people who will give them votes at the end of the day, and these people are the older persons mostly.”

---

7 This interview was with an official within relevant government agencies, conducted virtually through zoom. Informed consent was sought for quotes to be derived from interview transcripts and used in this research study.
Inadequacy in Financial Resources

This study further sought to establish whether the perceived scarcity of state financial resources served as a barrier to the inclusive and increased financing of the PWSD-CT program. According to Kabare (2018), the disability-targeted program is one of the mainstream tax-financed social protection programs. This type of financing, she argues, has the potential to offer greater support for expanded and universally-inclusive channels of disbursing disability benefits. While I assessed whether limitations in the available financial resources (tax revenues) played a role in potentially triggering policymakers to under-fund programs targeting persons with severe disabilities, responses from the interviews predominantly revealed otherwise. The findings suggested that the inadequacy in financial resources largely dictated how the “restrictive” eligibility criteria for program beneficiaries was established. For one to be considered deserving of inclusion in the program, they had to be a poor and disabled individual requiring 24-hour care. This was more apparent as evidently expressed in the perspectives of one of the key informants who highlighted that:

“The eligibility for the program was…………determined and largely dictated by the inadequacy in resources. So, we felt we needed to start with the most vulnerable. And as the resources grew, the program also enveloped and engaged or brought on board more people who are vulnerable. And so - to date, the program has grown to at least 47,000 beneficiaries.”

There was however wider acknowledgement that such tax-financed programs will always be marred with issues of adequate and sustained resource mobilization leading to decreased support for persons with severe disabilities. This is because political goodwill remains a highly contested affair among political legislators.
**Weaker Institutional Advocacy**

This research study further aimed at soliciting perceptions on whether existing advocacy institutional agencies, civil society organizations and disability-rights groups were operating in a fragmented manner, thereby lacking an instrumental and consolidated voice of advocacy on behalf of the needs of persons with severe disabilities. Kabare (2018) opined that institutions like the National Council for Persons With Disabilities, the National Gender and Equality Commission, and disability-rights groups like the United Disabled People of Kenya have a mandate in coordinating the concerns of the disabled in the society. Specifically, she contends that these organizations appear to be working in silos which limits coherence in their advocacy efforts. Upon being probed on whether this dispersion was contributing to the gaps in calls for increased funding of the PWSD-CT program, data from the interview respondents showed that this was not the case. To a large degree, the consensus that was emerging from the views of the informants revealed that these organizations were actually working more closely together to advance the disability agenda in Kenya. This was captured by one of the key informant interviewees who said that:

“.............we also work closely together to be able to advocate for these groups that require, you know, to be advocated for. So it’s not really about silos. It’s about coming together. We actually do work together to be able to push the disability agenda forward, and this includes issues of resources and issues of expanding programs for persons with disabilities. So it’s not silo-management really; I don’t think that is the reason why we have not been able to get more funding. I think for us the issue is always prioritization of funding by government legislators. Our policymakers just don’t seem to prioritize the affairs of people with disabilities. And even if you look at the current government, where are their priorities really?”
The interviews however made apparent instances of conflict in functions between certain institutional agencies. In particular, the National Fund for Persons with Disabilities and the National Council for Persons With Disabilities were cited to be two different institutions whose goals are similar - empowering people with disabilities - through the provision of better disability infrastructure, including the provision of assistive devices and toolkits for self employment. With such similarity in functions, one of the key informant interviews highlighted that a Persons with Disabilities Bill was being discussed by legislators in the Senate; with the likelihood of the two complementary Funds being merged as part of enhancing efficient service delivery.

“...............once it is actually passed, it will open doors for more deliberations and advocacy of disability rights, especially on matters of social protection! When this happens, the lobby for more resources from the government will be advanced and made a priority at large. I also think the Bill will enable complementary funds to be merged which will improve efficiency in the utility of resources. At the moment, we seem to have two different funds doing the same thing - the National Fund for the Disabled of Kenya which is anchored under the Office of the President and the National Development Fund for Persons with Disabilities which is domiciled here with the National Council for PWSDs.”

The Political Incentive Among Parliamentarians to Build A Voter Base: The Most Important Factor in Explaining Funding Gaps

In order to establish the most important factor explaining the limited funding support for the PWSD-CT program, I sent out a mini-survey question to all the key informant respondents (N=10) as part of follow-up between May 2023 and June 2023. The sample is not representative enough given that I had such a short time to conduct this study and had challenges accessing some of the key informants. The survey question I asked the respondents was “On a scale of 1 to 3, rank each of the factor variables
involving political salience, inadequacy in financial resources and institutional advocacy - the most important factor in accounting for the gaps in increased funding support for the PWSD-CT program.” 3 represented the most important factor, while 1 represented the least important factor. Table 8 below summarizes the key responses from all the key informants.

Table 8: The Most Important Variable Explaining Limitations in the Financing of the PWSD-CT Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Salience</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequacy in Financial Resources</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Advocacy</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Representation

The survey served as one of the secondary tools I employed after the interviews (primary tool), helping yield the most vital explanation as perceived by my sample. The sample size upon whom I administered the survey consisted of politicians, representatives of disability rights groups, international donor organizations and other government officials. I found that 80 percent of the respondents cited political salience as the most important factor out of the three variables of interest in explaining the reasons for the limitations in funding the PWSD-CT program. Regarding the inadequacy in financial resources, only 20 percent of the respondents accorded it greater significance.

One factor that came up during the interviews as an alternative line of inquiry was the question of deservingness. This is however a limitation of the study, as I did not directly focus on addressing this
issue within my lines of inquiry and interviews. In future research investigations, this could be a line of inquiry to engage with as part of the cultural and contextual lens to how funding for persons with severe disabilities are underprovided for by Kenyan policymakers.
CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the Africa region, social cash transfers have rapidly been embraced by governments over the past thirty years. This is because they are deemed to be effective anti-poverty social security interventions, with the ability to expand human capital among vulnerable populations including senior citizens, orphans, and people with disabilities. Yet, even though social security is a constitutional right in democratic states like Kenya, government policymakers have not adequately paid attention to financing social cash transfer programs for people with disabilities. As a result, there is restricted access to a social protection system that ought to be disability-inclusive. In this thesis, I have closely examined what explains the limited financing and support for the expansion of the Persons With Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer relative to the Older Persons Cash Transfer Program and the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children program - which receive wider support among policymakers and international donors. This is in spite of the fact that all the three social protection programs are analogous in impact.

Using the PWSD-CT program and Kenya as a case study, I first relied on qualitative tools including document analysis and key informant interviews to collect data. While I was open to possibilities of participant observation by primarily witnessing parliamentary sessions involving discussions around social protection issues and policy making, this was impossible given the timeframe of the study. After the interpretive analysis of the documents and interview transcripts, I then proceeded to run a
mini-survey aimed at corroborating the results and establishing the most important factor explaining the limited financing of the PWSD-CT program.

By employing these strategies to gain insight into the politics behind financing social safety nets and the dearth of literature on the financing of social protection programs that target disability-specific vulnerable populations in the global south, I find that the political motivation to secure votes during competitive elections has the most significant effect in explaining the limited financing of the PWSD-CT program in Kenya. Essentially, parliamentarians in Kenya are driven by concerns around building their voter base during elections. As a result, they intentionally target social welfare spending during parliamentary budgetary discussions and allocations towards populations that will likely support them - this being the OPCT program, while excluding people with disabilities because they are deemed to be politically less salient. The findings also shed light on the fact that whilst state financial resources are scarce and play a secondary role, there is greater lack of political goodwill among parliamentarians to effectively prioritize lobbying for policies that ensure increase in resources and effective provision of a disability-inclusive social protection system.

With social assistance being a product of political contestation and cooperation, this thesis contributes to the growing body of literature on the political economy of social protection in the Global South. It offers a renewed understanding of financing disability-inclusive social protection systems by highlighting the impact of politics on the selective financing of cash transfers. In terms of policy implications for program design, my analysis suggests that the present social assistance program-model in Kenya which features the categorical separation of programs across multiple vulnerabilities is a huge contributing factor to the under-provision of services for people with disabilities. This is in contrast to other regional countries like Tanzania and Malawi where social cash transfers are subsumed under
a single program targeting multiple groups of poor and vulnerable individuals. As established in this thesis, not all cash transfer programs have the same political purchase. Therefore, policymakers (both government and aid donor partners) need to be conscious of how designing a social protection policy with multiple cash transfer programs that individually cover a single vulnerability create an incentive for the underprovision of certain groups in need - especially in contexts like Kenya where elections are deeply competitive and hotly contested. This is an issue that is worthy to be further analyzed - particularly at a time when there is stronger commitment to “Leave No One Behind” - as envisaged in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Notwithstanding the need for further analysis, this thesis also contributes to the strand of literature advanced by Lavers and Hickey (2021) who correlated electoral competition to the delivery of goods and services to citizens; by arguing that the adoption and institutionalization of social assistance programs serves as a strategy of political survival in electorally competitive geographies. It would also be interesting to further contrast these findings with other regional examples where strides have been made (positive outliers) and where discourse is seemingly lagging (negative outliers) - as well as the global discourse on social protection. In addition to the fact that this single-case study focused on the financing of social policies at the national level in Kenya, carrying out a case study at the sub-national level might allow for a much more deeper comparative analysis and interrogation of the validity of my findings.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Human Rights Watch Report, HRW (2021). “We are all Vulnerable Here”: Kenya’s Pandemic Cash Transfer Program Riddled with Irregularities.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis Planned Activities</th>
<th>Jan 2023</th>
<th>Feb 2023</th>
<th>Mar 2023</th>
<th>Apr 2023</th>
<th>May 2023</th>
<th>June 2023</th>
<th>July 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A: PREPARATORY PHASE</strong> {Proposal Writing}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction chapter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Puzzle &amp; Research Questions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. My Arguments in Brief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Existing &amp; Alt. Explanations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Research methodology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Research protocols/instruments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Finalize Thesis Proposal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Committee approval form</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Pilot study tools &amp; review</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Seek IRB Ethical Approval _ NIU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Prepare Consent Form</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Prepare Research Budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Travel Grant Applications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B: FIELD SURVEY PHASE**

<p>| | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Data collection (Interviews)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Travel to Kenya for Fieldwork</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C: FINDINGS, DATA ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION PHASE**

<p>| | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Data entry and transcriptions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Analysis and chapter writing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Write conclusion and summary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>THESIS DEFENSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW GUIDE/QUESTIONNAIRE
Interview Guide / Questionnaire

I am Tyson Odoo Juma, an MA (Political Science) student at Northern Illinois University in Illinois, USA. I am conducting a research study on the politics of financing cash transfer programs in Kenya, with a particular focus on the Cash Transfer for Persons with Severe Disabilities (PWSD-CT) program. Whilst this study is for educational purposes with the findings getting published, any quotations from the interviews will be anonymized. It is also a voluntary research study and there will be no monetary benefits to the research participants, nor will there be any associated risks for participating. Thank you so much for the support.

QUESTIONS

1.1 Background

● How long have you worked in your current position?
  - What is the nature of your work (roles) in this position, with respect to cash transfer programs in Kenya?

● Where have you worked previously?
  - For how long were you delivering in this capacity?
  - What were your roles in the(se) previous positions?

1.2 The PWSD-CT Program

● My understanding is that the PWSD-CT program was established by the Kenyan Government in 2011, and has been fully tax-financed from the start.
  - What can you tell me about the initial phase of this program?
  - Do you know who pushed for it to be initiated?
  - Who were the major actors/voices shaping the design of the program?
  - What prompted the GoK to finance the program?

● According to a report by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (2021), the current program coverage is 47,000 households, but the Kenya Census Data (2019) indicates that this is only a fraction of the 1.3million disabled population in need.
  - What do you make of this incongruity? Do you agree with its justification?
  - Why do you think there is a gap between the current coverage and the existing eligible population in need?
  - Do you think generally people with disabilities are aware of the program and their eligibility states? (If Yes/No, Why?)
  - How does this frame the Ministry of Labor & Social Protection in terms of its responsibility to deliver for this constituency?

● The program currently is aimed at supporting households with a disabled individual requiring 24-hour care - rather than adopting a broader definition of what constitutes disability.
What are your views on this definition, including any motivation for why this program-eligibility criteria was adopted?

Do you know if there are any plans to expand this definition or eligibility-criteria? (If Yes/No, Why?)

What do you think the barriers are to expanding this definition or eligibility-criteria?

What are your personal views on what criteria should be used for eligibility?

During the Covid-19 pandemic outbreak, legislators approved an increased budgetary allocation to the social protection budget aimed at cushioning persons with disabilities. However, KIPPRA reports that the additional funds disbursed & meant for the PWSD-CT program were diverted and spent on the OPCT and CT-OVC programs.

- Are you aware of this change in funding decisions?
  a) If so, do you know why this happened?
  b) Who made the decisions to divert the funds?

- What, in your view, would a disability-inclusive social protection system for Kenya look like?

- What changes would need to be made at present to ensure a disability-inclusive social protection system is achieved?

- Are there any plans for increased/better financing of a disability-inclusive social protection system?
  ➔ Is this a priority for the government? (If Yes/No, Why?)
  ➔ Are there any other actors pushing for this? (Who are those actors?)

1.3 Financial Resources

- Kenya allocates approximately 3.6% of its annual social protection budget to people with disabilities, compared to over 40% allotted to OPCT.
  o Why do you think we see such a low investment in the PWSD-CT?
    - What drives this disparity in funding allocations for different CT programs?
  o What do you think would prompt proportionally equal funding (across programs)?
  o Are there any other resources available to PWDs outside of the CT programs?
    - Does the existence of other resources impact funding decisions for a disability-inclusive SP system?

1.4 The Political Incentive to Build A Voter Base

- How are CT programs viewed by MPs?
  - During legislative discussions involving social assistance policy programs, what specific cash transfer programs are normally discussed?

- How are they viewed by Civil Servants (i.e. cabinet ministers etc)?
• In a study conducted 2 years ago, findings revealed that legislative discussions on CTs have been disproportionately in favor of the OPCT program for the elderly, with less mentions of the PWSD-CT program.
  - Do you agree with the finding of this study?
    a) If Yes, Why do you think there was more political support for the OPCT program?
    b) If No, Why do you disagree?
  - Do you think there is an electoral appetite behind the wider appeal and support for the OPCT program?
  - Why is there less political support for the PWSD-CT?
  - How are people with disabilities perceived by politicians?
  - Do you think some groups of people within this broad category are more visible or have more power than others?

• Electoral promises by political parties often feature social protection in both their manifestos and campaign rallies; accompanied by the rhetoric “pesa ya wazee” (money for the elderly) in the latter.
  - Why do you think politicians use the “pesa ya wazee” in their campaign rhetoric but not the PWSD-CT…?
    (Does this speak to intentional financing pledges towards the OPCT program while underproviding for the PW3D-CT program?)

1.5 Institutional Advocacy
• Do you see channels of political activism for increased funding of cash transfers for PWDs by institutional agencies like the NCPWDs, UDPK, NGEC (mandated with coordinating the needs of persons with disability)?
  - What are these channels?
  - How is this activism important?
  - Does it meaningfully influence increased engagement of government for more financing of the PWSD program?
• Is the National Council for Persons with Disabilities - (who were essential in advocating for the start of the PW3D-CT program) - still playing an important role in advocating for adequate financing of the PWD-CT program?
  - Why?
  - Why not?

1.6 The Role of International Donors, Civil Society and Disability Rights Groups
• What is the role of international donors in shaping the domestic social protection policy agenda?
  - Has their contribution driven broader debates for increased funding of the PWSD-CT?
    If so, in what ways? If not, why?
Why was a lot of initial donor advocacy vigorously aimed at campaigning for the CT-OVC (i.e. UNICEF) and OPCT programs, and less of the PWSD-CT program (despite having children with disabilities)?
  - How do they prioritize their funding decisions across different vulnerable groups?
  - Is this a pattern evident across other country-cases or regions?

Is there a citizen-led, civil society-led or other NGO-led campaign for the support of PWSD-CTs?
  a) If so, who are the main actors?
  b) What strategies have they employed?
  c) What have they accomplished (successes)? / Any failures?
  d) What evidence has fundamentally led to change, if at all?

How responsive has the government been to the lobbying by the Civil Society groups?

In your opinion, what future opportunities exist for improving disability-inclusive financing of social cash transfers?
  - What shifts would need to occur to make this a reality?
  - What evidence would be needed to advocate for the change in the future?
APPENDIX C
INFORMED CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH STUDY
Study Title

Investigators
Name: Tyson Odoo Juma
Department: Department of Political Science
Phone Number: +1 (779) 270 - 4452

Key Information
● This is a voluntary research study on the politics of financing disability-inclusive social protection systems in Kenya.
● The time commitment of research participants will be 1 hour.
● The benefits to the research participants will involve increased insight into their thinking about financing disability-inclusive social protection policies.
● There will be no associated risks for the participation of informants in the study.

Description of the Study
The purpose of this study is to critically examine what explains why the Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer program (PWSD-CT) in Kenya receives limited financing and less support for expansion relative to the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT) and Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) which enjoy broader support from policymakers for increased financing and expansion. If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to participate in a 1-hr interview responding to questions about the politics of financing cash transfer programs for people with disabilities in Kenya.

Risks and Benefits
The benefits to the research participants will involve increased insight into their thinking about financing disability-inclusive social protection policies. There won’t be any reasonably foreseeable (or expected) risks as a result of your participation in this research study, including no risk associated with your employment or any form of embarrassment. There will also be nothing risky about anything recorded.

Confidentiality
● Any records collected will be kept strictly confidential. Research records, including any identifiable responses, will be kept in a locked file, and all electronic information will be coded and secured using a password-protected file. In the event that video or audio recordings are made, I will be the only one who will have access to them, and they will strictly be used for educational purposes. They will then be deleted at the end of the research study.
• It is only with your permission that the interview will be audio-recorded, and the recordings will only be accessed by me - the researcher. At the end of the research study, I will delete all the audio recordings.
• For any reports that I may publish, I will not include any information that would make it possible to identify you.

Future Use of Research Data
• After removing all the identifying information from your data, the information could be used for future research studies by me or distributed to another investigator for future research studies without additional informed consent from you.

Your Rights/Voluntarism
The decision to participate in this study is entirely up to you. You may refuse to take part in the study at any time. Your decision will not result in any loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You have the right to skip any question or research activity, as well as to withdraw completely from participation at any point during the process. You have the right to ask questions about this research study and to have those questions answered before, during, or after the research. If you have any further questions about the study, at any time feel free to contact me Tyson Odoo Juma through tjuma@niu.edu or tysonodoo@gmail.com or by telephone on +1 (779) 270 - 4452. You may also contact my thesis supervisor Prof. Alesha Porisky on aporisky@niu.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant that I have not answered or if you have any problems or concerns that occur as a result of your participation, you may contact the Office of Research Compliance, Integrity, and Safety at (815)753-8588. Your participation in the research study is highly appreciated.

Your signature below indicates that you have decided to volunteer as a research participant for this study, you give consent to be audio recorded (or video recorded, as appropriate) during the interview, and that you have read and understood the information provided above. You will be given a signed and dated copy of this form to keep, along with any other printed materials deemed necessary by the study investigators.

__________________________________________      _____________________
Participant’s Signature                                  Date

I give my consent to be audio-recorded (or video-recorded, as appropriate) during the interview in which you will be asked questions about the politics of financing disability-inclusive social protection programs in Kenya.

__________________________________________         _____________________
Participant’s Signature                                Date
Northern Illinois University
Informed Consent Form to Participate in a Research Study

Study Title

Investigators
Name: Tyono Odoo Juma
Department: Department of Political Science
Phone Number: +1 (770) 270 - 4452

Key Information
- This is a voluntary research study on the politics of financing disability-inclusive social protection systems in Kenya.
- The time commitment of research participants will be 1 hour.
- The benefits to the research participants will involve increased insight into their thinking about financing disability-inclusive social protection policies.
- There will be no associated risks for the participation of informants in the study.

Description of the Study
The purpose of this study is to critically examine what explains why the Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer program (PWSD-CT) in Kenya receives limited financing and less support for expansion relative to the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT) and Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) which enjoy broader support from policymakers for increased financing and expansion. If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to participate in a 1-hr interview responding to questions about the politics of financing cash transfer programs for people with disabilities in Kenya.

Risks and Benefits
The benefits to the research participants will involve increased insight into their thinking about financing disability-inclusive social protection policies. There won't be any reasonably foreseeable (or expected) risks as a result of your participation in this research study, including no risk associated with your employment or any form of embarrassment. There will also be nothing risky about anything recorded.

Confidentiality
- Any records collected will be kept strictly confidential. Research records, including any identifiable responses, will be kept in a locked file, and all electronic information will be coded and secured using a password-protected file. In the event that video or audio recordings are made, I will be the only one who will have access to them, and they will strictly be used for educational purposes. They will then be deleted at the end of the research study.
- It is only with your permission that the interview will be audio-recorded, and the recordings will only be accessed by me - the researcher. At the end of the research study, I will delete all the audio recordings.
For any reports that I may publish, I will not include any information that would make it possible to identify you.

**Future Use of Research Data**

- After removing all the identifying information from your data, the information could be used for future research studies by me or distributed to another investigator for future research studies without additional informed consent from you.

**Your Rights/Voluntarism**

The decision to participate in this study is entirely up to you. You may refuse to take part in the study at any time. Your decision will not result in any loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You have the right to skip any question or research activity, as well as to withdraw completely from participation at any point during the process.

You have the right to ask questions about this research study and to have those questions answered before, during, or after the research. If you have any further questions about the study, at any time feel free to contact me Tyson Odoo Juma through tjuma@niu.edu or tysonodoo@gmail.com or by telephone on +1 (779) 270 - 4452. You may also contact my thesis supervisor Prof. Alosha Porisky on aporisky@niu.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant that I have not answered or if you have any problems or concerns that occur as a result of your participation, you may contact the Office of Research Compliance, Integrity, and Safety at (815)753-8588. Your participation in the research study is highly appreciated.

Your signature below indicates that you have decided to volunteer as a research participant for this study, you give consent to be audio recorded (or video recorded, as appropriate) during the interview, and that you have read and understood the information provided above. You will be given a signed and dated copy of this form to keep, along with any other printed materials deemed necessary by the study investigators.


Participant’s Signature

Date

I give my consent to be audio-recorded (or video-recorded, as appropriate) during the interview in which you will be asked questions about the politics of financing disability-inclusive social protection programs in Kenya.


Participant’s Signature

Date

Northern Illinois University

4/6/2023

Approved by NIU IRB

Void one year from above date
APPENDIX D
RESEARCH COMPLIANCE APPROVAL NOTICE
Approval Notice
Initial Review

06-Apr-2023

TO: Tyson Juma (01907940)
Center for Nonprofit and NGO Studies


In a preliminary review, the Initial Submission of the above named research protocol was determined to meet the definition of human subjects research according to the federal regulations. The submission was then reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board through the expedited review process [45 CFR 46.110(b)(1) category 6, 7] under Member Review procedures on 06-Apr-2023. Please note the following information about your approved research protocol:

Protocol Approval period: 06-Apr-2023 - 05-Apr-2024

It is important for you to note that as an investigator conducting research that involves human participants, you are responsible for ensuring that this project has current IRB approval at all times. If your project will continue beyond the above date, or if you intend to make modifications to the study, you will need additional approval and should contact the Office of Research Compliance, Integrity, and Safety for assistance. In addition, you are required to promptly report to the IRB any injuries or other unanticipated problems or risks to subjects or others.

Please note that the IRB has the prerogative and authority to ask further questions, seek additional information, require further modifications, or monitor the conduct of your research and the consent process.

Informed Consent:

Unless you have been approved for a waiver of the written signature of informed consent, this notice includes a date-stamped copy of the approved consent form for your use. NIU policy requires that informed consent documents given to subjects participating in non-exempt research bear the approval stamp of the NIU IRB. This stamped document is the only consent form that may be photocopied for distribution to study participants.

If consent for the study is being given by proxy (guardian, etc.), it is your responsibility to document the authority of that person to consent for the subject. Also, the committee recommends that you include an acknowledgment by the subject, or the subject's representative, that he or she has received a copy of the consent form.

You are responsible for retaining the signed consent forms obtained from your subjects for a minimum of three years after the study is concluded.
Continuing Review:

Continuing review of the project, conducted at least annually, will be necessary until data collection is complete and you no longer retain any identifiers that could link the subjects to the data collected. Please remember to use your protocol number (HS23-0322) on any documents or correspondence with the IRB concerning your research protocol.

Closing the Study:

Please note that a final report submission should be created in the record in lieu of an annual continuation form if data collection has ended and the data are free of identifiers. The final report is a separate submission form in the list of options in the InfoEd record, and it may be submitted prior to the annual review deadline.

With all of this said, the IRB extends best wishes for success in your research endeavors!

Please see the RIPS website for guidance on the impact of COVID-19 on research(including face-to-face data collection) https://www.niu.edu/divresearch/covid/index.shtml
APPENDIX E
AN ANALYSIS OF CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS DEPLOYED IN KENYA,
IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19
### An Analysis of Cash Transfer Programs Deployed in Kenya, in Response to COVID-19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>TARGET NO. (caseload)</th>
<th>BUDGET</th>
<th>TRANSFER VALUE</th>
<th>GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE</th>
<th>ELIGIBILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multi-Agency COVID-19 Cash Transfer Program</strong></td>
<td>669,000 Households</td>
<td>Kshs. 2.8 Billion</td>
<td>Kshs. 1,000 per week for 4 months</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Poor &amp; Vulnerable households affected by COVID-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Committee on Persons with Disabilities (NCPWD) Cash Transfer Program</strong></td>
<td>33,333 Households</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Kshs. 6,000 (lump sum)</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Vulnerable people with disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kazi Mtaani Cash Transfer</strong></td>
<td>296,000 Youths</td>
<td>Kshs. 10 Billion</td>
<td>Kshs. 600 for 22 Days</td>
<td>34 Counties</td>
<td>Youths residing in informal settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNICEF Top-up Cash Transfer</strong></td>
<td>9,700 Households</td>
<td>Kshs. 232 million</td>
<td>Kshs. 2,000 per month for 2 months</td>
<td>Garissa, Kajiado, Kilifi, Kakamega and Migori counties</td>
<td>Inua Jamii Scheme beneficiaries with children under the age of 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU-funded Consortium Cash Transfer Program</strong></td>
<td>80,000 HHs and 10,400 women &amp; girls</td>
<td>€ 5 million from EU and Kshs. 310 million from Danish Embassy</td>
<td>Kshs. 6,668 per month for 6 months</td>
<td>Nairobi and Mombasa counties</td>
<td>Vulnerable households in the informal settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WFP Cash Transfer</strong></td>
<td>94,500 Households</td>
<td>Kshs. 8.3 Billion</td>
<td>Kshs. 4,000 per month for 3 months</td>
<td>Nairobi and Mombasa counties</td>
<td>Vulnerable households in the informal settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNICEF Cash Transfer</strong></td>
<td>2,000 Households</td>
<td>Kshs. 39 million</td>
<td>Kshs. 2,000 per month for 2 months</td>
<td>Kilifi and Kajiado counties</td>
<td>HHs with children with severe acute malnutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FCDO Cash Transfer</strong></td>
<td>52,700 Households</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Kshs. 4,000 per month for 3 months</td>
<td>Nairobi and Mombasa counties</td>
<td>Individuals in informal settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shikilia Cash Transfer</td>
<td>200,000 recipients</td>
<td>Kshs. 500 million</td>
<td>Kshs. 3,000 per month for 3 months</td>
<td>Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu counties</td>
<td>Individuals in informal settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TED Cash Transfer Program</td>
<td>120,000 Youths</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Kshs. 3,000 per month for 4 months</td>
<td>Nairobi and Mombasa counties</td>
<td>Individuals in informal settlements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Financial Sector Deepening Kenya (FSD-Kenya, 2020); Binci et al. (2021)

**NOTE:** 1 USD equals Kshs. 125 (As per February 2023 Exchange Rates)