Testing the impact of state-society relations on human security

Ilhan Aydemir

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ABSTRACT

TESTING THE IMPACT OF STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS ON HUMAN SECURITY

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Northern Illinois University, 2018
Kheang Un, Director

The aim of this dissertation is to provide explanations for why prosperity, peace and development are achieved in some countries but not in others. To do so, this research analyzes how civil society and state capacity effect human security; using an explanatory mixed-method approach. The statistical analysis used in this research is a time series cross-sectional data analysis covering over 160 countries from 1984 to 2014. The statistical findings are further tested by comparative case studies of Slovenia, Lithuania, Russia and Singapore. The results suggest that civil society and state capacity are significant factors for explaining how different levels of human security emerge in various socio-political settings. Here, particular combinations of state and society strengths define whether prosperity, development and peace are achieved in a given country. Hence, this dissertation suggests that countries with strong state capacity and civil society are the ones with the highest level of human security.
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
DEKALB, ILLINOIS

DECEMBER 2018

TESTING THE IMPACT OF STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS ON HUMAN SECURITY

BY

ILHAN AYDEMIR
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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Doctoral Director:
Kheang Un
DEDICATION

To my parents, my wife and my daughters.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CIVICUS: An International Non-profit Organization for Civil Society.

FH: Freedom House.


HSI: Human Security Index.

HDI: Human Development Index.

MDGs: Millennium Development Goals.


USSR: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

UCDP: The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

“In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity” (UNDP 1994, 22).

The perspectives on security changed drastically after the Cold War, when the process of securitization swept away the traditional state-centric understanding of security. Conventional security studies focus exclusively on the state as the referent subject of security (Mauer and Myriam, 2009). For instance, survival and wellbeing of the state above anything else is the key in the anarchic realm of international relations according to realist thought (Gilpin, 1987). However, a great number of studies have focused on humans as the referent of security. Today, most threats to security have non-state origins and target humans not states. Interstate wars have declined drastically since the end of the Cold War (from 1991 to present) (Mauer and Myriam 2009). Table 1 compares traditional security and human security.
Table 1: Traditional vs. Human Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Security</th>
<th>Referent Object</th>
<th>Responsibility to Protect</th>
<th>Possible Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Security</td>
<td>The State</td>
<td>The Integrity of the State</td>
<td>Interstate War, Nuclear Proliferation, Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>The Individual</td>
<td>The Integrity of the Individual</td>
<td>Disease, Poverty, Natural Disaster, Violence, Landmines, Human Rights Abuses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Contemporary security concerns focus mainly on disease, poverty, violence, human rights abuses and the like, which directly threaten humans across the world. These developments and the understanding of security led to the emergence of the human security concept (HS).

HS is defined by two factors; freedom from fear (narrow definition) and freedom from want (broad definition). The 1994 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) introduced the idea that the primary referent of security should be humans rather than states. The report presented seven dimensions of HS: economic, food, environment, health, personal, community and political security.

Freedom from fear deals with the insecurities resulting from inequality, violence and the like. On the other hand, freedom from want entails a broader understanding of human security, such as personal liberties. It should be noted here that HS perceives individual, state, and
international security as a whole, since they are all interconnected. Thus, HS does not disregard state and international security.

In this regard, the human security discourse has great potential as it explains security concerns of contemporary international relations and developmental studies. However, the ambiguity of the concept and the difficulties in operationalization have thus far produced little testable knowledge. While the normative implications of HS are widely accepted, its analytical utility is debated (Owen 2008). Thus, one can conclude that HS remains controversial, lacking theoretical coherence and systematic empirical testing (Inglehart and Norris 2012).

Nevertheless, some efforts to measure HS have contributed significantly to the discourse of human security. Interest in how to assess the scope and domain of HS has grown. King and Murray (2001), for instance, operationalize human security by conceptualizing it as a notion of generalized poverty. This occurs “when an individual fall below the threshold of any key domain of human well-being” (King and Murray 2001, 585). Werthes et al. (2011) created a data set that includes 209 countries and embraces the UNDP’s seven categories of HS. Most recently, Hastings (2013) operationalized HS as “the Human Development Index with indicators that attempt to characterize inclusive income, knowledge, and healthcare as actually delivered to people” (10). This index consists of three different categories—economical, environmental and social fabric indexes—and covers 190 countries. Since these efforts have made HS measurable, it has become necessary to analyze how we can achieve a prosperous level of it. This dissertation will seek explanations of why some states have high levels of human security while others do not.
1.2. Scope and Objectives

In acknowledging the need to study human security in an analytical manner, this research aims to investigate what factors affect it. In this regard, the research looks at two explanatory variables (state capacity and civil society) and their relations to human security.

By employing various concepts and theories—such as democracy, development, human rights, good governance and civil society—this research argues that a high level of human security comes about through strong state capacity and robust civil society. However, these factors alone are not sufficient to explain why a high level of HS is found in some countries but not in others. The key factor here is the balance between a strong state and a strong society. Accordingly, the main questions this dissertation asks are:

- What are the significant factors explaining the variation in HS?
- Does the existence of a democratic regime guarantee a high level of HS?
- If so, why do some authoritarian regimes have a high level of HS?
- How does state capacity affect HS?
- How does civil society affect HS?
- Is the combined effect of state capacity and civil society on HS more than their individual effects?

The impact of democracy, state capacity and economic development on human security has long been acknowledged (Lipset 1959; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985; Migdal 1988; Diamond 1996; Sen 1997; Carothers 1999; Weber 2008; Halperin et al 2010; McFaul 2010; Norris 2012). For instance, strong capacity states are able to deliver goods and services that
increases human development and are capable of providing various forms of security to their people. Similarly, economic development increases people’s access to better healthcare, education and the like. Democracy provides accountability of politicians and policies and so reduces arbitrary use of power and violations of human security. However, the impact of these factors on HS has not been tested adequately to strengthen the validity of the relationships among these variables nor has enough study been done on the impact of civil society on human security. However, this research questions the impact of regime type and further adds the importance of civil society as it conditions the relationship between state and society in such a way that it creates a platform for the application and endurance of HS policies. This research thus investigates how state capacity and civil society affect human security. It proposes that the level of human security in a given country depends on the very nature of these two factors together. That is, a high level of human security should be observable in countries with high levels of state capacity and civil society. In sum, this dissertation develops a comprehensive theory to explain different levels of human security across the world.

Figure 1: Research Model
1.3. Research Design

A mixed-method approach will be used to answer the research questions. In the first part of analysis, this research adopts a time series statistical analysis. The data for analysis come from multiple sources. *Country year* is the unit of analysis and 130 to 190 countries are involved, depending on the availability of data. The time period for this research ranges from 1984 to 2014. In the second part, qualitative analysis explores causal mechanisms behind the relationships between variables. Four case studies will be conducted in order to analyze causal pathways between variables. The first pair of case studies will look at how state capacity and civil society affect human security in democratic regimes. A second pair investigates the same relationship by looking at authoritarian regimes. This way of selecting cases will offer insight into the assessment of the impacts of regime type, state capacity and civil society on human security. As Freedman (2004) suggests, case studies can be a great tool to strengthen theory in quantitative analysis. Process tracing in case studies, for instance, can identify causal mechanisms behind the correlations proposed in a statistical analysis.

The dependent variable is human security (HS). Following Norris Pippa (2012), HS is measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) taken from the UNDP data set and internal conflict variable taken from the UPPSALA conflict data set. Four dependent variables define the value of human security – a long and healthy life, knowledge, a decent standard of living, and internal conflict. Overall, this research looks at three key aspects of human security: *economic growth, social development and physical security.*
State capacity and civil society are the key explanatory variables of this research. Building upon the influential work of Pippa Norris (2012), democracy as a key explanatory variable will be also included in the analyses for replication purposes. Norris’s (2012) comprehensive analyses reveal that quality of governance and liberal democracy together increase prosperity, peace and development. Countries’ democracy scores will be measured by the varieties of democracy data set. This index ranks countries according to their quality of democracy with regards to stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and political and social integration. Democracy scores range from 1 to 10. State capacity is measured by Political Risk Service’s Group (PRSG) International Country Risk Guide estimates of the quality of governance (QOG). This index covers bureaucratic quality, corruption; and law and order. Civil society is measured by the civil society index from the varieties of democracy dataset (Coppedge et al. 2017). This index looks at the robustness of civil society and consists of civil society organization entry and exit, repression and participatory environment.

Since the explanations of different levels of HS are subject to multiple stimuli, there is a need to analyze multiple explanatory factors simultaneously and interactively. This is particularly important since their individual effects may or may not be novel enough to explain the processes that effect HS. For instance, regime type alone may not provide satisfactory explanations unless the nature of state capacity and civil society are included in the equation. Thus, mixing the right kind of explanatory factors will provide robust explanations for the variation in HS.
The structural conditions in this research, such as geographic location, culture, country’s place in the global economy, ethnic divisions and colonial legacies, will be controlled. These factors are believed to affect the level of human security in a given country. For instance, the number of deaths, which directly reduces the Human Security Index (HSI) and Human Development Index (HDI), will be higher in high-risk geographic locations like some countries in the African conflict zones. Detailed explanations of variables and data sets will be presented in Chapter 3 as well as in the appendix.

1.4. Significance of the Research

The arguments advanced in this dissertation are hardly new. Prior research has identified that democracy, civil society and state capacity can affect human security, but those arguments were not tested vigorously enough to propose robust discourse. Besides, the impact of civil society is rather neglected in the literature. Studies that tested the relationship between independent and dependent variables have done so by looking at the unique effect of these factors on HS. So far, only one study has underlined the importance of the combined effect of state capacity and democracy (Norris 2012). Additionally, analytical research on this topic consists mainly of qualitative analysis; only a few studies used quantitative analysis. This dissertation, however, underlines the importance of civil society and state capacity together by using a mixed-method approach, since the mutual effect of these factors can help us understand the variations in human security across different socio-political settings. Thus, what makes this dissertation new is the systematic analysis of the effects of civil society on human security.

This dissertation, therefore, contributes to the literature in three aspects: methodological, theoretical and substantive. First and foremost, it is another step toward measuring the factors
that affect human security in international relations and development studies. Human security, because of conceptual as well as operational problems, has been overlooked in empirical security studies. Most studies in the increasing recent research on this topic fall short of providing testable arguments and propositions, mainly because the body of research in HS discourse encapsulates positivist as well as non-positivist studies. Additionally, though the empirical research on human security consists mainly of case studies; only a few studies use statistical methods, and these do not analyze the importance of civil society on human security. Therefore, this present research contributes to the literature on HS by emphasizing theory development that has been rather neglected.

Second, this dissertation expands on the theory of Pippa Norris (2012) whose argument lacks the emancipatory dimension of human security (societal factor). According to Norris, the conditions of liberal democracy and effective state capacity should exist together to create a thriving human security. Norris’s main argument is that “development is most often achieved and sustained in societies where the formal institutions of both liberal democracy and bureaucratic governance are simultaneously strengthened in parallel” (Norris 2012, 35). Bureaucratic democracies, in this regard, constitute the only type of state that can provide higher levels of HS. This is where this research becomes important by explaining why we need another institution, namely civil society, in order to provide better explanations for the variation in HS across the world. By introducing the importance of civil society, this research builds upon Norris’s argument, explaining, for instance, why we do not see high levels of human security in countries where democracy and state capacity seem to be present. This shows that the bureaucratic democracy model Norris (2012) proposes lacks or takes for granted an essential ingredient, civil society. Through a mixed-method approach this research also tests Norris’s
argument on the working of democratic governance. In doing so, this dissertation utilizes additional data sets and conceptualizations that differ from those Norris employs. Finally, this research adds the importance of international factors in which international stimuli manifest themselves into civil society. In short, this research contributes to the development of a theory of human security.

Third, this dissertation contributes to policy making by bringing forth the importance of civil society. It proposes a theory of creating a human security platform which portrays successful settings of an ideal human security environment. The research further contributes to the state building, democratic aid and human development literatures, as well as to policy-making circles. For instance, international aid toward development in the Third World misses how great an impact civil society can make.

1.5. Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter One constitutes an overview of the work. It introduces the background that motivates research on human security, and specifies the dissertation’s scope, objectives, and key research questions. It then explains the research designs employed to answer the key research questions and elaborates on the significance of this study. The outline of the dissertation is presented at the end of Chapter One.

Chapter Two introduces the relevant literature and theoretical background of this study. First, the development of human security discourse will be introduced by locating HS in security studies. Then, HS will be conceptualized by integrating narrow and broader versions of it. Second, the distinctions among human security, human development, human rights, and human
security will be discussed to eliminate conceptual ambiguity. Third, the concept of democracy and its qualities will be analyzed. The importance of liberal democracy will be underlined in relation to HS since the qualities of democracy contribute positively to HS. Fourth, the impact of state capacity will be investigated. States with strong state capacity are able to implement policies that facilitate development and HS. Fifth, civil society will be discussed as it empowers humans against violations of human rights and arbitrary policies of government. This research particularly highlights the importance of civil society, as it creates a meeting stage among state, society and international relations.

Based on the theoretical foundations introduced in this chapter, a testable hypothesis and propositions will be presented. Overall, this chapter will conclude that strong state capacity and robust civil society together increase the odds of having a high level of HS, thus explaining the variation in dependent variables.

In two sections, Chapter Three describes the methodology used in this research. The first section consists of quantitative analysis. In this phase of research, the data sets, variables and measures used in the statistical analysis will be reported. Overall, this section will operationalize democracy, state capacity, civil society and human security. In the final section of this chapter, a qualitative analysis will be conducted. Case selection, data and variables, and operationalization of the variables will be reported. Four case studies are presented to test correlations found in the statistical analysis. Two pairs of cases are selected for qualitative analysis. The first pair consists of democratic regimes and the second pair represents authoritarian regimes. Overall, a mixed-method approach will harvest maximum validity and explanatory power from the research topic.

Chapter Four tests the main arguments of this dissertation through quantitative analyses.
It presents a brief summary of descriptive statistics, rationalization of the empirical models developed in this study and the particular statistical method used in this research. Chapter Five investigates causal mechanisms through comparative case studies. Both chapters Four and Five discuss the findings in relation to the hypothesis and main assumptions of this dissertation. Both chapters systematically analyze how the balance between civil society and state capacity provides better explanations for the variation in the dependent variable(s). Chapter Six summarizes the main arguments of the dissertation and presents both theoretical and practical implications. It also reports the study’s limitations and offers insights for future research.
2. THEORITICAL FOUNDATIONS

This section introduces various theoretical debates related to human security and human development. The literature can be understood primarily by looking at democracy promotion, state building, and structural theories. First, democracy promoters argue that the qualities of democracy will increase human wellbeing and human development (Boix 2001; Carothers 1999; Diamond 1996, 1999; Helperin et al. 2010; Lipset 1959; Mcfaul 2010; Russet 2004). The primary argument presented by these scholars is that democratic regimes make politicians accountable to citizens, thereby empowering citizens. As noted earlier, empowerment is the key concept under the freedom from want vision of human security. Thus, it is expected that rule of law, political and civil liberties, which constitute instruments of liberal democracies, also increase the level of human security. Democracy promotes application of human rights and protects individuals from arbitrary violations of those rights and their well-being (Russet 2004). However, liberal democracy alone does not guarantee that human development and human security are complete. In fact, an excessive checks and balances system in liberal democracies might even hinder states’ capability to make timely decisions about human welfare (Norris 2012). This is where state capacity becomes an important factor in expanding human security.

State building perspectives underline the importance of creating a functioning state which can facilitate human development and human wellbeing (Chesterman 2004; Fukuyama 2004, 2011; Fukuda-Parr 2011). Strong state apparatuses are necessary to achieve these goals since fragile states cannot provide basic human rights and services to cultivate human development. As Fukuyama posits (2014) “deeper and longer-lasting forms of security depend on the state’s ability to convert power into authority” (1329). For instance, as Chesterman
(2004) suggests, the post-conflict resolution in Bosnia failed to establish institutional arrangements, such as law enforcement which, in turn, did not solve the violations of human rights in this country.

Finally, structural theorists argue that human security can be determined by looking at the deep structural drivers. For instance, geographic location, culture, countries’ place in the global economy, ethnic divisions and colonial legacies are some key structural drivers that could determine human security (Norris 2012). In this regard, Easterly and Revine (1997) argue that “ethnic diversity explains a substantial part of the cross-country differences in public policies, political instability, and other economic factors associated with long-run growth” (1). In this view, ethnic diversity promotes ethnic conflict which in turn reduces human security because when there is a threat to people’s physical wellbeing it is difficult to sustain development. Another example can be drawn from the relationship between environmental factors and internal conflict. Environmental degradation and population growth constitute a serious security threat according to some scholars (Deudney and Matthew 1999; Homer-Dixon 1994; Kaplan 1994; Malthus 1992; Theisen 2008). For instance, in his case studies, Homer-Dixon (1994) finds that environmental scarcity creates and promotes internal conflict. In the competition over scarce environmental resources, the likelihood of conflict increases drastically.

Some of the key literature and theories are drawn from the topics of democracy, state capacity, human development, human rights, civil society and human security. This research, therefore, looks primarily at governance, regime, and state-society relations since comprehensive understanding of HS demands a holistic view of relevant literature. It begins with laying out the key debates on and framing the boundaries of human security. It then turns to explaining how
human development and human rights are related to HS. This is followed by an analysis of the key literature on democracy and how and on what grounds liberal democracy affects HS. Finally, to show the importance of state-society relations, state capacity and civil society literature will be reviewed to see how these factors interact with HS. Thus, this chapter will uncover multilevel theoretical frameworks that could be applied to understanding of the HS discourse. The unified theory advanced in this research is summarized at the end of this chapter.

Two main hypotheses proposed in this research account for the level of human security in a given country. In addition to these hypotheses, the relationship between democracy and HS will also be tested to replicate previous research on this topic. First, countries with high levels of state capacity can effectively implement human security policies. Following this logic, as a state gets stronger human security is expected to be higher. By the same token, a low level of human security is observed in fragile states like Sierra Leone and Somalia.

_Hypothesis 1:_ As the level of state capacity increases, human security also increases.

Second, an active and strong civil society is expected to be emancipatory in terms of magnifying people’s resistance to any type of human insecurity threat. Thus, the stronger the civil society gets in a country the more likely a high level of human security becomes. However, if a country lacks state capacity or liberal democracy, it will be impossible for it to achieve a higher level of human security even though it has a robust civil society.

_Hypothesis 2:_ As the level of civil society increases, human security also increases.
2.1. Human Security

Before explaining what human security is or is not, it is important to explain the concept of security and the changing dynamics of security in international relations and development studies. The Oxford English Dictionary defines security as: “the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety, freedom from anxiety or apprehension, a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger” (OED 2015). The concept of security has long been debated in international relations because security is subjective. As Steve Smith (2005) puts it, security is “an essentially contested concept.” Securitization is socially constructed and defines what constitutes a threat to security (Waever 1995). In this regard, what is defined as security changes from one person/society to another (Booth 1991, 2005). For instance, Buzan (1998) posits that the Soviet threat—which was an established threat to the West during the Cold War—was no longer a security threat in the post-Cold War period. This changing notion of security can be described as a de-securitization process. Overall, three important dimensions in contemporary security understanding can be inferred: socially constructed, ever-changing and context specific.

Therefore, it is not surprising that HS scholars focus exclusively on re-conceptualizing and re-theorizing security discourse (McDonald 2002). While traditional security studies focus on state security, HS discourse suggests that individuals – not states – should be the main concern because today more people die from non-state-based threats, such as epidemics, poor healthcare and terrorism, than interstate conflicts. Additionally, many people die from atrocities perpetuated by their own state (Rummel 1994). The link between security and the military must be broken in order to understand the new broader discourse in security studies (Buzan 1998). In this broader discourse, the concept of security is now genuinely and essentially contested (Booth 1991, 2005; Buzan 1998;
Thus, security is no longer considered synonymous with “the military dimension of state security” (Smith 2005).

Additionally, state security does not necessarily guarantee human security. For instance, while national security may not be under threat, human security could be at stake from such threats to human well-being as political repression, economic deprivation, health deficit and the like. Thus, HS corresponds to the changing dynamics of security by moving away from state-centric security understanding and placing humans in the center of security as a referent object (UNDP 1994, 22). In so doing, “human security complements state security, strengthens human development and enhances human rights” (CHS 2003, 2).

After locating HS in the broader security discourse, this research will move on to the origin and concept of HS. Although the HS concept is believed to have originated from the United Nations Development Report in 1994 (Alkire 2003), it had already been in the literature before that (Shuhrke 1999; Sen 2014). However, Cold War politics postponed its appearance simply by signifying Hobbesian state-centric security understandings with states the main actors in international relations. Thus, states’ securities were the chief concern in bipolar Cold War politics. The post-Cold War era, however, brought about a new international environment in which state-centered approaches do not provide valid explanations of today’s security concerns (Tadjbaksh and Chenoy 2007; Thomas and Tow 2002; Fukuda-Parr 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2012). Table 2 below illustrates the new threats in contemporary security understanding.
Table 2: Types of Human Security Threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Security</th>
<th>Examples of Main Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic security</td>
<td>Persistent poverty, unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food security</td>
<td>Hunger, famine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health security</td>
<td>Deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of access to basic health care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental security</td>
<td>Environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal security</td>
<td>Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community security</td>
<td>Inter-ethnic, religious and other identity-based tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political security</td>
<td>Political repression, human rights abuses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Human security discourse can be quite complicated since from the very beginning, the terminology itself has spanned different issues, sources, disciplines, policies and the like. Respectively, HS “sits in the interstices of human development, human rights and security discourses, it sometimes appears marginal to more mainstream on this topic, and implementation requires the crossing of policy and disciplinary boundaries” (Martin and Owen 2014, 1). Similarly, Paris (2004) argues that HS encompasses many different security concerns which lead to over-securitization as well as to difficulties in analyzing the topic through causal hypotheses (371). Thus, the concept of HS is unclear and difficult to approach analytically. Although critics see this as a weakness, proponents see it as evidence of the richness and strength of the discourse.
The difficulties of conceptualizing human security present another problem. The vagueness of the concept keeps researchers from proposing a framework to operationalize human security issues. Although such important unifications as rallying cries and political campaigns have evolved under this umbrella, the vagueness of the issue itself still limits its effectiveness in terms of analytical study of the concept. In this regard, the contribution of HS has been mainly on practical grounds in the sense that politicians, civil society organizations and international institutions have adopted HS policies (Werthes et al. 2011). Thus, analytical criticism persists despite the recognition of HS in international policy circles because different visions of human security prevent scholars from finding a common ground for measuring it.

As a consequence, the HS debate is “first, between the proponents and detractors of human security, and second, between a narrow as opposed to a broad conceptual theorization of human security” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, 40). The first debate lost importance because of the rising importance of HS in international relations and development studies. The second one, however, gained new breath, leading to a trend toward unifying both narrow and broad versions of human security which the literature calls the European School (Martin and Owen 2010). “On the one hand, this perspective is more strongly related to the third dimension of liberty, rights and rule of law while it is not strictly limited or primarily focused on this dimension on the other” (Werthes et al. 2011, 10). So then, the merit of combining narrow and broad versions of security can help us understand the dynamics of HS discourse.
As noted earlier, the concept of HS can be divided into two subcategories: freedom from fear and freedom from want. Figure 2 illustrates how freedom from fear and freedom from want visions correspond to each other, so when operationalizing HS both narrow and broad versions should be integrated.

There are two key versions of human security—the institutional approach and the emancipatory approach—and “while one sees the creation of liberal institutions to protect human
security as paramount, the other aims at the empowerment of individuals and the removal of unnecessary constraints over their lives” (Oliver 2007, 460).

Thus, two dimensions of HS constitute freedom from fear and freedom from want -- protection and empowerment. Protection can be defined as “strategies, set up by states, international agencies, NGOs and the private sector, [to] shield people from menaces” (CHS 2003, 10). This implies that norms, processes and institutions act like a mechanism to protect humans from any threat to their security. Empowerment can be defined as “strategies [that] enable people to develop their resilience to difficult situations” (CHS 2003, 10). In this regard, emancipation/empowerment of individuals produces security, not power or order in international relations (Booth 1991, 319). While emancipation is about freeing people from conditions that limit their well-being, security means the absence of threats that target individuals directly or indirectly. Thus, empowerment enables people to fight for themselves as well as others. It can be understood that protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing and must exist together in order to produce HS (CHS 2003).

Overall, despite conceptual and operational critiques, human security in general constitutes an important dimension of contemporary security policies as well as security studies. Some countries, such as Canada and Japan, and international organizations like the UN, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have integrated HS in their policies. In addition, despite the complexities and vagueness of HS, recent attempts to operationalize this concept yield invaluable contributions. However, these efforts need further testing of their normative and theoretical implications. After drawing the main features of HS, it is time to discover the relationships among human development, democracy, state capacity, and civil society and HS.
All these concepts share some attributes, so it is necessary to lay out how these concepts differ from one another. Besides, the theoretical foundation of this research is tied to the theoretical implications of these very concepts.

2.2. Human Development and Human Rights

2.2.1. Human Development

Human security discourse mainly springs from a security-development nexus (Anand and Gasper 2007; Chandler 2008; Duffield 2010; Hettne 2010; Martin and Owen 2010). Although human security and human development are interrelated, they are not the same. As noted in the UNDP’s 1994 report, human development is about increasing the number of choices that people have, whereas human security is about providing means of freely exercising those choices (UNDP 1994, 23). Security and development “can also be seen as discursive constructions that produce the reality they seem to reflect, and thus serve certain purposes and interests” (Stern and Öjendal 2010, 7).

Therefore, one can suggest that these concepts are mutually reinforcing. In this regard, as Tadjabksh and Chenoy (2007) suggest, we need to enlarge the threshold of human security and development, so they operate together. Human security (as reactive) is needed first for sustainable human development to evolve; human development then needs to be prioritized in order to maintain and fully achieve human security (as defensive). The best example of the relationship between these two concepts can be observed by looking at the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In September 2000, world leaders came together at the UN to discuss policy options to end extreme poverty and to prosper human development across the world. From this gathering, the MDGs were adopted and a 2015 deadline was set. Eight main
goals emerged from the MDGs: 1) eradicate extreme hunger and poverty, 2) achieve universal primary education, 3) promote gender equality and empower women, 4) reduce child mortality, 5) improve maternal health, 6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 7) ensure environmental sustainability, and 8) develop a global partnership for development. By looking at these goals, one can see that HS is an immediate need, whereas human development is a long battle against underdevelopment.

It should be noted here that human development is different from the conventional understanding of development, which focuses exclusively on economic development. This narrow version of human development has been criticized because development cannot be measured only by looking at economic development (Ul-Haq 1995; Sen 1997). In this regard, the 1990 Human Development Report (HDR) shows that development cannot be only about extending economic well-being; it requires, instead, a broader outlook about extending people’s choices. Following the HDR report, the Human Development Index (HDI) was created by including the measures of wealth, health and knowledge. In this regard, as Fukuda-Parr (2011) suggests, the real purpose of development should be about human development not about economic development. So, poverty, which concerns human development, should be the focus for a basic and necessary level of economic maturity to initiate human development. In this regard, economic development is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for human development.

One can conclude that there are two dimensions of development in general: the quantitative, which includes providing food, shelter, education and healthcare and the qualitative, which is about creating human self-esteem and control of one’s own life (Thomas 2001, 161).
Thus, development and freedom are closely interrelated in the sense that human development will provide necessary conditions to nurture freedom and human security (Sen 1999).

### 2.2.2. Human Rights

Another concept that adheres to human security (HS) along with human development is human rights. Human rights and HS are not the same concept but are closely related. Violations of human rights will surely lead to human insecurity. Accordingly, “without respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the attainment of lasting peace would be impossible and human security would remain illusory” (Ramcharan 2004, 39).

Human rights should be understood as a discourse (Ignatieff 2001). There are four stages of contemporary human rights development: 1) the normative foundation, 2) the process of institution building, 3) implementation of rights protection in the post-Cold War era, and 4) the development of individual criminal responsibility, minority rights and collective humanitarian intervention (Buergenthal 1997). Thus, the human rights discourse creates the meaning of human security (Ramcharan 2002, 9).

As can be inferred from the formational stages, “any account of human rights protection must examine the overlap between the domestic and international spheres of politics, law, institutions, and norms to how states and individuals are constrained in actions that may or may not lead to the violation of human rights” (Landman 2005, 11) because human rights discourse encapsulates both domestic and international politics. Respectively, “national security and international security cannot be achieved without respect for individual security in the form of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Ramcharan 2004, 40).
Human rights discourse has gone global by going local first (Ignatief 2001). The spread of human rights in our contemporary world started by empowering local people against social pressures and authoritarian rules. To that end, the international community has had what is called the “boomerang effect” by which international institutions such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch can pressure states for their violations of human rights (Korey 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Thus, human rights norms, through international institutions, have the essential power to alter any human insecurities existing in any given country (Risse et al. 2009).

2.3. Democracy, State Capacity and Civil Society

The three main theoretical perspectives presented in this research could explain the different levels of human security across the world. These theoretical perspectives are drawn mainly from the literature on democracy, state building, and civil society.

2.3.1. Democracy

Democracy and HS appear to be concurrent in the sense that a high level of human security seems to be present mainly in liberal democracies. Considering that it promotes human development (Przeworski et al. 2000) and delivers human rights (Norris 2012), democracy should be regarded as a prerequisite for human security. The absence and/or lack of human development and rights will eventually yield to human insecurity. The relationship between democracy and human security is very compelling to such an extent that some scholars even measure democracy using a human empowerment approach (Alexander and Welzel 2011), since the quality of a democracy can best be understood by looking at human welfare.

Democracy promoters argue that liberal democracies have particular abilities that enable the protection and survival of human security (Carathors 1999, Diamond 1996; Halperin et al.
Rule of law, for instance, is the key institution that promotes horizontal and vertical accountabilities. Vertical accountability corresponds to elections in the sense that governments can be punished by the ballot for their actions, and horizontal accountability makes sure the checks-and-balances system among different government institutions is intact (O’Donnell 1994). Here, the type of democracy is important to understanding the relationship between democracy and HS. When the level of democracy increases, the level of HS also increases. For instance, liberal democracies use various mechanisms to enforce human rights and punish violators of those rights. However, minimally defined democracies, like procedural ones, will fall short of ensuring HS, since they lack accountability, transparency and other institutional measures.

In order to understand how the level of democracy affects HS, one can look at the relationship between democracy and human rights. Some democracies can be seen as “right protective” regimes (Donnelly 1999). In this sense, democratic governments are expected to protect human rights while also empowering people. However, human rights can also be violated in democratic regimes and some democracies might fall short of providing rights and security to their people, thereby reducing the level of human security in those democratic states. Accordingly, one can conclude that “human rights and democracy do not necessarily share a symbiotic relationship, as is often assumed” (Evans 2001, 639). That is, weak democracies lack the capacity or a checks-and-balances system to ensure human rights implementation. The type of democracy matters in order to have a higher level of HS in a given country. In this regard, as Zakaria (1997) puts it, the existence of constitutional liberalism will lead to liberal democracy. Constitutional liberalism entails “rule of law, separation of powers, and protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property” (Zakaria 1997, 22). So then, in illiberal
democracies, governments achieve legitimacy by only elections. Once a party wins an election, the citizens are left out. There is no constitutional liberalism that guarantees additional accountability.

It is essential, then, to focus on the qualities of democracies. There are particular characteristics of liberal democracy which promote HS the most. For instance, “democratic states are expected to provide elected leaders with strong incentives to respond to social needs” (Norris 2012, 13). This is because the attributes of democracy, namely contestation, participation and human rights (Dahl 1989), require that political leaders protect citizens’ interests for the sake of their own survival in the political arena (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). Additionally, a liberal democracy promotes prosperity and peace through its qualities (Carothers 1999; Halperin et al. 2010; McFaul 2010).

Multi-party elections deliver invaluable assets to the endurance of HS. They provide accountability and give leverage to people in order to make sure human well-being is provided and protected (Shapiro and Hacker-Cordsn 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000). Drawing from the median-voter theorem, for their own political survival elected officials are required to implement policies that benefit people (Schumpeter 1948). Additionally, institutional dynamics of democracies are also important to explain how democratic rule can make sure HS policies are implemented (Sen 1999). For instance, Sen suggests that democracies do not face famines in the same way democratic governments answer to their citizens in the election process, so governments take necessary actions to protect citizen’s wellbeing from catastrophic events. In this regard, democracy is believed to have an invisible-hand effect that positively impacts social goods and services through qualities of democracy (Lake and Baum 2001). The magnitude of
this effect, however, depends on the type of democracy as well as the institutional capacity of a
given democracy. Since liberal democracies have strong institutions, high levels of
accountability, and rights-protection mechanisms, they increase the odds of establishing a high
level of HS.

Despite the common perception, the concept of state and democracy are not the same. In
the democratization and state-building literature, there are two contending perspectives about the
sequencing and/or interaction between these two concepts. The debate between “sequencing”
and “nexian” approaches to political development is relevant to comprehending why democracy
may not be adequate to achieve human security. The sequencing perspective suggests that state
building should come first since democratization may not be possible without a state (Linz and
Stephan 1957). In this view, without a functioning state any effort to establish democratic
principles will fall short since the state will be incapable of doing so. Some scholars even suggest
that democracy without state-building might actually magnify differences between political
groups and promote further conflict; thus, more democracy may not be what is needed in the first
place for the developing world (Zakaria 2003).

In response, the nexian camp of the debate suggests that democracy and state
complement each other (Fukuyama 2014; Anderson et al. 2014; Mazzuca and Munck 2014).
Here, the primary argument is that democracy needs state-building at any phase of
democratization (Carathors 2007), that democracy and state building should work
simultaneously so they can strengthen each other. Democracy promotes state- building through
its various mechanisms: 1) It increases participation and inclusion, 2) it increases administrative
capacity, and 3) it strengthens rule of law (Vu 2015). Thus, there is a reciprocal relationship
between state-building and democracy according to the nexian account.

Despite the positive effects of democracy on human security, the HS index shows that some non-democratic states can have notable levels of HS. According to the measurements of Werthes et al. (2013), for instance, Oman has a high HS score and is categorized with countries having above-average ratings. At the same time, Oman, an absolute monarchy, is labeled “not free” by Freedom House. So, one can argue that if HS is achievable in non-democratic regimes, democracy may not necessarily be the only prerequisite for it. Oman and the USA score nearly the same on the Werthes et al. index, with Oman at 13.36 in the Human Insecurity Index and the USA at 13.02. By the same token, Singapore is among the countries with the highest human security score, and it is an authoritarian regime. Overall, democracy may not be a prerequisite for human security but is a strong instrument to further human security.

2.3.2. State Capacity

State capacity (quality of governance) is another important concept that could explain the variations in human security across the world. The literature on state-building suggests that strong states are capable of implementing policies (what Michael Mann (1984) calls infrastructural power of state) that prosper human development and security (Norris 2012). Thus, strong state capacity is imperative “in achieving developmental goals, by bolstering state effectiveness and thus allowing responsive officials to deliver things which citizens want: better security, schools, clinics, and living standards” (Norris 2012, 7). In addition, state capacity has an impact on economic development as well. Some argue that a bureaucratic state is necessary for capitalist development (Evans 1995; Evans and Rauch 1998; Weber 1978). This is because bureaucratic states are capable and equipped with organizational capacities to create economic
programs that will push economic growth. To the contrary, as Migdal (1988) posits, low state capacity limits such state’s functions as governing efficiently and distributing raised revenues through public services. One can, therefore, conclude that “extensive, internally coherent bureaucratic machinery is the first prerequisite for effective state action” (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985, 50).

In this regard, one key role of a modern state is providing and protecting rights of its citizens through legitimate use of force (Weber 2008). This is expected and feasible in countries capable of doing so, however, weak and/or fragile states cannot perform these tasks. Weak-capacity states will be unable to respond to internal fractures in society. Somalia, Sierra Leon and Sudan are a few examples of how weak and failed states end up in the center of human insecurity. Ethnic conflict, terrorism, insurgency and violence become usual occurrences in fragile states. Thus, weak state capacity threatens failing and failed states the most in the sense that human insecurity remains at higher risk in these states. Unfortunately, in our contemporary world, “many regimes – probably between a quarter and a third – are poor and weak and cannot contain threats from rich and strong militias and mafias” (Shaw et al. 2006, 17).

In addition, as Evans (1995) suggests, states are not generic and “different kinds of state structures create different capacities for action” (11). Here, structural factors define state ability to perform a particular role. For instance, some developmental states, such as Singapore, South Korea and Thailand, have prioritized economic development above anything else in their agendas. Other states, like Turkey, focus on internal stability by controlling society. Thus, variations in state structure also define a country’s ability to perform human development policies.
The impact of state capacity on HS is better understood by looking at how weak-capacity states fall behind in terms of human development. According to the statistical findings of Besley and Persson (2010), “low legal capacity can be conducive to lackluster economic growth or might contribute (through wages) to the likelihood of civil war and that lack of fiscal capacity can yield (through production distortions) low income” (27). By the same token, “the evidence suggests that the risk of civil war is reduced by equitable economic growth, increased state capacity and inclusive democracy. Development is a necessary condition for security—and vice versa” (Mack 2005, 188).

As noted earlier, the relationship between state and democracy can be reciprocal in that state formation and democratization complement each other. In this regard, democracy needs the institutional capability to execute democratic governance. As Inglehart and Welzel (2003) posit, democracy emerges from a process by which economic development fosters interpersonal trust, and together they initiate democratization. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the joint effect of these factors on HS, as suggested by the unified theory proposed by Norris (2012). In addition, although institutional capacity is important, the type of institutions matters for HS. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) suggest, the absence of inclusive political and economic institutions undermines the prosperity and development of a nation. In their account, the absence or the presence of inclusive economic and political institutions determines whether a country succeeds or fails in terms of development in social, political and economic spheres. Their arguments confirm that inclusive institutions need to be present in order to ensure HS is intact. If a state has a strong institutional capacity, but the nature of its institutional configuration is exclusive—meaning some parts of society are left out, or institutions do not treat every citizen in the same way—then, it is nonproductive to talk about the existence of HS.
One thing that should be noted here is that democracy and state capacity are not mutually exclusive. That is, democratic states might have poor state capacity and authoritarian regimes do not necessary lack state capacity. In this regard, developmental states can achieve millennium developmental outcomes without acquiring liberal democracies. Doner et al. (2005) define the developmental state as “organizational complexes in which expert and coherent bureaucratic agencies collaborate with organized private sectors to spur national economic transformation” (328). Singapore, South Korea and Thailand are perfect examples of developmental states that achieved rapid development before acquiring democracy.

Overall, the main theoretical foundation of this research is based on the neo-Weberian tradition in which the assumption lies under the idea that state and society should rise together. The harmony and balance in strength in this dichotomy can generate development of every sort. Although states are autonomous, they are also influenced by and limited to socio-economic relations (Evans et al. 1985).

Thus, strengthening state capacity is imperative to achieve millennium developmental goals, which in turn will create conditions that can help sustain human security. However, what matters is achieving institutional settings that are inclusive in nature. This can only be possible by strengthening society.

2.3.3. Civil Society

All the institutional and normative settings cited above make sure human security is protected. However, human empowerment needs further assistance, which can only be done through civil society, an institution that is independent of the state. One can argue, “It is in the interaction between the state and civil society that the conditions for the good life should be
found” (Streeten 1993, 68). Thus, focusing only on the state ignores contributions of civil society, which underlines the importance of the emancipatory part of HS. Civil society is particularly critical as it plays a key role in the developmental process. Accordingly, the introduction of institutions and institutional arrangements will be short-lived or ineffective without support from the people.

The concept of civil society can be defined as “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, bound by a legal order or set of shared rules” (Diamond 1999, 221). There are certain characteristics of civil society that need to be emphasized. First, civil society should be autonomous from the state and economic sectors, so it can prevent dominance in the economy and politics particular groups. Second, civil society is voluntary and fosters collective action through associational networks among people. Third, civil society promotes universalistic interests rather than the interests of a few. Finally, civil society enforces the rule of law by emphasizing civic values.

Transparency and accountability are the two main areas that civil society fosters in modern states. In the contemporary world, civil society acts like a checks-and-balances mechanism. Gellner (1994) suggests that civil society functions as a “set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society” (5). Likewise, the networks that are built through civil society can be used to disseminate information, popularize democratic ideals, and mobilize citizens (Letki, 2009). Thus, civil society plays an important role in three aspects. First, it can alter the balance of power between
state and society in favor of the latter by contributing to a kind of “balanced opposition”. Second, civil society plays a “disciplinary role” in relation to the state by enforcing standards of public morality and performance and improving accountability both of politicians and of administrators. Third, civil society plays a crucial role as an intermediary between state and society (White, 1994).

Another dimension of civil society is social capital that can be defined as connections among individuals, social networks, and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness (Putnam 2000). In this fashion, social capital will be higher if networks, communication, social trust, social inclusion, collective action and cooperation among citizens are advanced. Accordingly, social capital along with strong civic engagement increases institutional performance and conditions the maintenance of democratic government (Putnam 1994). Thus, civil society has every necessary ingredient to foster human empowerment and protect citizens from arbitrary actions of governments.

Among the civil society mechanisms, NGOs affect human security the most because people channel their powers through some sort of institution. Two types of NGOs will be analyzed in this research: 1) one that operates at an international level (transnational NGOs) and 2) one that operates at the local level (local NGOs). The interactions between local and transnational NGOs bring about a successful construction of human security at local, national and international levels. Some key roles of NGOs follow: “working with (or against) governments in developing agendas for action; in standard-setting (that is, establishing international norms for state behavior, set forth in legally binding treaties that have been negotiated and ratified by governments); in preparing and providing information about abuses
based on research; in lobbying officials and media; and in providing direct assistance to victims of human rights abuses” (Welch 2001, 3).

Overall, transnational NGOs are “dedicated to the development, diffusion, and realization of universal human rights standards around the globe” (Mitoma 2008, 607). Their expert views on specific cases and impartial stands on the issues between parties (Clark 2010; Welch 2001) make them invaluable actors in applying human security policies.

In this regard, a key effect of civil society on HS is that civil society organizations are connected to transnational advocacy networks (TANs). As Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest, TANs channel different sources of power by creating links among actors in civil societies, states and international organizations and become powerful actors both transnationally and domestically. These activists beyond borders have an organized system of operation in which members adopt shared principles and values and engage in a “voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal exchange of information and services” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 200). The operation of the TANs can be explained by looking at four dimensions: information, symbolic, leverage and accountability politics.

In our highly globalized world, local civil societies have connection to TANs, which creates a flow of information between these two entities. In addition, local civil societies have connections to other international organizations and regimes. In this fashion, “global institutions are needed in order to curb the occasionally destructive and self-destructive tendencies of the state and to assert the values shared by all humanity” (Streeten 1993, 68). Therefore, the interactive relationship between domestic civil societies and various forms of international institutions magnifies the influence and magnitude of local civil societies, as they draw support
not only from locals but also from different types of international organizations.

Hence, civil society in a contemporary state might even challenge state sovereignty in some cases. This could be a good thing when a state violates HS policies, in the sense that local or national struggles for HS can be heightened to the international level. This will increase the possibilities of exposing states that violate HS to sanctions by international organizations. In return, governments can move backward, since the cost of putting up local movements might be higher than just providing requested HS to people. Thus, civil society can play a key role in the institutionalization of international norms at the local level as well as the international level. “A successful incorporation of human security into national and international policy strictly depends on the active engagement of civil society actors” (Kotter 2007, 52). With this in mind, one can suggest that civil society can be an intermediary institution where domestic and international politics overlap.

So then, civil society in general increases consciousness of individuals about what is happening in the state and in the world and how these affect citizens’ wellbeing. This function of civil society creates what Norris (2011) calls “critical citizens” who will not abide any arbitrary use of force by governments against the interests of the citizenry.

Is a strong civil society taken for granted in liberal democracies? This essential question underlines the importance of analyzing civil society. Conventional wisdom suggests that liberal democracies are expected to have robust civil societies. After all, civic virtue is an inalienable dimension of liberal democracies. Nevertheless, the literature on civil society suggests that strong civil society does not lead to democracy (Berman 1997; Encarnacion 2006; Langohr 2004; Weiss 2006, 2008). Statistical data show that civic activism in many democracies has
been declining over the last couple of decades, while the liberal democracies have remained. Furthermore, if one compares democracies in terms of their civil societies, striking differences can be found. For instance, South Korea and South Africa have identical democracy scores but South Africa has a high civil society score and South Korea has a low one. These disparities imply that the relationship between democracy and civil society is not straightforward and these two variables could be mutually exclusive. In this regard, despite the strength of civil society in the middle east, the weakness of the institutional capacity of the Arabian states and the weak political parties does not lead to democracy in the region as Langohr 2004 posits. In addition, NGOs can be ill-equipped and follow particular interests of their own rather than democratic norms (Langohr 2004). In the long run, however, some scholars suggest that a strong civil society together with economic development and globalization will bring about democratic change (Diamond 2014).

There is a reciprocal relationship between “power of the state and power of the civil society” (Stepan 2001, 74). This, according to Stepan, could be in various forms such as zero sum, positive sum or negative sum. The variation in the formation of state-society forces generates different outcomes in terms of human security. Therefore, this research will investigate the argument that a strong state and a strong society are the key ingredients for prospering human security. Although regime type is also an important factor, it generates a weak explanation as to why some authoritarian regimes or less democratic ones have relatively higher levels of human security than their highly democratized counterparts. It is both plausible and possible that the relationship between regime type and human development might be a spurious one.
3. METHODOLOGY

Contemporary scholarship moves toward using a mixed-method approach in scientific inquiry. The merits of combining methods have long been emphasized in political science research, since this type of methodology has greater explanatory power and yields a greater validity (Box-Steppensmeier et al. 2008). The research here employs a mixed-method approach or what Denzin (1978) calls triangulation. The mixed-method approach was chosen in order to better explore the relationship among variables since the topic is very complex to begin with. Thus, “multi-method research combines the strength of large –N designs for identifying empirical regularities and patterns, and the strength of case studies for revealing the causal mechanisms that give rise to political outcomes of interest” (Fearon and Laitin 2008, 758). This is exactly what this research is meant to achieve in the sense that a mixed-method approach will help double check findings in order to propose robust arguments and strengthen validity. Additionally, statistical analysis cannot reveal some of the key relationships among variables, so case studies will illuminate why and how the key explanatory variables affect HS.

Qualitative and quantitative analysis each has its own weaknesses and strengths (Brady et al. 2004). For instance, while the quantitative method embraces large-N analysis (LNA) and captures a broad picture, qualitative analysis uses small-n analysis (SNA) and provides in-depth investigation. LNA captures correlations between variables, but SNA reveals causation and shows how independent variables affect dependent variables.
One important name in combining qualitative and quantitative analysis is Lieberman (2005) who explains how qualitative and quantitative methods can be combined in a productive manner. The author calls this form of mixed-method analysis “nested analysis.” This process starts with a preliminary LNA and once the researcher finds robust and satisfactory results, he or she will move on to model testing SNA. If the model captured by LNA is tested by SNA, the process will be successful. Thus, this research will present valid causal inferences by testing the relationship found in statistical analysis through case studies that will help to articulate theoretical insights (Lieberman 2005).

This chapter has two main sections. The type of quantitative analysis used in this research, the variables and their operationalizations will be reported in the first. In the second phase, the type of qualitative analysis, variables and their operationalizations will be presented.

3.1. Phase I: Quantitative Research

Statistical analysis will be conducted using cross-sectional time series data of over 163 countries around the world from 1984 to 2014. This research will use a wide range of datasets on human development, regime affects and civil society. Through deductive reasoning, this part of the research will be a systematic way of analyzing how civil society and state capacity affect human security. This is particularly important since the aim of this research is to capture generalizable and testable explanations. This part of the research also replicates and extends Norris’s (2012) argument.

Large-N comparisons yield invaluable findings and identifies outliers that could open up avenues for further research. The model used here employs a wide range of political, social and
economic indicators from a variety of datasets. The unit of analysis is a country/year panel which covers 130-195 countries around the world (depending on the availability of data) for over 30 years (1984-2014).

The statistical analysis used in this research is ordinary least squares linear regression with panel corrected standard errors (OLS with PCSE). As Beck and Katz (1995) suggest, OLS with PCSE overcomes the issues of regular OLS regression in conducting time-series cross-section data analysis. These are unit-level heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation between variables. Heteroscedasticity refers to the circumstance in which the variability of a variable is unequal across the range of values of a second variable that predicts it. The opposite of heteroscedasticity is homoscedasticity, which suggests that a dependent variable’s (DV) variability is equal across values of an independent variable (IV).

3.1.1. Data and Variables

3.1.1.a. Dependent Variables

By following the previous literature (Norris 2012), this research looks at three key aspects of human security: economic growth, social developmental indices and internal conflict. Thus, there are four dependent variables in this research—Human Development Index (HDI), economic growth, life expectancy and internal conflict. For analytical and parsimonious reasons some of the components of human security are dropped. Respectively, infant and maternal mortality variables are removed as life expectancy provides a sufficient measure for quality of life. Additionally, political and environmental components of HS are removed since structural factors are controlled. Natural disasters, for instance, are measured by the environmental security dimension. Political security is removed since it is measured by looking at the factors that are
also used in measuring democracy and/or state capacity, such as political stability and corruption variables.

*HDI* is taken from the Human Development Programme which consists of education, life expectancy and gross national income (GNI) indexes. *Education* is operationalized as the gross enrollment in secondary education. The data come from the World Bank’s 2017 World Development Indicators. *Economic growth* data are taken from the Penn World Tables dataset which measures economic development by looking at the annual percentage growth rate of per capita GDP at market prices based on constant local prices. *Life expectancy* data are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Life expectancy measures at birth total number of years expected. *Internal armed conflict* data is measured by using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Internal armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The existence of armed conflict in a given year is coded as 1 with 0 for non-existence.

### 3.1.1.b. Independent Variables

The two independent variables in this research are civil society and state capacity. In order to strengthen reliability, this research will also replicate the arguments presented in the previous literature. Thus, regime type will be categorized as an independent variable. However, the replication analysis will not be in the models used in this research. Instead, fundamental results of the statistical model used in the previous literature (liberal democracy model) will be compared to the main model of this research (civil society model).
Measuring state capacity can be quite complicated, as it varies across different areas of research in political science because one cannot think about a state as if it consists of only a few elements. Additionally, the concept of state is often confused with other concepts, that is, “further complications arise from an abundance of terms that refer to closely related attributes of states: state strength or power, state fragility or failure, infrastructural power, institutional capacity, political capacity, quality of government or governance, and the rule of law” (Sigman and Hanson 2013, 2). This research analyzes state capacity by taking a minimalist and widely used approach. In this vein, state capacity can be described as the “degree of control that state agents exercise over persons, activities, and resources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 78). Thus, state capacity is the ability of state institutions to implement state policies in an effective manner (Sikkink 1991).

**State capacity** is measured by Political Risk Service’s Group (PRSG) International Country Risk Guide estimates of the quality of governance (QOG). PRSG’s quality of governance index is widely used by scholars and is the most comprehensive one to date. This index combines three measures: 1) bureaucratic quality; 2) corruption; and 3) law and order. It is standardized to a 100-point scale, is based on expert assessment starting from 1984 and covers over 100 nation states (Dahlberg et al. 2018). Bureaucratic quality is determined by looking at 1) meritocratic recruitment and career advancement, 2) independence from political pressure, and 3) governments’ ability to provide services during government changes (Charron and Lapuente 2010). Corruption is assessed by looking at patronage, nepotism, bribes and secret party funding. Law and order are assessed by looking at strength and impartiality of the current legal system in a given country.
Civil Society is measured by the civil society index from the varieties of democracy dataset (Coppedge et al. 2017). This index asks how robust civil society is. It combines three important qualities of civil society: civil society organization entry and exit, repression and participatory environment. Civil society is an interval variable and ranges from 0 to 1. Data is available for over 180 countries covered from 1984 to 2014. Additionally, some other civil society measures are used to cross check findings. For instance, civil society variable measured by the indices of social development is taken from the International Institution of Social Studies. This data cover the time period from 1990 to 2010 and include 193 countries around the world. Social capital variable as one of the indicators of civil society is planned on adding into the analyses, however, because of lack of data problem it is not added.

Although the democracy variable will not be in the main model and is used only for replication purposes, it is operationalized as follows: Democracy is measured by using the liberal democracy index (Coppedge et al. 2017) from the “Varieties of Democracy” dataset. This index measures liberalism of democracy in particular, focusing on how government is restrained by rule of law, constitution, judiciary, and checks and balances. Additionally, it takes the level of electoral democracy into account, to complete a measurement of liberal democracy. Thus, this dataset asks the following question: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved? It is aggregated by combining polyarchy and liberal variables in the dataset.

In order to achieve precision in the statistical analysis, this research will also cross-check different data sets for measuring regime type. First is the Gastil Index (liberal democracy index) that includes a seven-point scale used by Freedom House. It measures political rights and civil liberties, from 1972 to the present. It is standardized to a 100-point scale. Second, the polyarchy
variable is used from the Varieties of Democracy dataset in order to have a fine-grained measure of regime type. This variable looks at electoral democracy and asks the following question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy achieved in its fullest sense? Using multiple variables this way is particularly important since the liberal democracy variable is often associated with some other variables. For instance, civil society and democracy are highly correlated as found in the statistical analysis.

For measuring the impact of democracy and state capacity together, Norris (2012) creates her own variable, namely democratic governance. The value of democratic governance is calculated in her operationalization by multiplying the liberal democracy and the governance capacity indexes and standardizing them to a 100-point scale. The purpose of combining state capacity and democracy is that these two variables should be presented simultaneously in order to achieve human security according to Norris (2012). This particular statement was the author’s main contribution to the literature. However, the current research will not utilize this variable in the statistical analysis since it lacks analytical coherence and deviates from parsimony.

3.1.1.c. Control Variables

The structural conditions in this research will be controlled. The list of control variables and their explanations will be presented in the appendix as well. The control variables are borrowed from Norris (2012). Among the key control variables are geographic locations, natural resources, culture, religion, ethnic conflict, colonization and countries’ position in the global market.
Geographic location is measured as “the absolute value of the latitude from the equator of the capital city, divided by 90 (ranges between 0 and 1)” (La Porte et al. 1999). Economic development data are taken from the World Bank Datasets. It is per capita GDP measured in constant international $ in purchasing power parity. Area size is described as the area of the nation state in kilometers. The data are taken from the Cross-Polity Time-series Database (Banks 2008). Natural resources are described as oil and gas rents per capita. These data are borrowed from Ross (2004). Ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization data look at ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in each country. The fractionalization data are taken from Alesina et al. (2003). Population size is measured as the estimates of total population (in thousands). The source is the World Bank’s 2017 World Development Indicators. British and French colonialization data (two separate variables) are borrowed from Pippa Norris’ 2015 cross national democracy dataset. It is coded as (1) for the existence of British or French colonial history and (0) for non-existence of a colonial background.

3.2. Phase II: Case Studies

In this part, the research will adopt case studies in order to discover causal mechanisms behind the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables. Case studies contribute to theoretical development by providing refinements to the existing middle-range theories through introducing new variables and causal patterns (George and Benett 2004). Therefore, theory-building and testing are among some of the imperative contributions of case study methods that will also be in this research.
3.2.1. Selecting Countries for Case Studies

The significant relationship found in the statistical analysis between civil society, state capacity and human security will be tested by four case studies selected on the basis of common structural characteristics yet different developmental and state-society outcomes. The case studies will be conducted in two pairs. In the first pair, two countries with the same level of democracy but different levels of civil society will be selected. These two democracies are Slovenia and Lithuania. The second pair, Russia and Singapore, will be selected from authoritarian regimes, based on their divergence on civil society and state capacity, and similarity in terms of regime type.

It will then ask the following question to investigate correlations: Is there any evidence that the relationship between variables disclosed by statistical analysis actually exists? If affirmative responses are achieved to this question by initial case selection, this research will investigate causation by examining country-specific data. In doing so, the research will investigate the questions of how and why do state capacity and civil society affect human security? A wide range of data is used for conducting case studies, including but not limited to, surveys, statistical datasets and secondary resources.

3.2.2. Case Study Data Sources

The main sources of data are taken primarily from the World Bank Development Indicators, CIVICUS country reports and surveys, the Legatum Prosperity Index, the Human Security Index and the data used in the statistical analysis.

In the analysis of the civil society of the selected cases, the CIVICUS data will be used. CIVICUS uses four components in assessing a country’s civil society score—the structure, the
external environment, the values and the impact of civil society. Civic engagement is defined as “the level of individual participation in social and political organizations and fields,” level of organization is defined as “the degree of institutionalization that characterizes civil society,” practice of values is defined as “the extent to which civil society is seen to internalize and model positive values,” and perception of impact is defined as “the perceived social and policy impact of civil society, according to both internal and external perceptions” (CIVICUS 2017, 9).

Together, these four assessment tools create the civil society diamond. By reading the civil society diamond, CIVICUS assesses a country’s civil society scores and categorizes them as open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed or closed. In addition to the CIVICUS CSO assessments, this dissertation will also use some other resources in order to measure the strength of a society.

The measure of social capital will be taken from The Legatum Prosperity Index. Social capital is operationalized as “the strength of personal relationships, social network support, social norms and civic participation in a country” (Legatum 2017).

3.2.3. Case Study Method

Process tracing or causal process observation will be used to measure how strong state and/or strong civil society improve human security in the case studies. Process tracing refers to a “method [that] attempts to identify intervening causal processes—causal chain and causal mechanism—between independent variable or variables and dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2004, 206). Process tracing should be based on the right kind of evidence, otherwise it can lead to what David Hume (1977) calls the “problem of induction.” Another criticism of process tracing is that it has infinite regress because there are too many details to be analyzed. However, Bennett (2008) suggests that the persuasiveness of the evidence when looking at its quality, with the research question in mind and relational logic between evidence and the
research question, can help reduce this infinite step problem. The intervening variables should be connected to the causal chain or mechanism in such a way that it “allows process-tracing to reduce the problem of indeterminacy (the problem often misidentified in case studies as the degrees of freedom problem)” (George and Bennett 2004, 207).

First, this research will trace the process of how state capacity might increase the level of human security. The administrative, bureaucratic and coercive apparatus of state will be investigated to explain relationships between the dependent and independent variables. Second, the functions of civil society will be analyzed. In doing so, this research will trace the process of how civil society empowers individuals by looking at the structure, the external environment, the values and the impact of civil society in a given country. Respectively, this dissertation will analyze civil society by looking at various activities of civil society. The key dimensions of operationalization of civil society can be listed as “CSO autonomy, state-civil-society dialogue, and relationships of co-operation and support between the state and civil society” (Malena and Heinrich 2007, 343). The impact of social capital will also be added in the analysis of civil society as these two concepts may not be mutually inclusive. In addition to this, the international influence on civil society will also be integrated into the analysis of civil society.
4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES

The quantitative analyses in this research extend the argument of Norris (2012) by adding a variable representing each country’s level of civil society. In the analysis by Norris, the regime type that most closely emphasizes the importance of civil society is bureaucratic democracies. However, since there is no direct measure for examining the importance of civil society on human security (HS), her research misses the influence of civil society on HS. This current research uncovers why democracies may or may not have high levels of human security by adding an indicator of the level of civil society alongside an indicator of government capacity in the models. Thus, I will argue that the formula for achieving developmental goals and HS by and large depends on both the conditions of strong state capacity and a robust civil society. It is my contention that these conditions will surpass regime type as key to understanding HS.

Table 3 below shows descriptive statistics for all the variables included in my models. Overall, the variables are normally distributed. Economic development, area size, natural resources, former French and British colonies, societal health, civil society participation and civil society repression indicators vary the most as indicated by standard deviation values that are higher than their mean values. This is important to consider because large variation will ensure that I will get more robust tests.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables That Are Used in the Statistical Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum Value</th>
<th>Maximum Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>4054</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Secondary)</td>
<td>3979</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>164.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>4885</td>
<td>395552.4</td>
<td>1312003.0</td>
<td>267.3328</td>
<td>17200000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>5225</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Conflict</td>
<td>5828</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Capacity</td>
<td>5797</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>4950</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Location</td>
<td>5828</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>4326</td>
<td>12369.3</td>
<td>15666.7</td>
<td>242.0</td>
<td>129349.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Size</td>
<td>5828</td>
<td>685609.0</td>
<td>1863123.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>16400000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>5382</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization</td>
<td>5456</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>5735</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Size</td>
<td>5828</td>
<td>5828.0</td>
<td>31700000.0</td>
<td>121000000.0</td>
<td>8007.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Colonization</td>
<td>5828</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>5828</td>
<td>1999.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As discussed earlier, time-series cross-sectional data suffer from contemporaneous correlation across the units and unit level heteroscedasticity issues. Therefore, in order to
investigate the presence of heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan and Koenker tests are conducted (See Table 4). The result suggests that I can reject the null hypothesis that states heteroskedasticity is not present (this means data are homoscedastic). Thus, this research uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE). Heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors in OLS regression provide robust standard errors in time series cross sectional data analysis (Beck and Katz 1995).

Table 4: Heteroscedasticity Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LM</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>80.069</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koenker</td>
<td>129.920</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present (homoskedasticity). if sig-value less than 0.05, reject the null hypothesis.
Note: Breusch-Pagan test is a large sample test and assumes the residuals to be normally distributed

4.1. Findings of Quantitative Analyses

Although Norris’s 2012 study is replicated by analyzing how regime and state capacity effect human security, it is not modeled in this study. Instead, I compare the key findings of the author with the models of this research. There are two main models in Norris’s work that correspond with this research. The first explains the impact of democratic governance on human development. The second model reveals the impact of democratic governance on internal conflict. Each of these models is replicated by expanding the time period. Norris’s statistical analysis covers the period from 1984 to 2009, whereas this research covers from 1984 to 2014. Many datasets used in this research are similar to Norris (2012) and substantially parallel results
are found. However, this research could not exactly replicate the models that Norris used due to a variety of factors intrinsic to the model under consideration. For instance, the replication analysis of Norris suggests there is a correlation between state capacity and globalization variables in the Norris models, however, there is no such correlation in her models.

By using similar models but replacing the democracy variable with the civil society variable, this research builds upon Norris’s (2012) arguments. Additionally, unlike the previous literature, this research also analyzes the human development index by dissecting it into its three main components. Because of the multicollinearity problem, civil society and liberal democracy cannot be incorporated into the same model in a statistically acceptable way; that is, civil society and liberal democracy are strongly positively correlated. For that matter, the impact of regime type was analyzed separately but not included in the main models. Table 5 below represents the comparison of civil society and democracy models. The dependent variable (human development index), the control variables and the particular statistical analysis (OLS with PCSE) are the same in these two models.

In terms of internal conflict, there should be a negative association between the outcome variable and the predictor variables, as any increase in predictor variables will result in less internal conflict. The replication test in Table 6 suggests that Norris’s (2012) model on internal conflict does not yield a strong model as $R^2$ being 24 (Democracy is significant at $P=0.000$). Likewise, the model with civil society term as $R^2$ being 24 (Civil Society is significant at $P=0.000$) does not produce a strong explanatory model (see Table 6).
Table 5: Comparison Between Civil Society Model and Liberal Democracy Model on Human Development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>beta</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
Note: These models are exactly the same in terms of control variables, dependent variable and the type of statistical analysis. The time covered in the previous literature, however, is extended in this research.

Table 6: Comparison Between Civil Society Model and Liberal Democracy Model on Internal Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>beta</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.0061</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>-0.6326</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
Note: These models are exactly the same in terms of control variables, dependent variable and the type of statistical analysis. The time covered in the previous literature, however, is extended in this research.
After conducting the replication tests of the previous literature and comparing them with the key explanatory variables of this research, I will now conduct detailed tests for measuring the impacts of civil society and state capacity on human security. In this respect, there are five main models in the statistical analysis (see Tables 7 and 8). The dependent variable of human development was measured by using the Human Development Index (HDI) and by segregating each component that makes HDI. That is, the first model takes HDI as the dependent variable. Life expectancy, education and economic development (GNI) are the dependent variables for the following models. Internal conflict will be the dependent variable in the last model.

In the presence of control variables, the model with civil society leads to a better explanation of variation in human development. As indicated by the improved adjusted $R^2$ (See Table 5), this research comes to the conclusion that the model with the civil society term is associated with higher predictive ability and better explanations. That is, the civil society model yields $R^2=70$, whereas $R^2$ goes down to 67 in the same model with the democracy variable, indicating a key relative contribution to the literature. By looking at these results, one can argue that the relationship between human development and regime type could be a spurious one. That is, what explains the variation in human security might be the civil society component of the liberal democracy index. However, further research is needed to reach a decisive conclusion. So far, this research used different measures of regime type, including the minimalist definition of democracy (polyarchy). Despite the fact that using polyarchy instead of liberal democracy shows regime type to be significant, the explanatory power of the model and the significance of regime type dropped noticeably.

In all of the four models that measure human development and its components, civil society and state capacity are positively correlated with the dependent variables and are
statistically significant (see Table 7). Thus, the very argument presented in this paper is confirmed by the statistical analyses. In the first model, all the control variables are statistically significant as well. Among the control variables, natural resources, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, British colonization and population size variables are negatively correlated with HDI. In this regard, the oil- and gas-rich countries are found to be those with lower human development scores. Ethno-linguistically diverse countries are also the ones with less human development. Population size seems to have a reducing effect on human development. Finally, the countries with British colonial history are also lacking human development. Geographic location, area size and religious fractionalization increase level of human development as well.

In the second model in which life expectancy is the dependent variable, both state capacity and civil society are significant (see Table 7). All the control variables are found to be statistically significant as well. Among the control variables, geographic location, area size, natural resources, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, religious fractionalization and British colonization variables are negatively correlated with the dependent variable. So, all these variables have a reducing impact on life expectancy. To the contrary, economic growth and development, education, and population size are positively correlated and increase life expectancy.

In the third model, in which education is the dependent variable, state capacity and civil society are found to be statistically significant (see Table 7). Control variables are also found to be significant. Natural resources and ethno-linguistic fractionalization variables are negatively correlated with education. That is, the countries with rich natural reserves are the ones with lower education scores. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization seems to have a reducing effect on education. Religious fractionalization, geographic location, economic development and growth
are also significant factors that explain education. The only insignificant control variable in the model is population size. Population size of a country does not explain education at all. The existence of a British colonial past of a country, although it is significant, makes a slight impact on education.

In the fourth model, in which economic growth is the dependent variable, civil society and state capacity are statistically significant (see Table 7). Civil society increases the odds of having economic development. The idea that ethnically diverse nations lack economic development (Easterly and Revine 1997) is confirmed in the statistical analysis. Thus, ethno-linguistic fractionalization is significant in explaining economic deficiency of some countries. There is a positive correlation between religious fractionalization and economic development. So, it is found that religiously diverse nations are doing better in terms of economic development. Area size and natural resources are found to be significant; however, they reduce economic development.

Although the model with internal conflict does not produce strong $R^2$ (see Table 8 below), it gives important insights into the relationship between civil society and internal conflict. That is, civil society is a significant factor in explaining internal conflict ($P=0.000$, $b=-0.6326$). The model with democracy as the key explanatory variable does not produce strong $R^2$ either. In fact, it has lower $R^2$ than does civil society (see Table 6). The democracy variable came out as significant ($P=0.000$), it has a lower coefficient in absolute value ($-0.0061$) than civil society.

Other significant factors gleaned from the model are ethnic and religious fractionalizations, they are expected to be explanatory from the theoretical perspective (see Table 8). There is a positive correlation between internal conflict and religious fractionalization;
however, there is a negative correlation between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and internal conflict. So, the idea that ethnically diverse countries are prone to conflict seems to be supported. On the contrary, religious diversity and differences appear to have a reducing impact on internal conflict. As expected, economic development and growth are other significant factors that reduce internal conflict. Area size and British colonization are found to be statistically significant as well. Both area size and past British colonization of countries are positively correlated with internal conflict. This indicates that they increase the likelihood of internal conflict in a given country.

State capacity, however, is found to be insignificant in explaining internal conflict (Table 8). This suggests that the countries with strong state capacity do not necessarily get away from internal conflict. Population size, education, geographic location and natural resources are not statistically significant, either. Among these variables, the effect of geographic location on internal conflict is surprising as it is found significant in the previous literature.

To sum up, statistical analysis confirms the very argument presented in this research. In all five models, civil society is found to be statistically significant. State capacity is also found to be significant in human development; however, it registers as insignificant in terms of explaining internal conflict. In the previous literature (Norris 2012), state capacity is removed from the internal conflict model, probably due to producing an insignificant argument. Nevertheless, the findings endorse that civil society is a significant factor for welfare, prosperity and peace, and state capacity is significant for welfare and prosperity. At this stage, the statistical findings need to be further tested by qualitative analysis. For that matter, this research will report the findings of the case studies in the following part, in order to elaborate on the relationships among variables found in the statistical analyses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>PCSE</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>(-0.051)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Capacity</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographic Location</strong></td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>(-0.006)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-5.872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Development</strong></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Growth</strong></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area Size</strong></td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>(-2.13)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-9.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Resources</strong></td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>(-0.001)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization</strong></td>
<td>-0.169</td>
<td>(-0.002)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-6.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Fractionalization</strong></td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-4.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Size</strong></td>
<td>-3.53</td>
<td>(6.09)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>British Colonialization</strong></td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-2.491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-5.632</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>-20.23</td>
<td>(27.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Observations:</strong></td>
<td>3384</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²:</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
NS: Not Significant
Table 8: The Impact of Civil Society and Quality of Government on Internal Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Internal Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>PCSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>-0.633</td>
<td>(-0.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Government</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>(-0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Location</td>
<td>-0.258</td>
<td>(-0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Size</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization</td>
<td>1.086</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>-1.204</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Size</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Colonialization</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>5.222</td>
<td>(3.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Observations:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²:</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.

NS: Not Significant
5. CASE STUDY ANALYSES

5.1. Liberal Democracies

5.1.1. Slovenia

Slovenia is a liberal democracy with a high level of human development. Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Slovenia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in December 1990, and the Republic of Slovenia was founded in June 1991. Unlike in the other Yugoslavian nations, Slovenian independence was bloodless. Additionally, the transformation from Communism to a free market economy and democracy was much smoother and very fast. With a massive privatization program that began in 1992, Slovenia was able to achieve integration into the European Union, becoming a member in 2004. It joined the European Monetary Union in 2007. Slovenia is ethnically and religiously homogenous, with the majority of its citizens (about 90%) being Slovene.

5.1.1.a. Human Security in Slovenia

Today, Slovenia has a high level of HDI value compared to the other democracies in Eastern Europe and it is above the average European Union countries in general. According to the Human Development Program of 2016, Slovenia ranks 25 out of 188 countries. Arguably, one reason behind the quick transformation and high levels of development and prosperity is that Slovenia has a strong civil society, despite the civil suppression by the Communist regime.
After independence, Slovenia witnessed a steady increase in the HDI components. Figure 3 illustrates how it achieved prosperity over the years. From 1990 to 2015, Slovenia’s HDI increased around 16% (UNDP 2016). At face value, the changes in Slovenian HDI over the years suggests that the regime type might be playing a role in expanding human development. A closer look, however, shows Slovenia’s HDI values before the 1990s (when Slovenia was a Communist regime) and suggests that regime type may not be that important. Slovenia during this time period maintained a high level of human development compared to its democratic counterparts. Figure 3 also illustrates how the components of HDI increased over time in Slovenia. Among the HDI indices, increase in the level of education is the most drastic one.

Figure 3: Trends in Slovenia’s HDI component indices 1990-2015
According to the UPPSALA Conflict Data Program, Slovenia is free from internal conflict. Even during its declaration of independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenian resistance was peaceful, and it was not involved in armed conflict. According to the Legatum Prosperity Index of 2017, Slovenia ranks 21st out of 149 countries. In terms of the safety and security dimensions of the same index, it is 19th. Today, Slovenia is one of the few countries that enjoy a very peaceful environment in terms of any types of internal conflict.

5.1.1.b. State and Society in Slovenia

Slovenian state capacity has not increased significantly since its independence. Although Slovenia has an average score on state capacity in the world, compared to the other developed countries and its European counterparts it has a low level of state capacity. For instance, on average Hungary’s state capacity over the years is 0.9, whereas Slovenia’s state capacity is 0.7. Table 9 illustrates how Slovenia scores in the governance indicators that are used to gauge state capacity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Indicator</th>
<th>Rank (1-100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularity Quality</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank Governance Indicators, Slovenia 2016
Slovenia scores lowest on the good governance indicators of the political stability index. However, this is not a bad score compared to the rest of the world. For instance, Slovenia ranks 30th in the world according to the World Bank Political Stability Index, as illustrated in Figure 4.

![Slovenia - Political stability](source: TheGlobalEconomy.com, The World Bank)

**Figure 4: Political Stability of Slovenia from 1996 to 2016**


In terms of civil society, Slovenia’s is robust, with long historical roots (Rakar et al. 2011). Compared to the other former Communist bloc countries, “the hegemony of new social movements in initiating and directing the democratic transformation was a unique Slovenian phenomenon; and it was only in Slovenia that the alternative to the existing system was explicitly articulated in terms of civil society” (Mastnak 1994, 97). Despite its social cohesion
and the strength of its civil society, the Communist regime suppressed civil society in Slovenia during the Cold War. Nevertheless, civil society played a key role in the formation of liberation movements and the collapse of the Communist regimes in Slovenia (Ash 1989, 174).

Slovenian civil society is categorized as open, according to the civil society rating of CIVICUS. By drawing from the CIVICUS qualitative and quantitative data, Slovenia has a robust civil society that is politically and socially active. In the following paragraphs, this research will investigate the structure, the external environment, the values and the impact of civil society in Slovenia.

According to statistics from the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services (AJPES), Slovenian civil society consists of around 75% associations, 6% private institutions, 4% religious organizations, 1.5% cooperatives and 0.7% foundations (CIVICUS 2010, 14). The reason associations rank higher than any other civil society organizations is that during the Communist regime they were the only associations allowed to form in Slovenia as the other forms of civil society organizations were seen as a threat to the regime.

With the former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) policies in the 1980s, one can argue that civil society started to gain power in the Communist bloc countries. In places like Slovenia, with a strong foundation of civil society even before the Communist regime, civil society started to become powerful in the 1980s. In Slovenia, “the end of the old regime began with the opposition in civil society to the death penalty and to the infamous Article 133 of the federal code (verbal delicti)” (Antic 1991, 150). In 1989, therefore, the Slovene Spring was the
pure success of civil society that brought independence and liberation from Communist rule. The democratization process was signaled by this movement as well.

In the former Communist countries, the emergence of critical Marxism as a way of modifying Marxism and its implications about political and economic spheres started to find support both in intellectual circles and in civil groups. This contributed to the development of civil society. During the 1980s, “most of what remained of critical Marxism ended in post-Marxism and in the promotion of civil society discourse” (Mastnak 2005, 331). These movements, however, created different outcomes, such as liberal rights movements and revisionism, in different socio-political contexts. Thus, “in Yugoslavia, civil society became the framing concept of independent social action only in Slovenia, while revisionism remained strong in Belgrade and Zagreb” (Mastnak 2005, 342).

CIVICUS analyzes civil society development in Slovenia under four different time frames. In the period of state socialism (1945-1970), the functions of civil society were undertaken by the public sector which weakened civil society development. For instance, the number of associations decreased from 6,919 to 6,761 in this time period (Rakar et al. 2011).

In the second period (self-governing socialism of the 1970s), the pressures on Slovenian civil society were reduced by state policies which introduced decentralization and removed coercion of civil society organizations. The Associations Act of 1974 allowed the emergence of new civil society organizations and “provided a space for the bottom-up founding of CSOs as true citizens’ initiatives” (CIVICUS). Thus, having less intervention by the state and more autonomy helped civil society organizations generate more public good and services for the Slovenian people.
The period of new social movements (1980s) witnessed the growth both in scope and in depth of civil society organizations. New organizations were established and created public good and services. According to the CIVICUS data, after independence while some civil society organizations remained civil society organizations, others were integrated into political parties. From 1975 to 1985, the number of civil society organizations in Slovenia rose by almost 50% (Rakar et al. 2011).

In the period of transition after 1990, new laws were adopted to regulate civil society organizations and “the state monopoly over the production of social and other services was removed” (CIVICUS). The number of civil society organizations almost doubled in this time period, reaching 28,647 active CSOs in Slovenia by 2009 (see Figure 5 below). When this number is compared to the population, Slovenia ranked among the countries with the highest number of CSOs in the world (Rakar et al. 2011).

According to the European Values Surveys, over 20% of Slovenian citizens participate in various types of voluntary organizations. Additionally, in that same survey, almost all the respondents think Slovenian civil society organizations are trustworthy and effective in terms of raising the public’s voice.
Figure 5: The Number of CSOs in Slovenia, 1965-2008


From independence onwards, CSOs in Slovenia contributed to human development in myriad ways. Not only did Slovenian NGOs succeed in domestic politics but some of them also became internationally active and reputable organizations. For instance, Enhancing Human Security (ITF), which was originally founded by the Slovenian Government in 1998, has become one of the most powerful INGOs in human security today. Their anti-mining project saved many lives and lands for cultivation across the world. In terms of local politics, the Green Party of Slovenia was actually founded by environmentalist activists after independence. These activists contributed to public health and wellbeing by pressuring the government to take action against environmental threats. Overall, NGOs have played a crucial role in the regime transition, development and democratization of this country in 1990s.
According to the Human Rights Council Resolution (32/31) on civil society space, the Slovenian government encourages its CSOs to participate in UN activities. This is a promising, as the local CSOs benefit tremendously by working with international organizations because international organizations provide local CSOs with a flow of information, expertise, and monetary aid, to name a few benefits. However, this support of the government does not resonate in terms of other forms of governmental aid to NGOs. In this regard, one of the main problems with Slovenian CSOs is insufficient financial support from the government and non-governmental entities. Today, NGOs survive through limited aid from the government, donations from people and monetary aid from international and regional organizations. After joining the European Union, Slovenian CSOs received much support for improving its CSOs (Lajh 2004).

Over the last decade Slovenian civil society started to flourish, especially over issues concerning public health and strategic investment (Freedom House 2017). Slovenian civil society has achieved many milestones in terms of human development and human security in contemporary history. Slovenian CSOs are active in lobbying political parties and media groups to voice their stands on particular issues. In this regard, “according to the research findings from the 1996 survey among the 70 most active interest groups in 11 policy fields, the National Assembly is relatively open and accessible to interest groups and is a quite important target of practical lobbying” (Fink-Hafner and Krasovec 2005, 412).

Organizations like Slovenian Global Action (SLOGA) increased the efficiency of NGOs working in the fields of humanitarian aid, education and development (CIVICUS 2018). One example that shows how CSOs in Slovenia have become influential is the tension between the government and some civil oppositional groups. The Slovenian trade unions have had a
substantial impact on government policies through the Economic and Social Council of Slovenia. Starting in 2012, the unions organized two general strikes to protest the government’s austerity policies (BTI 2014). The Slovenian Government planned to start a railway project. The cost of building this railway was so high that it drew criticism from the citizens. Some NGOs opposed this as they believed the money could be spent on more immediate issues that the government promised to solve. A referendum took place and the government supporters won. However, some NGOs denied the referendum results by claiming that the government used public funds for their campaign before the referendum, and the NGOs took the matter to the supreme court. The court decided that referendum was invalid and the Slovenian prime minister, Miro Cerar, resigned over the decision. Thus, the NGOs achieved a victory against the politics and proved that a feedback loop between state and society is effective in Slovenia.

Today, Slovenian CSOs are very active in human rights and social services issues. The majority of all voluntary participations (52%) are fulfilled in the area of social services (ERSTE 2017). For instance, according to the ERSTE 2017 report, civil society organizations like Slovenska Karitas and Rdeči križ Slovenije provided impactful contribution to refugee crisis and human rights issues. These organizations provided asylum and development assistance policies to the refugee crisis in Slovenia. Zveza Prijateljev Mladine Moste-Polje and some other NGOs contributed to improving the lives of children and adolescents who need financial assistance. Anina Zvezdica provided food and basic needs to vulnerable families. The role of CSOs in social services have increased gradually since independence and the magnitude of their impact increased after Slovenia joined the European Union. Slovenian CSOs received flows of information, expertise and monetary aid from the European Union, in terms of advancing human development and security. Thus, “the number of interest groups trying to influence the legislative
process, and the frequency of contact between interest group representatives and members of parliament of have been growing” (412). This also created a notion of self-confidence for CSOs in a sense that they become more progressive and successful in advocating their interests (Fink-Hafner and Krasovec 2005, 409). Today, CSOs provide social services that was formerly provided by the state (ERSTE 2017).

In terms of social capital, Slovenia scores high in the Legatum Prosperity Index of 2017. Although social trust among the people is low, Slovenians have strong social networks and engage in social matters as they have decent community awareness. Therefore, social cohesion in Slovenia is high (Filipovic et al 2005).

Overall, civil society in Slovenia is categorized as open. Civic engagement is high as Slovenians participate in social and political organizations and activities. Organizational development of civil society is very strong since CSOs have a decent degree of institutionalization. Practice of values is also a strong suit of civil society organizations in Slovenia as CSOs seem to like internalizing positive values. The only lower rank Slovenia holds on the CIVICUS civil society diamond is the perception of impact. The perceived social and policy impact of Slovenian CSOs is still lacking. Apart from that, state capacity seems to be strong enough to prosper human security and yet it is relatively weak compared to the other liberal democracies in Europe.

5.1.2. Lithuania

Lithuania is a Baltic state and a liberal democracy with promising developmental outcomes. After the collapse of the Communist bloc, Lithuania declared independence. At first,
the USSR did not accept the independence and used force to impose embargos. However, Russia was suffering from its own internal turmoil and recognized Lithuania’s independence in 1991. Lithuania then turned to the west and adopted a capitalist economy. It achieved rapid growth in the 1990s and became an EU member state in 2004. In terms of religious and ethnic diversity, Lithuania is homogenous, with a majority of its people (85%) Lithuanian. This social composition contributed to the lack of conflict in the country.

5.1.2.a. Human Security in Lithuania

Like Slovenia, Lithuania experienced an increase in its HDI value after independence. Lithuania has a high level of human development with a 2015 HDI score of 0.848, positioning it 37th out of 188 countries (UNDP 2016). After independence, there seems to have been a steady increase in the HDI components. From 1990 to 2005, HDI increased significantly, after 2005 the uptrend was a bit slower-moving. Although Lithuania’s HDI score is very high, it is still below that of other European Union (0.890) countries. Figure 6 below illustrates Lithuania’s HDI trends since independence.
Figure 6: Trends in Lithuania’s HDI Component Indices 1990-2015


Lithuania is free from internal conflict according to the UPPSALA Conflict Data Program. The Legatum Prosperity Index of 2017 ranks Lithuania at 41st out of 149 countries around the world. In terms of the safety and security dimensions of the same index, Lithuania ranks at 43. So, Lithuania is clearly above average in both of these scores.

5.1.2.b. State and Society in Lithuania

In 1990 Lithuania was the first country to declare independence from the Soviet Union. In 1988, the Lithuanian Reform Movement Sąjūdis started a struggle for more liberal and equal rights for Lithuanians and later in their struggle defended Lithuanian independence. Compared to Russia, Lithuanian social classes (even the rural social classes) were more willing to accept democratic values after Communism collapsed (Reisinger et al. 1994, 220). The Lithuanian state managed to form unity with the society after independence. However, the people’s trust in government institutions has declined in the last decade according to the EU surveys.
Table 10: Governance Indicators of Lithuania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Indicator</th>
<th>Rank (1-100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularity Quality</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the World Bank Political Stability Index, Lithuania ranks 50th in the world, which puts it above average. Figure 7 illustrates Lithuanian political stability from 1996 to 2016. After 2002, political stability in Lithuania appears to have steadied. According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the governance effectiveness in Lithuania is above average across the world (Kaufmann et al. 2010). The only areas of attention in the governance indicators are political stability, voice and accountability, and control of corruption. In terms of corruption, Lithuanians witnessed turmoil in 2016 as members of six political parties were involved in political corruption over the last decade (FH 2017). Thus, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index dropped in the last few years.
Lithuania has a relatively strong civil society compared to many other post-Soviet countries. When compared to other liberal democracies, however, Lithuania’s civil society can be labeled weak. For instance, according to the civil society rating of the CIVICUS Project, Lithuanian civil society is categorized as narrowed. There are several reasons for this categorization. The survey conducted by the Civil Society Institute of Lithuania suggests that the majority of Lithuanians do not participate in civic activities. Thus, civic engagement and social trust in the country lag behind other liberal democracies. For instance, “according to a study conducted in 2007, 67% of organizations have eight or fewer members, and only 10% have 9-15 members” (Rikmann and Keedus 2013, 160). Alas, the majority of Lithuanian people still believe that their collective actions cannot have an impact on politics and policy making (Ziliükaitė et al. 2006, 275).

**Figure 7: Political Stability in Lithuania from 1996 to 2016.**

According to survey data collected by the Civil Society Institution of Lithuania, despite the growing number of civil society organizations across the country, voluntary citizen involvement remains unchanged. Lithuanian people avoid voluntary participation in civil society as if nonparticipation were the norm. This is because in Communist Lithuania, the activities of civil society were perceived skeptically and “it is still considered to be suspicious untrustworthy and decadent even today” (Mzavanadze 2009, 410). It is not surprising, therefore, that the 2007 survey results suggest 40% of the overall population do not participate in any form of civic engagement. However, compared to other post-Soviet societies this can be considered high.

In addition to lacking social trust and civic engagement, Lithuania’s civil society also suffers from political inertia because “civil society inputs have been replaced by stronger governmental control, which in turn further accelerates the vicious cycle of prejudices of strong omnipotent government and the undiscovered, unprofessional civil society” (Mzavanadze 2009, 410). Respectively, in Lithuania, “there were, until recently, only rather general legal provisions in place for the institutionalization of CSO participation in decision- and policy-making such as provisions regulating access to information and allowing the civic sector to be represented in the policy process” (Rikmann and Keedus 2013, 158). This shows that the Lithuanian state has ignored the importance of social capital and civil society in policy making. This further contributes to the lack of development in the civic space as civil society is not given an opportunity to flourish. In 2009, however, the Lithuanian government adopted a policy to support and strengthen civil society organizations and Lithuanian civil society participation scores have almost doubled (from 0.56 to 1.09). This, however, had only a marginal impact on human development as this achievement needs to be sustained over the years.
Although public attitude about the impact of civil society on the government sector is rather grim, evidence suggests that CSOs which provide vital services for human security have an impact on policy making. For instance, “Human Rights Monitoring Institute, Center for Equality Advancement, Civil Society Institute, Lithuanian Green Movement, Lithuanian Youth Council, Transparency International Lithuanian Chapter and others not only actively deliver their opinion on the draft laws discussed by the Government and Parliament, but also submit their own proposals for the necessary legislation” (Transparency International 2012, 213). The foundation of the Chief Commission of Professional Ethics in 1999 also helped to Lithuanian CSOs for interacting with the government. This commission “oversee two laws - the Law on the Compatibility Public and Private Interests in Public Service and the Law on Lobbying Activity” (Palidauskaite et al 2010, 58). Thus, the harmony between state and society is protected by the laws of Lithuania.

The Open Lithuania Foundation (OLF) founded in 1990 to create an open society in Lithuania through advocacy initiatives, visibility campaigns, joint projects, and monitoring and training programs. The majority of its contribution has been in the field of education. Over the last two decades the OLF has achieved many milestones in terms of human development, including but not limited to, scholarships, grants, educational opportunities, and foundation of networks and libraries. In general, around 55% of NGOs in Lithuania operate in social services and healthcare (NISC 2017).

Illiberal and extremist movements have been minimal in Lithuania’s contemporary history. In 2016, for instance, “there were no significant demonstrations or other acts of unconventional political activism organized by such movements throughout the year” (FH 2017,
This also explains why internal conflict is absent in Lithuania as there is no motive to produce conflict.

There is a strong and independent media in Lithuania. In 2006, “the Lithuanian parliament adopted amendments to the Civil Code of Lithuania that could potentially enable the legal prosecution of people for expressing critical opinions” (FH 2017, 8). CSOs, mainly media groups, raised concern over these amendments and appealed to the president Dalia Grybauskaitė to request his veto rule on the parliament decisions. Subsequently, the president vetoed the amendments and the parliament voted in favor of veto decision in the second round.

Another important dimension for assessing the strength of a society is social capital. According to the Legatum Prosperity Index of 2017, Lithuanian social capital ranking is very low. Social networks in Lithuania are limited and very weak as trust in other people is low. In addition, Lithuanians do not engage in social affairs as noted earlier, since they lack confidence in the impact of civil society in general. Consequently, Lithuanian social cohesion comes out very low.

Overall, civil society in Lithuania is categorized as narrowed. One of the main downsides of CSOs in Lithuania is that civic engagement is low in the political and social organizations, and activities. Another shortcoming is that perception of impact of CSOs is very low. However, the level of CSO organization is promising, since Lithuanian CSOs are sufficiently institutionalized. Likewise, practice of values is also higher as CSOs adopt positive values. Thus, civil society ranking of Lithuania is above average. However, social cohesion comes out very low compared to other liberal democracies in the region. In terms of state capacity, the
Lithuanian state has an above-average score, however, the Lithuanian state falls short in support of CSOs and the feedback loop between state and civil society is still underdeveloped.

5.2. Hybrid Regimes

5.2.1. Russia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation emerged as an authoritarian regime. Russia is a federal republic and has a multi-party system. In the 1990s, Russia struggled with many problems and came almost to the edge of civil war. An economic crisis, political turmoil, minority issues, and armed conflicts can be listed as the main issues Russia faced. Today, although Russia succeeded in eliminating many problems of the 1990s, many issues still remain to be solved. For instance, Russia suffers from institutional weaknesses, corruption, lack of rule of law, and lack of civil liberties.

5.2.1.a. Human Security in Russia

Compared to the rest of the world, the Russian Federation has a high human development score. According to Article 7 of the Russian constitution, Russia is a social state and is responsible for providing vital goods and services to its citizens and ensuring free development of individuals. Although Russia managed to provide some of these, it fell short for burgeoning human security. Russia’s HDI value for 2015 is 0.804, positioning it 49th out of 188 countries (UNDP 2016). From 1990 to 2015, Russia’s HDI value increased from 0.733 to 0.804 (see Figure 8). During this time period, the 1990s were the worst years in terms of human development. Starting from the early 2000s, Russia has been able to produce some
developmental outcomes. Today, although Russia’s HDI ranking is above many countries in the global south, it still falls below the countries in the global north.

![Trends in the Russian Federation’s HDI Component Indices 1990-2015](image)

**Figure 8: Trends in the Russian Federation’s HDI Component Indices 1990-2015**


Unlike the other three cases, Russia has often struggled with internal conflict. According to the UPPSALA conflict data set, from 1991 to 2017, the number of deaths in Russia totaled 24,768. State-based violence accounted for 21,729 deaths out of this total and the rest were caused by non-state violence. This high number of deaths probably resulted from ethnic conflicts. For instance, the wars in Chechnya have been one of the most serious conflicts since World War II, with many casualties (Lapidus 1998). Furthermore, on the Legatum Prosperity
Index of 2017, Russia ranks 101st out of 149 countries. In terms of the safety and security on the same index, Russia ranks 109th, which puts it below the average.

5.2.1.b. State and Society in Russia

Regime change has always been problematic in history. Often, inheritance from an old regime becomes an obstacle in social, political and economic development. Russia is a good example of this as it could not eliminate some of the formal and informal institutional settings of the Communist regime. For instance, “soviet-style patronage was systematized as never before by the structure known as nomenklatura, which was the backbone of society without ever being acknowledged as such” (Hosking 2000, 314). In this regard, in post-Soviet Russia, the existence of patronage and clientelism changed its nature, but did not disappear (Hosking 2000, 319).

After the collapse of the Communist regime in Russia, the need for patronage networks became more and more important with increasing privatization efforts aimed at integrating Russia into the world economy. One of the best examples of this is the rise of oligarchs in Russia. Russian oligarchs, with their interest in expanding their wealth, use privatization in their favor by establishing networks in the government sectors. This indicates that Russia failed in institutional advancement in the government sector and in establishing the rule of law. Table 11 illustrates the governance indicators of Russia. Overall, the Russian score is very low and major areas that need attention are political stability, voice and accountability, and control of corruption.
Table 11: The Governance Indicators of Russia for 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Indicator</th>
<th>Rank (1-100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularity Quality</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank Governance Indicators, Russia 2016

According to the World Bank Political Stability Index, Russia ranks at 161 out of 194 countries around the world. This shows that political stability is severely absent in the Russian state. Figure 9 illustrates how political stability remained below zero from 1996 to 2016. Since 2005, political stability has been somewhat steady, but still has negative values. In terms of governance effectiveness Russia scores below average according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al 2010).

Figure 9: Political Stability in Russia from 1996 to 2016

Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Russia 2016
According to CIVICUS, the civil society rating of Russia is repressed, putting this country into the basket of countries with very low levels of civil society rankings. According to the Soviet Contract, workers gave up their rights to organize or join any political or social activities (Kubicek 2002). Compared to the former Communist regime, post-Communist Russia has a remarkably more vibrant civil society; however, civil society in Russia today is still restricted and pressured by the government. For instance, the CSOs (like human rights advocates) with allegedly political motives, according to the Russian government, are heavily monitored and censored.

According to the CIVICUS data, citizens do not participate in civic activities and there is a lack of trust regarding civil society organizations. In 2012, the Russian government brutally repressed civic society organizations by blocking their funding, using force against civic activities, censorship, torturing and arrests. So, the civic space is constrained harshly if it threatens or challenges the authoritarian government.

CIVICUS categorizes Russian civil society development into four stages. The first (1760-1860) represents the creation of public organizations (science, leisure, charitable activities etc.). For instance, one of the largest organizations established in this era was the Russian Geographical Society that investigates geography and people of the Russian Empire (CIVICUS 14). During this time development of the civil society seems to have been going parallel to the urbanization and industrialization as the sphere of social life changed drastically with the industrial revolution.

The second stage (1861-1917) represents diversification and professionalization of the civil society organizations. The number of civil society organizations increased in the second stage and these organizations started to become vital tools for civic development. During this
era, “early civil society organizations addressed social services such as social security, education, science and public health, which the state did not provide or provided poorly” (CIVICUS 14).

The third stage of civil society development in Russia (1917-1980) represents the institutionalization process. Civil society organizations during this time were limited to the sphere of social life where state socialism has no activities of any kind. The number of unions, for instance, increased. However, the Soviet government did not support some of the organizations that offered civil services (health, education and the like) “as the Soviet authorities doubted the utility of voluntary movements and the reliability of their participants” (CIVICUS 15). After the 1920s, the number of civil society organizations decreased and the ones that survived were controlled by the government.

The fourth stage, from the 1980s to the present, shows the revival of civil society in Russia albeit in a weak phase. After the collapse of the Soviet government, Russia witnessed some internal turmoil both economically and socially. The need for social service was met by establishment of new civil society organizations whereby the state is incapable of delivering an ample amount of goods and services. During this time, international CSOs began to interact and help Russian civil society organizations. Although the state no longer controls civil society organizations as it did in Soviet Russia, state pressure on civil society and civic activism remains the case in post-Soviet Russia.

There are approximately 136,000 active civil society organizations in Russia. Civic engagement is on the low side with a 33.7% participation score. According to the CIVICUS survey results, membership in more than one socially based organization is at 15.4% and volunteerism is at 17.4% in more than one socially based organization. Part of the reason for the low level of civic engagement is that people do not trust CSOs. According to the Geo Rating
Survey, many people do not believe collective action can have a significant impact, so they do not trust CSOs. Even the heads of civil society organizations (45% say insignificant and 19% say very insignificant) believe that the role of CSOs is insignificant in terms of democratic decision making (CIVICUS 26). Therefore, it is not surprising that only five percent of the overall population participate in public organizations, as Dormin (2003) concludes.

Historically, the Russian state has always been more closely related to civil society than its Western counterparts (Dormin 2003). This is probably because the socialist system encapsulates as well as controls social proceedings. Although complete independence from the state has not yet been achieved for civil society, in post-Soviet Russia civil society is more independent from the state. According to the field research of Hemment 2004, the CSOs in the post-socialist Russia is the property of the old elites (the Soviet nomenklatura).

Russian civil society shows the characteristics of top-down civil society formation instead of bottom-up formation where civil society is established through people’s participation. In Russia, “the government affects the nature of group formation by enacting policies and procedures, which create conditions for the rise of civic groups” (Hudson 2003, 215). In the bottom-up formation of civil society, feedback from civil society can force governments to take particular action; however, in the top-down formation of civil society governments dictate and direct people. So, Russian civil society can be considered as a statist version of civil society (Dormin 2003), where the state controls CSOs. Thus, it is not surprising that “since 1991 the Russian government has been a sponsor and, it says, a protector of civil society by passing national legislation to guarantee the existence of civic groups and to regulate them at the same”
Overall, Russian civil society does not correspond to the widely accepted definition of civil society which is defined as outside the political realm.

The Civic Forum in Moscow in 2001 is a good example of how the Russian government tries to control civil society. The government representatives at the conference proposed that civil society organizations be integrated into one single entity that could interact with the state. This would undoubtedly have undermined the independence from the state of civil society organizations (Squier 2002) and the state will keep pressuring society by narrowing the civic space in Russia.

Another issue faced by CSOs in Russia is that they have fewer ties with international organizations. As stated before, CSOs should have strong connections to the outside world through international organizations. This helps local CSOs establish mutual transactions of goods, services, expertise and the like. At the end, this process of strong connections can support the expansion and growth of local CSOs. Only few NGOs in Russia successfully channel international support. For instance, a NGO called Friends “were able to build an organization made up of volunteers, capable of generating its own funding, and thus effecting sustained and successful campaigning, in their case within the area of the National Park” (Crotty 2009, 101).

In 2015, however, Russian CSOs received another limitation from the government as Putin signed a bill that prevents international CSOs from operating on Russian soil. This suggests that rule of law in Russia is arbitrary and favors the ones with political power. Although many CSOs across Russia today contribute to public goods and services, they cannot contribute enough to human development as they face strong state limitations. In this regard, human rights
advocates, democracy promoters and other CSOs that challenge the status quo are unable to operate and contribute to the social and political development in Russia.

In Russia, civil society has a tightly regulated environment in which the state has absolute control of civil society organizations. The pervasiveness of neo-Marxist ideas seems to be still intact in the post-Soviet space. The perception of civil society remains to be suspicious, since civil society is seen as an instrument for powerful groups in society as Anthony Giddens puts it. Therefore, CSOs in Russia operates in “constrained place, characterized by new hierarchies and dependencies. While it claims to nurture the local and the grassroots, it enables a small circle of elites to flourish (many of whom were agents of the old party state)” (Hemment 2004, 235).

In 2006, the government attacks and harassments of civil society continued. Some CSOs were labeled foreign agents and they were either shut down or sanctioned with heavy regulations. For instance, “Russia’s best-known election-monitoring organization, Golos, was liquidated by court order in July after a ruling that the NGO conducted political activity” (FH 2017). In addition, the critics of the Russian army’s existence in Ukraine also faced harsh reaction from the government, “the NGO Svobodnoe Slovo (Free Speech) headed by the politician Lev Shlosberg, which published the newspaper Pskovskaya Gubernia in Pskov, was designated a foreign agent by the Ministry of Justice” (FH 2017).

One main financial resource of NGOs is government subsidies. The government aid to NGOs is very low in Russia. According to some case studies, Russian NGOs receive about 8-13% of their budget from the state (Hudson 2003). The majority of NGO incomes come from members and supporters. International aid to Russian CSOs is also limited, since international aid puts certain NGOs on the government’s radar and carries a risk of being accused of espionage.
The only CSOs that face less pressure from the state are the ones that have dedicated themselves to providing fundamental goods and services to the Russian people (Benevolenski and Toepler 2017). The Russian government does not overwhelm these CSOs with sanctions and pressures, since they do not have any political motives that could challenge the political status quo. Besides, these organizations take loads off the government’s shoulders by providing social services that the government needs to deliver or finance. Thus, it is not surprising that while the Russian Government suppressed CSOs that have political motives and foreign influence, it introduced some instruments in 2009 to support these CSOs that are apolitical and socially oriented (Benevolenski and Toepler 2017). For instance, in January 2016, “the government initiated a program in this area (education) with total funding of almost 1.7 billion rubles ($26.5 million) through 2020” (FH 2017, 9). The Russian state also has a particular interest in investing educational NGOs, as it expects them to implement patriotic education.

Furthermore, these CSOs are also allowed to receive support from foreign donors unlike other Russian CSOs that have political motives. For instance, the Humanitarian Institute “has been the recipient of several large grants, from foundations such as TACIS (the EU program of Technical Assistance to the CIS) and Eurasia” (Hemment 2004, 222) and it managed to deliver developmental outcomes by lobbying the government.

The media sector faced government pressure for making news on corruption. Some of the newspapers targeted by the government are RBK, Vedomosti, and Novaya Gazeta. For instance, “the owner Mikhail Prokhorov changed RBK’s management after it published a number of investigations about Putin’s daughters and stories based on the leaked information about offshore accounts known as the “Panama Papers,” which included accounts held by the Russian elite”
(FH 2017). Thus, media censorship in Russia undermines the people’s voices and shows how the Russian government extends its control over every aspect of social life.

So overall, civil society in Russia suffers from some serious problems. A lack of trust of CSOs and the impact of collective action, and the government’s repressions are primarily the main issues that civil society in Russia faces today. The Russian state still perceives CSOs as untrustworthy and citizens believe CSOs cannot have a significant impact on the current political environment. Although the number of CSOs increased in post-Soviet Russia, many civil society organizations lack institutional unity and suffer from corruption, lack of funding and civil support. However, despite these problems, civil society in Russia developed noticeably after the 1990s and “the level of public activity in stable periods is sufficient, but that it is capable of mobilizing quickly under conditions of instability” (CIVICUS 2017, 21).

Just as in Lithuania, Russia has a low level of social capital according to the Legatum Prosperity Index of 2017. One of the main reasons for this is that social networks in Russia are weak and social trust in the society is very low. Although Russians in the contemporary history started to engage in social affairs, this is still very low as the citizens do not believe in the impact of collective action. This is not surprising given the pressures on civil society by the Russian government. Thus, social cohesion is very low in Russia.

Overall, state-society relations are problematic, and Russian civil society is categorized as obstructed. Russian CSOs are oppressed and they lack support from international organizations. In the CIVICUS civil society diamond, civic engagement is low as people’s participation in social and political organizations and activities is lower. The level of organizations is above average since there is some sort of institutional formation in the CSOs. Practice of values seems to be adequate, as the CSOs generally internalize and advocate
progressive norms. Perception of impact is very low as the government applies heavy pressures on the CSOs. In terms of state capacity, Russia scores very low in the rankings as the state fails to deliver some of the vital goods and services in terms of advancing human security. Respectively, the government’s effectiveness of Russia is below average in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al 2010).

5.2.2. Singapore

Singapore is an island state with striking levels of developmental outcomes. Like China, Singapore reached economic development before achieving democracy. After independence in 1965, Singaporean politics was dominated by a single party called the People’s Action Party (PAP). This contributed to the view of Singapore as an authoritarian regime. Despite the authoritarian rule, Singapore has achieved a high level of development and social stability since its independence. Additionally, it has been able to maintain peace despite being a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. Today, Singapore can be characterized as a hybrid regime which maintains an authoritarian character at the same time it embraces democratic practices. For instance, although the PAP is still the ruling party, it is an elected government.

5.2.2.a. Human Security in Singapore

Singapore has a very high HDI score (the 2015 HDI score is 0.925) positioning this country with Denmark on the HDI ranking (CIVICUS). From 1990 to 2015, Singapore HDI increased from 0.718 to 0.925. The Singaporean state prioritized economic development in the first place and after the 1990s the state also supported social development by boosting civil society. Prior to the 1990s, the state took over the role of civil society where it deemed
necessary. Figure 10 illustrates the trends in Singapore’s HDI component indices from 1990 to 2015.

![Trends in Singapore’s HDI Component Indices 1990-2015](image)

**Figure 10: Trends in Singapore’s HDI Component Indices 1990-2015**


In terms of internal conflict, Singapore has a good track record for keeping internal affairs free from conflict. This is particularly significant since Singapore embraces a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population. In the time period of this study, from 1984 to 2014, Singapore experienced no internal conflict, according to the UPPSALA conflict data set. Additionally, the Lagatum Prosperity Index of 2017 ranks Singapore at 17. Singapore ranks 1st on the safety and
security measure of the same index. There are several reasons for this, but perhaps the most important one is the society’s success in promoting common ground and unity. In addition, Singapore is one of the few countries to achieve “rapid growth with equity” (World Bank 1993, 157) as, with the help of a wealth-sharing program, all citizens benefited from the economic development rather than just a few. Since 1970 Singapore has introduced many public programs (such as health and education assistance to its citizens) to increase human capital (Brown 1996, 156). So, Singapore accomplished “growing economic prosperity and modernization, effective governance, and deepening political and economic regionalism” (Brown 1996, 184).

5.2.2.b. State and Society in Singapore

Singapore has a strong capacity, putting this country among the top countries with strong state capacity across the world. Singapore owes this to its emphasis on accountability and its ability to implement administrative reforms (Quah 2008). The PAP government was successful in deepening accountability in the state system by introducing a series of policies to prevent corruption. The Singaporean state has also been very successful in introducing and enforcing necessary policies that foster human development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Indicator</th>
<th>Rank (1-100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularity Quality</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>96.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td>97.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Singapore achieved great success in terms of good governance (see Table 12). According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, governance effectiveness is very high in Singapore (Kaufmann et al 2010). The absence of a strong private sector in Singapore created a system by which the state expanded its space. Starting in the 1980s, the nationalization of many enterprises like housing, communication, social security and health consolidated the state’s dominance in social, political and economic spheres. From the 1990s onward, Singapore’s state reduced its dominance while still acting as the regulator of change. By privatizing its economy and encouraging its civil society, the state started to hand off its load and opened up avenues of development in contemporary history. Although the state shrank in some respects, its dominance and control over the major enterprises still seems to be intact.

![Singapore - Political stability](source: TheGlobalEconomy.com, The World Bank)

**Figure 11: The Political Stability of Singapore from 1996 to 2016**

According to the World Bank political stability index, Singapore has ranked as the 1st country in the world in terms of political stability from 1996 to 2016. One reason for this success is the Singaporean government’s ability to unify society and stabilize politics. This is what Doner et al. (2005) call “side payments.” In order to gain broader support, the PAP government provided side payments to people, such as “the government created the Housing Development Board (HDB) to subsidize land, building prices, and home financing, education was prioritized and subsidized, and the state forced firms to increase their contributions to the Central Provident Fund (CPF); allowed workers to access CPF funds to pay for housing, education, and health needs” (Doner et al. 2005, 348).

Singapore’s state can be considered a corporatist state, which refers to “attempts by an avowedly autonomous state elite to organize the diverse interest associations in society so that their interests can be accommodated within the independent and organized national community” (Brown 1994, 67). However, after the 1990s, with state encouragement, civil society development started to gain a track. This does not change the fact that civil society in Singapore still has many obstacles to overcome and is controlled by the state. For instance, according to some scholars (Brown and Jones 1995), Singapore lacks a middle class to push for liberalization and democratization. However, as other scholars also argue, Singapore has every necessary ingredient to prosper in terms of democracy (Norris 2012).

According to the CIVICUS Project, the civil society in Singapore is categorized as obstructed. The state influence over civil society and its tightly regulated environment are still the main issues.
In 1997, Prime Minister Tong stated that civil society should be encouraged. In 1991, acting minister Yeo had stated that Singapore needed a civic society to harness togetherness in the country in order to facilitate development. Yeo delivered a keynote speech at a conference in 1998 and underlined the importance of civil society for a thriving Singapore.

“It is hoped that civil society in Singapore will stimulate thought on defining more precisely the Singapore idea, and on finding new and better ways to bind state and society together. For it is in working together that we optimize our position in the world. In the web world, the state is not completely above society. Both exist together drawing strength from each other” (Yeo 2000, 26).

Starting from the 1990s, civil society in Singapore flourished with the help of state support. However, the Singapore state remained the sole controller of this development as it did not want any group to become an obstacle against to the status quo. As Tanaka (2002) suggests, “today, the authorities (Singaporean) have switched from open repression to a system of subtle and indirect but nonetheless potent measures to keep NGOs in line” (216). Thus, while any CSOs with political motives are restricted, the CSOs with non-political agendas and objectives to increase prosperity are supported by the state. However, the pressure on CSOs in Singapore is less than it is in Russia. Thus, one can suggest that “a truly Dialogic and Participatory civil society materializing in Singapore, however, remains questionable” (Lee 2002, 103).

Singapore’s civil society development can be categorized into four time periods (Tay 1998). First, in the pre-independence period Singapore’s civil society started to emerge due to a need to provide services that the colonial government was not providing (Tay 1998). The Chinese clan associations were a successful example of the early civil society organizations in Singapore.
The second time period witnessed the emergence of student unions and labor associations. During this era, Singapore’s struggle for independence became the main driving force that created and strengthened the civil society organizations (Tay 1998). Women’s organizations, for instance, became very active requesting equal rights and going against polygamy.

The third time period corresponds to the 1970s and 1980s when the People’s Action Party (PAP) began to take the role of civil society under the socialist regime (Tay 1998). Besides, the PAP government was suspicious of civil society which it perceived as a threat to the status quo. The civil society space shrunk during this time as the government suppressed any civil or political mobilization.

The fourth time period entails the development of civil society in Singapore after the 1980s to the present time. From 1990 onward, Singapore’s civil society became active and powerful as it got support from the government. For instance, “a Nominated Member of Parliament system was introduced in 1990 through which prominent members of civil society could make their views heard in Singapore’s legislature” (Koh and Soon 2012, 94). In addition to this, the minister for Information and the Arts, George Yeo, in his speech stated that state should decrease its dominance in civic space so that citizens can participate more on public activities (Yeo 1991, 12). Additionally, the connection and transaction between international NGOs and Singaporean NGOs also increased. In this regard, external human rights and media advocacy groups regularly monitor and politicize any violation of human rights and abuses in Singapore. Although, Singaporean NGOs are still weak, these international groups raise public awareness about human security issues (Gomez 2005). Overall, today’s Singapore civil society is not totally open and autonomous as the state still has significant influence over the CSOs.
Singaporean development state absorbed and emasculated civil society. Public healthcare, public housing and educational supports are among the few activities that Singaporean state shows its effectiveness. In Singapore, however, the state delivers all these services to its people. Additionally, internal conflict also is kept low by the government through establishing anti-insurgency task forces, expanding government aids to vulnerable groups in the society, and delivering economic growth to all of its citizens (Brown 1996, 185). Thus, Unlike Huntington’s thesis that suggests modernization creates internal conflict (1968, 6), Singapore’s rapid modernization created conditions for a peaceful domestic environment which is free from internal conflict.

Despite the weakness in Singapore’s civil society, the country has relatively high social capital. According to the Institute of Policy Studies survey research, “diversity in social networks among Singaporeans strengthens social capital, trust, national identity and national pride” (Chua et al. 2017, 1). So, social networks in Singapore are inclusive and there is a harmonious environment in the society because in a developmental state like Singapore, social capital also increases over time as the state is able to deliver development (Pereira 2008). Besides, Singapore has a particular system of meritocracy in which equal distribution and equal rights are provided to every citizen. For instance, as noted earlier, the rapid economic development of Singapore is distributed to all Singaporean citizens rather than just to certain groups in the society. Thus, social cohesion, engagement and networks are very strong in Singapore according to the Legatum Prosperity Index of 2017. Then, one can suggest that “Singaporean civil society be examined as a series of "reciprocal" relationships between activists and state representatives situated in different locations of power and resources, who are able to engage with each other when their interests converge and disengage when they diverge” (Chong 2005, 273).
Overall, Singapore has an oppressed civil society. Civic engagement is above average as people participate in social and political organizations. The level of organizations in CSOs are also above average since CSOs are institutionalized. Practice of values is also above average as CSOs adopt and internalize positive values. However, perception of impact is lower as the Singaporean state oppresses CSOs. Overall, civil society in Singapore is still weak according to CIVICUS’s civil society diamond. Social capital, on the contrary, is high in Singapore. In terms of state capacity, Singapore has one of the highest scores in the world. It ranks at the top of the list in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2010).

To sum up, Russia, Lithuania and Slovenia experienced Communist influence which both contained and suppressed civil society. Although Singapore did not experience Communist influence, its authoritarian nature prevented the development of civil society. In all four cases, states seem to like absorbing civic space and society. In the former socialist regimes, more specifically Lithuania and Russia, this legacy of an expanded state remained resilient. In these two countries, while the state still questions the value and contribution of civil society, society itself lacks trust in the government. Despite the shared socialist experience, Slovenia seems to achieve balance and harmony between state and society. In Singapore, the state also absorbs civil society and civic space. However, the developmental state in Singapore also functions as a civil society and distributes goods and services to the whole society. Although, state expansion spoiled the political development in these countries, it did provide some positive contributions to human development. Thus, the case studies suggest that regime type may not be a strong factor for explaining human development and security, as authoritarian regimes can have a high level of human development and human security.
5.3. Findings of Case Study Analyses

As noted earlier, except for Singapore, all the cases experienced Communist influence in their social, political and economic spheres. It seems that Communist influence strengthened state capacity in these countries (excluding Russia), and yet damaged civil society and social fabric. Among these case studies, the regimes that transformed into democratic practices show promising growth. However, this growth may or may not be tied to liberal democracy. In this regard, the case study findings on Singapore suggest that regime type plays a small role in a country’s success in achieving higher levels of developmental outcomes. Instead, the Singaporean developmental state was able to deliver goods and services as well as provide internal security which in turn bolsters human security and development. Thus, it is not surprising that Singapore as an authoritarian regime scores higher than many liberal democracies in terms of human development. For that matter, the case studies suggest that states which have strong state capacity and a strong civil society become successful in producing vibrant developmental and security outcomes.

The case of Singapore opens up another important aspect of how state-society formation in a country effects human development. In this regard, despite the weakness of civil society in Singapore, the state overtook the role of civil society in the past and provided all the necessary goods and services that prosper human development. The question is how long the Singaporean state will be able to make its citizens happy and satisfied?

The Social Fabric Index created by Hastings (2013) is a comprehensive index that incorporates diversity, education and information empowerment, food security, governance, health, and peacefulness measures. Although Singapore’s civil society level is very low
compared to Slovenia and Lithuania, this index shows that its social fabric index is not very different from theirs. The primary reason for this difference lies under Singapore’s good governance for its effective way of delivering goods and services. As noted earlier, economic development breeds social capital in the developing world. The relationship between state and society, despite the state limits on the civic space, has been harmonious in Singapore.

Table 13: The Comparative Indicators of the Cases: Social Fabric Index and Social Capital Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Social Fabric Index</th>
<th>Social Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Furthermore, the Legatum Prosperity Index of 2017 suggests that Singapore ranks higher than Lithuania in terms of social capital. The social capital component of this index measures social cohesion, engagement and networks. Thus, the country rankings of this index coincide with the case studies. That is, despite the weakness of personal liberties and civil society in Singapore, it is evident that there is cohesive social capital which increases the odds of having a high level of human security. By the same token, Lithuania has a relatively strong civil society. However, because of weak social capital, as the findings of the case study on Lithuania suggest,
Lithuania falls behind in terms of human security compared to the other liberal democracies or countries like Singapore. This also proves that liberal democracies do not necessarily have a high level of social capital or vice versa.

In Figure 12 below, the CIVICUS civil society ratings of the four cases are reported. Slovenia, with a civil society rating of 94, has the highest score among the countries and civil society in this here categorized as open. Lithuania comes second with a civil society rating of 85 and the Slovenian civil society is categorized as narrowed. Singapore has a civil society rating of 44 and falls under the category of an obstructed civil society. Finally, Russia has a civil society rating of 30 and its civil society is categorized as repressed.

**Figure 12: Comparative Indicators: Civil Society, State Capacity and HDI**

Figure 12 also represents the comparative evidence that regime type may not be a strong argument in terms of explaining human development. Instead, a high level of human development can be observed in countries where both state and society are strong. In this regard, Singapore ranks first among four countries as it has a strong state capacity and average but a developing civil society. Slovenia comes second, as both civil society and state capacity are higher. The only shortcoming with Slovenia is that it has a relatively weak state capacity compared to Singapore. On the other hand, Singapore has a weak civil society. Lithuania also has a strong state and society; however, they are not strong enough. Russia suffers from both weak state capacity and a weak society. Despite that, Russia seems to be above the average human development when internal conflict added to the equation the level of human security drops exponentially. Russia scores 109 out of 190 countries according to the Human Security Index (Hastings 2013). On the same index, Slovenia scores 44; Lithuania scores 49; and Singapore scores 47.

In order to make comparison more indicative, Norway is added to the chart (Figure 12) as it has the highest level of HDI value in the world with a UNDP 2016 rating of 0.95 and ranks 4 in HSI. In terms of state capacity, Norway is among the top five countries in the world. Similarly, in terms of civil society Norway is also among the top countries in the world. The intriguing question is: Does Norway have a high level of HDI because it has a liberal democracy, or does have a strong state and strong civil society? The answer could be drawn by looking at the comparison between Singapore and Norway. Both countries have similar (High) levels of HDI and state capacity levels. While Norway is a liberal democracy, Singapore is an
authoritarian regime. This indicates that regime type may not matter a great deal in explaining the variation in human development, as found in the previous literature.

The comparative case study analysis confirms the relationship between the key explanatory variable and the dependent variables. In all four case studies, it was found that the variations in state-society strengths create different human security outcomes. Among the most striking evidence found in the case studies is that strong civil society does not necessarily mean robust social capital or more democracy. The comparative evidence between Lithuania and Singapore suggests that social capital could be higher in countries with weak civil society or vice versa.

To sum up, the analyses suggest that the equilibrium between the forces of state and society is the key factor explaining the variation in the dependent variables. That is, states that are able to provide goods and services, and the type of society that can pressure and regulate the state for prosperity, are the key arguments presented in this dissertation. When there is an imbalance between state and society forces, as long as the stronger side complements the weaker side, the possibility of achieving a high level of human security and developmental outcomes increases drastically. For instance, while both Russian and Singaporean states have authoritarian controls over their civil society; the Russian state does not fulfil the functions of civil society, but Singaporean state does. Thus, the balance and the relationship between state and society are very significant in terms of explaining human development and security across different socio-political settings.
6. CONCLUSION

Does civil society have an impact on human security? Can the regime type be considered an important factor for prosperity and peace? How does state capacity affect human security? These are some of the key questions that this research tries to answer. Previous literature states that regime type and state capacity are important factors in determining human security. This current research, however, adds the importance of civil society to the literature by separating it from the regime type. It also reveals that civil society has more explanatory power than regime type in explaining the variation in human security around the world. Additionally, this research highlights the importance of state-society relations on human security.

The relationship between democracy and human security is remarkable, as liberal democracy has key igniters for healthy and strong development of prosperity and peace. Thus, it is not surprising that countries with high levels of human development are also the ones with high levels of liberal democracy. However, one complication remains to be addressed. If democracy and human security are highly correlated, then, what explains the success of authoritarian and hybrid regimes in terms of achieving high levels of human security? Norris (2012) suggests that state capacity and liberal democracy should exist together to achieve prosperity and peace. Despite the fact that her argument explains many cases, it falls short of explaining cases where democracy is not present, but a high level of human development is. The findings of this research suggest that a strong state and a strong society are the key catalysts to prosper human security.
The findings of statistical analysis are tested and confirmed by the comparative case studies. Both state capacity and civil society are found to be important factors in explaining the variation in human security. Based on the analyses, some questions remain to be asked.

Why do we observe high levels of human development in mostly liberal democracies? This question brings up an important theoretical debate that needs to be further investigated. However, as the analytical evidence presented in this research suggests, the relationship between regime type and human development could be a spurious one. That is, there seems to be another factor controlling the relationship between regime type and human security.

For that matter, this research concludes that civil society is the key explanatory variable that brings more robust explanations to the variation in human security around the world. This also explains why liberal democracies in general have high levels of human security as they also have a strong civil society. Thus, by separating civil society from regime type this research is able to offer some key theoretical insights. The findings of both the statistical and the comparative case study analyses suggest when a strong society couples with a strong state a high level if human security is almost inevitable. Another important finding of this dissertation is that if a state functions as a civil society, then it is also very likely to have a high level of human security and development even with a low level of civil society rating in a country.

6.1. Limitations

Every research suffers from certain limitations, and this research is no exception. First, missing data is one of the main problems with statistical analysis. Since this study looks at time-
series data, the missing data problem was inevitable. In order to overcome it, some of the missing data were collected manually; the rest were coded as missing.

Second, omitted variable bias might have been an obstacle in some of the models used in this dissertation. Mostly used explanatory (control) variables were taken from the relevant literature, in order to eliminate omitted variable bias. In the models, where HDI and its components are dependent variables, this issue is addressed as the literature identifies key explanatory variables sufficiently. However, the model with internal conflict seems to be missing some of the controls despite the fact that all the relevant controls in the previous literature are used in this model. This could be because internal conflict is often explained by qualitative data rather than quantitative data.

Third, measurement errors and poor conceptualization are common problems with any statistical analysis. All data used in this research were taken from reputable sources and they have been used constantly in many previous scholarly works. Thus, measurement errors and poor conceptualization issues were reduced to a minimum by replicating the previous literature. Even then, there seems to be some criticism toward poor conceptualization of the data used. For instance, the Freedom House Democracy Index was criticized for being conceptually expansive (thick description). In this regard, this democracy index limits statistical precision as it has many variables in it. In order to overcome this, different operationalizations of democracy (minimal definition of democracy that looks at electoral system only other than the qualities of democracy) were used in this research.

Another matter connected to the issue of poor conceptualization is that democracy and civil society variables seem to be correlated. For this reason, various solutions are administered.
Knowing the liberal democracy index has some variables that also define civil society, a minimal definition of democracy is used. However, both the minimalist definition of democracy, polyarchy variable and the electoral democracy variable, seem to be correlated with the civil society variable. For that matter, different measurements of civil society are also used. Nevertheless, civil society participation, civil society repression and strength of civil society variables are also found to be correlated with even the minimalist definition of the democracy variable. Therefore, realizing there is no easy way to analyze the effect of civil society and democracy in the same model, this research analyzed the impact of these variables in different models.

In conducting the case studies, limitations were generic to the case study method in general (generalizability, researcher bias, etc.). However, this research addressed these shortcomings of case study method by using a mixed-method analysis. One particular difficulty with the case studies, however, is the lack of data problem as some of the country-specific data are written in native languages. This issue is addressed by accessing secondary sources. Although reliability of secondary sources is questionable in case studies, they still provide invaluable contributions where primary resources are not accessible.

### 6.2. Final Remarks and Future Research

The concept of security in international relations has been spinning toward human security as humans, not states, are the most vulnerable objects. By recognizing the need to study human security in an analytical manner, this research seeks for possible explanations for the variation on human security. The previous literature outlined the important factors that could increase human security. These are mainly structural factors, democracy and state capacity. This
research however adds the importance of civil society as it is the perfect checking mechanism between state and society. Development and security are only achievable by having a constant interaction and feedback loop between state and society.

Why does civil society matter? Some might argue that liberal democracy can explain the variation in human security and it is assumed that democracies have stronger civil societies. The problem with this view is that it presumes a democratic regime generally has a strong civil society. However, one can find strong civil societies in non-democratic regimes and weak civil societies in democratic regimes. By the same token, the effect of civil society is undermined in a research where only democracy is the key explanatory factor. Lithuania, for instance, has a liberal democracy, but its civil society is weak compared to the other democracies. This dissertation shows that civil society measure other than democracy measure generates more explanatory power in the variation of human security. However, what explains some country’s success in human security with a low level of civil society?

This is where state capacity becomes important. If a strong society is not backed and governed by a strong state, it is very difficult to deliver the developmental and security needs of people. By looking at the statistical analysis only, Singapore’s success in human security can be tied to state capacity (controlling for other key explanatory variables like economic development or geographic location). However, the results from case study analysis suggest that Singapore’s success in human development actually became more visible when the Singaporean government started to strengthen its civil society during the 1990s. Before that, the Singaporean state absorbed the reflexes of civil society and functioned as one. Additionally, despite the weakness of civil society in Singapore, there is a relatively high level of social capital as shown in the case
studies. This further confirms that a high level of human development can manifest itself when a strong state and a strong society exist together.

Thus, this research contributes to the previous literature by introducing why civil society matters when coupled with state capacity. It also brings out the importance of state-society relations and their various configurations that produce explanations in variations in human security. The results of this study have policy-related, theoretical and methodological implications.

First, policy-making can focus on strengthening civil society in developing and underdeveloped countries. International aid can be allocated accordingly by delivering logistical, personal, expertise and monetary assistance to construct state and society. Concentrating only on democracy promotion or economic aid will fall short as there will be weak states and societies in the developing world. Thus, there needs to be institutional capability as well as social consciousness to make better use of aids. Additionally, many authoritarian regimes, such as Russia, tend to limit the operations and contributions of international organizations on their soil. As noted earlier, the connection of local civil society organizations to the international network provides an invaluable contribution to local civil society organizations. One of the best examples of this exchange is the expertise contribution to underdeveloped civil society organizations as they suffer from not knowing how to handle and respond to particular threats to human security. Another example can be monetary aid provided by international organizations to local civil society organizations for making sure these weak organizations have enough power to be institutionalized and to provide aid to the ones in need.
Second, from a theoretical standpoint, this research contributes to the previous literature by emphasizing the impact of civil society on human security. In doing so, this research separates civil society from regime type in the analysis of human security so that it refutes the presumed inseparability of these concepts. By using a mixed-method analysis, this research reveals how civil society can provide prosperity and peace despite differences in regime type. Thus, this research brings “the society back in” by drawing from the very premise of human security. That is, human empowerment is vital for increasing human development.

Another important theoretical contribution of this research is that the configuration of different levels of state capacity and civil society brings satisfactory explanations for variations in human security. The vocal balance between state and society forces produces prosperity and peace in a given country. Therefore, this research endorses the bringing the society back in thesis as well as the bringing the states back in thesis. In this regard, this research contributes to theory building in human security literature by amalgamating strong state and strong society view.

Third, methodologically, this research introduces the measures of civil society to the human security literature both in qualitative and quantitative analyses. Furthermore, this research contributes to the previous literature by using fine-grained measures of regime type. As noted earlier, the liberal democracy indexes have many variables in themselves, which could produce multicollinearity problems with the measures of civil society and state capacity.

Based on the limitations and findings of this dissertation, further studies can focus on the following premises. First, as found in the qualitative analysis, analyzing the interaction effect of state capacity and civil society in the statistical models could be indicative. Inclusion of interaction terms might yield to more robust findings for explaining the variation in human
security. Second, because of lack of data on social capital, this variable could not be measured in the statistical analyses. In the qualitative analyses, however, it is found that there is a discrepancy between civil society and social capital. At face value, one expects these two terms to be positively correlated. However, as the case studies on Singapore and Lithuania suggest that social capital can be low where civil society is strong or vice versa. Thus, more elaborate research should be conducted to investigate the relationship between these two variables. Third, future research can also benefit from testing state-society relations in different regime types to understand whether the impacts of these variables change by the regime.

To sum up, state-society relations are overlooked in human security studies. The affirmative results of this study suggest that this literature can benefit more from understanding the relationship between state-society formation and human security. Although this research confirms the positive impact of democracy on human security, the analytical evidence presented suggests that this relationship is overstated. Instead, civil society is a better predictor for explaining variation in human security. Therefore, state needs to be capable of delivering and producing prosperity and peace, and society needs to be strong enough to challenge state’s arbitrary actions and to guide state to produce necessary policies and actions. By understanding the vital role of empowering people, future research should focus more on human security in scientific inquiry.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX

Description of The Variables and Data Resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>Combination of education, life expectancy and the gross national income. Source: The Human Development Programme 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>The annual percentage growth rate of per capita GDP at market prices based on constant local prices. Source: Penn World Tables 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>At birth total number of years expected. Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Conflict</td>
<td>A contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Source: The Uppsala Conflict Data Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Combination of civil society organization entry and exit, repression and participatory environment. Source: The Varieties of Democracy Project 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Location</td>
<td>The absolute value of the latitude from the equator of the capital city, divided by 90 (ranges between 0 and 1). Source: La Porte et al 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>Per capita GDP measured in constant international $ in purchasing power parity. Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Size</td>
<td>The area of the nation state in kilometers. Source: The Cross-Polity Time-series Database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>Oil and gas rents per capita. Source: Ross 2004.</td>
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