Publication Date

2016

Document Type

Dissertation/Thesis

First Advisor

Un, Kheang

Degree Name

M.A. (Master of Arts)

Department

Department of Political Science

LCSH

Political science||Natural resources--Government policy--Cambodia||Natural resources--Government policy--Indonesia||Forest policy--Cambodia||Forest policy--Indonesia||Political corruption--Cambodia||Political corruption--Indonesia

Abstract

This paper address two questions. First, it examines the question of why authoritarian rulers rely on natural resources to stay in power. Second, it address the mechanism of how authoritarian rulers extract rents from natural resources and distribute the rents to construct patronage systems to cement political pacts and gain popular legitimacy. In this paper I argue that the characteristics of the state determine the strategy employed by authoritarian rulers to use natural resources for political purposes by distributing monopolies to business elites and receiving financial donations in return. This paper examines the cases of forest exploitation in Indonesia and Cambodia to explain how authoritarian rulers exploit natural resources to construct a patronage system and perpetuate their power.

Comments

Advisors: Kheang Un.||Committee members: Kikue Hamayotsu; Scot Schraufnagel.

Extent

91 pages

Language

eng

Publisher

Northern Illinois University

Rights Statement

In Copyright

Rights Statement 2

NIU theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from Huskie Commons for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without the written permission of the authors.

Media Type

Text

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