Publication Date

1996

Document Type

Dissertation/Thesis

First Advisor

Miller, Charles E.

Degree Name

M.A. (Master of Arts)

Department

Department of Psychology

LCSH

Prisoner's dilemma game

Abstract

The purpose of the present study was to test predictions derived from Orbell and Wilson's (1978) analysis of structural solutions to various configurations of the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma (NPD) game. Participants took part in one of three versions of the NPD game and received feedback about the choice behavior of other purported group members. The three versions differed in the payoff for cooperation, with the payoff for defection and the social fine, or externality, being held constant. Participants were, after a dozen trials of the game, given a choice between continuing to play the game as before, with no restrictions on choice behavior, or adopting one of two structural solutions to the game? the determination of choices by majority rule or by a superordinate authority. Orbell and Wilson's analysis suggests that different structural solutions should be preferred under the three different configurations of the NPD. The predictions derived from the analysis were not confirmed.

Comments

Includes bibliographical references (pages [63]-65)

Extent

v, 92 pages

Language

eng

Publisher

Northern Illinois University

Rights Statement

In Copyright

Rights Statement 2

NIU theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from Huskie Commons for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without the written permission of the authors.

Media Type

Text

Share

COinS