David J. Buller

Document Type



Millikan (1993) and Wilson (1994) argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretationso f the role of referencet o the environmenti n such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretationsI, develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one explanatory paradigm among many in psychology.

Publication Date


Original Citation

Buller, David J. 1997. "Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (or: In Defense of 'Narrow' Functions)." Philosophy of Science 64: 74-95.

Legacy Department

Department of Philosophy




Philosophy of Science

Rights Statement

In Copyright



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