Document Type

Article

Abstract

This study derives an expression for effort from utility-maximizing behavior on the part of workers, whose utility depends on consumption, effort, and the ratio between their wage and their perceived fair wage. Unlike many shirking models, this study treats effort as a continuous variable rather than as a dichotomous choice. Effort is shown to depend on wages at a worker's current firm, wages at other firms, the ratio between a worker's wage and perceived fair wage, unemployment benefits, the unemployment rate, and the firm's monitoring intensity.

DOI

10.1016/j.econmod.2005.09.006

Publication Date

3-1-2006

Original Citation

Campbell, Carl M. III. "A Model of the Determinants of Effort," Economic Modelling, Vol. 23, March 2006, pp. 215-237.

Department

Department of Economics

Legacy Department

Department of Economics

Language

eng

Publisher

Elsevier

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